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Summary
This research is a study of relationships between companies in the same corporate 
organisation or group. The relationships they form are termed intragroup.
A series of propositions are developed to help describe and account for the behaviour of 
companies involved in intragroup relationships. The propositions indicate the different 
factors which require investigation in order to understand the nature of these 
relationships.
The methodology used to evaluate the propositions has two features. Firstly, 
respondents’ perceptions and views are determined by their reactions to a number of 
scenarios. These scenarios are developed after an initial study of intragroup 
relationships. They each depict a situation that may occur in these relationships. The 
reactions to the scenarios are tape recorded and analysed by a form of content analysis. 
This approach has allowed the study of a wide range of factors which the propositions 
had indicated were important.
The empirical work mainly took place in one focal organisation. For comparative 
purposes, a limited number of interviews were conducted with managers in other 
corporate groups.
The main body of the research explores the following aspects of intragroup relationships:
• The way these relationships are influenced by the presence of a corporate centre.
• The influence of other companies, both inside and outside of the group.
• The factors that affect the formation of trust between group companies.
• The way the group environment influences the flow of information between 
companies.
• Sources of conflict in intragroup relationships and mechanisms for their resolution.
The research concludes by highlighting the unique characteristics of intragroup 
relationships that influence their formation and development in a group setting.
The findings have important implications for managers who seek to co-ordinate activities 
between various parts of a multi-divisional corporation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Areas and aims of the study
This study is an investigation of relationships between companies within the same 
corporate organisation or group. The relationships they form we shall term ‘intragroup’.
The aim of this study is to develop a comprehensive understanding of intragroup 
relationships. The degree to which membership of a corporate group influences 
relationships between internal companies, represents one of the prime areas of 
investigation. We are interested in identifying factors that are associated with the 
environment of the group itself, that are likely to endow intragroup relationships with 
special characterising features. Our objective is to produce an in-depth and 
comprehensive analysis, by bringing many of these factors together in the context of a 
single study.
Academics have recognised that the formation and development of business relationships 
is often based on many factors. In a particular situation, certain contingencies may be 
influential over others in deciding whether one company chooses to interact with another. 
(Oliver 1990). Understanding the impact of each contingency and its interaction with 
others, represents one method of characterising and explaining the behaviour of 
companies. A key to understanding the dynamics of ‘intragroup behaviour’ is to 
recognise whether these relationships are characterised by a profile of contingencies 
where certain factors are particularly dominant. This provides a useful reference by which 
to compare and contrast relationships between group companies, with other forms of 
business relationships, particularly those between unrelated entities. (Ones we might term 
‘intercompany relationships’).
The analysis presented in this thesis, draws on several concepts from the behavioural 
sciences, economics, business strategy as well as modem industrial marketing theory 
developed in the last fifteen years. It is considered that integration of these different
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concepts will provide a useful advance on our understanding of these relationships in 
terms of describing and predicting how companies might view each other, and how they 
behave.
Our primary area of analysis is focused on dyadic relationships that develop between 
internal group companies. We are particularly interested in relationships that involve 
some form of economic exchange of goods and services between group members. We 
also acknowledge that there may be important intragroup relationships inside a group that 
involve no financial exchange (for example the transfer of information and know-how 
between counterparts) which the parties may regard as significant. The presence of a 
group centre or head quarters, that potentially connects all operating companies inside a 
group, suggests that triadic linkages (between buyer, seller and centre) are also significant 
in understanding the nature of intragroup relationships. The focus on dyadic and triadic 
constructs is a major theme running throughout this study.
The main body of research into intragroup relationships takes place inside a specific 
corporate group called ‘Agrifood’. The findings of the research primarily relate to one 
specific case. We examine intragroup relationships operating inside of Agrifood to 
distinguish special characterising features, that may apply to intragroup relationships in 
other corporate groups. There are a number of reasons behind the selection of Agrifood 
as the organisation in which to conduct research into intragroup relationships.
• Agrifood is structured along the lines which is typical of many multi-divisional 
corporations being divided into principal operating divisions and individually 
accountable business units.
• Agrifood is characterised by a number of significant buyer/seller relationships 
between various parts of the group, typically representing over 10% of business unit 
sales or purchases.
• Access to managers was made available to the researcher, who had been a member of 
the organisation for over fifteen years, and had been involved in a number of internal 
relationships inside Agrifood.
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1.2 Intragroup relationships and the multi-divisional form
Intragroup relationships derive from the multi-divisional form of organisation which has 
grown to prominence during the twentieth century. It represents one of the century’s 
most important innovations in business organisation, replacing unitary or 
functionally-based organisations as the prevalent form of corporate structure. (Palmer et 
al 1987). It has facilitated the growth, expansion and globalisation of companies across 
all continents.
In multi-divisional corporations, the hierarchy is organised on an operating rather than 
functional basis. Each division controls the operations of a self contained part of the 
organisation. Tasks are organised into units, usually on the basis of products or 
geographic markets to which outputs are sold. The aim is to place in one division 
activities which interact strongly and put weakly interacting parts in different divisions. 
(McGuinness 1996). These divisions may further be organised into individual operating 
companies or business units.
The head of each division (or operating company or business unit) is responsible for its 
operating performance which is judged by indicators of overall success in its markets. 
These divisions or business units therefore represent discrete business entities which are 
related through a common parent company. The latter we will refer to in this text as ‘the 
corporate centre’. Its role is to choose organisational goals, monitor and audit the 
performance of the separate operating divisions and allocate organisational resources 
amongst those divisions.
A simplified example of the structure of a multi-divisional corporation is provided in Fig 
1.1. Intragroup relationships can occur between operating companies A and B within the 
same operating division, or between companies A and C in different divisions. They may 
also arise between business units within the same operating company. (E.g. between 






Intragroup relationships therefore represent relationships between divisions or operating 
companies or business units in the same corporate group. Their characterising features 
are that:
• Parties in the relationships are connected through common ownership.
• Each party is independent and accountable for its own performance.
Intragroup relationships become increasingly significant when they involve some form of 
economic exchange between the parties in the form of goods and services. In this case, 
one part of the group becomes a customer of, or a supplier to, another part. Because each 
party is independent, we would expect intragroup relationships to assume many of the 
features of dyadic interaction associated with ‘normal’ customer/supplier relationships 
between unrelated companies. We would however, also expect that interaction between 
the companies to be influenced by the fact that they belong to the same corporate group 
and are ultimately accountable to the same authority.
In defining relationships in this way, it is important to specify what we would not classify 
in the ‘intragroup’ category.
• In this study, the focus of attention is on relationships between organisations, rather 
than within each individual organisation. We are not therefore concerned with
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relationships between various functional areas inside individual operating companies.
• Secondly, we are not primarily concerned with superior/subordinate relationships 
inside a group, for example between a corporate headquarters and an individual 
operating unit. The only proviso we make to this is where a subsidiary company’s 
relationship with the centre affects its relationships with other subsidiaries. Analysis 
presented later in this study will show that a corporate centre can have a profound 
influence on the relationships of its operating companies.
• Thirdly, we would exclude from our analysis vertically integrated units that are 
managed and co-ordinated by a single authority within the group. Thus we would 
distinguish between an in house plant that supplied parts and components to a user 
that was inside the same division, to a manufacturing plant that supplied components 
to other divisions across the group. Our prime area of focus is on the latter.
Finally, we must emphasise the point that our prime area of concern is studying economic 
relationships between group actors that involve the exchange of goods and services and 
are regarded as significant and important by the individual companies involved. We must 
recognise that relationships may develop between different parts of a group that are not 
primarily economic in nature, where other aspects are valued by the parties, e.g. the 
transfer of information or social dialogue. Whilst we acknowledge that these 
relationships may also be regarded as important to the participants, and may ultimately 
have an economic purpose, we are primarily interested in situations where goods and 
services are exchanged between members of the same group; where one part of the group 
is a raw material or component supplier to another.
1.2.3 Importance of the study of intragroup relationships
The study of intragroup relationships is important for a number of reasons.
Firstly, intragroup relationships are themselves important. Reece & Cool (1978) reported 
as far back as 1976 that 98% of the largest 1,000 US manufacturing companies were 
organised in multi-profit centre form. Some 80% of these were estimated to use 
intra-profit centre transfers. In addition, Eccles & White (1988) identified that many
5
smaller firms are also organised in a multi-profit centre basis, although the percentage of 
small firms using intragroup transfers is probably smaller than in large corporations. This 
would suggest that relationships between different companies or divisions in the same 
group extensively occur in many industrial sectors.
Secondly, business relationships generally, are important. Johanson & Wootz (1984) 
have argued that industrial marketing is ‘very much a matter of establishment and 
development of customer relationships’. Early IMP studies were based on the 
fundamental notion that a critical task for the business marketeer and purchasing manager 
is the management and development of relationships with customers and suppliers. (Ford 
1997). To understand what goes on inside a company, one needs to understand its 
relationships for these effectively define its existence. Without external relationships a 
business has no meaning. A firm’s performance depends not only on its own efforts, but 
those of other organisations that provide it with inputs and seek access to its outputs. A 
company’s ultimate success is inextricably tied to near and distant relationships with 
other businesses. The way these relationships are managed, may significantly constrain a 
company’s future earnings potential. ‘The management of these relationships is a critical 
task on which a company’s very existence depends’. (Ford 1998).
The third factor is related to the second in that whilst the development and management 
of relationships fundamentally defines earnings potential at the company level, in the case 
of intragroup relationships, these may significantly influence the earnings potential of the 
group as a whole. Many corporations seek to derive some form of synergy from the 
collection of divisions and operating companies that comprise the group. Without this 
synergy, the fundamental rationale for the existence of the corporation may be flawed. 
One way of unlocking this synergy is through the interaction of various parts of the 
group. This interaction may involve the transfer of goods and services between different 
divisions. On the other hand it may represent the exchange of technical information and 
know-how. Intragroup relationships represent the vehicle for these exchanges to occur. 
They may enhance these exchange processes or impede their progress. They can provide 
the key for exploiting various synergies between different parts of the group. Or they can 
ensure that synergies remain buried in the organisation never to see the light of day.
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1.2.4 Overview of the chapters
The form of presentation of this thesis can be outlined as follows:
Chapter 2. Review of the literature
This chapter places the study in the context of work developed in the area of business 
relationships. We see that intragroup relationships have commanded little attention in 
academic literature. Our aim therefore is to identify key concepts from related works, that 
can be used to analyse and comprehend relationships in a group setting. We first of all 
identify and examine a number of critical contingencies that motivate companies to 
establish business relationships. We then go on to examine these relationships in the 
context of industrial networks. We highlight that one of the aims of this study is to fill a 
gap in the literature by giving prominence and highlighting the importance of 
relationships between companies in a group.
Chapter 3 Development of propositions about intragroup relationships
In Chapter 3, we develop a series of propositions that describe various characteristics of 
intragroup relationships. These propositions have been derived from: the literature review 
of Chapter 2, the author’s intuitive ideas about intragroup relationships and conversations 
with various practitioners involved in managing relationships in a group setting. The 
purpose of the propositions is to help describe and account for the behaviour of 
companies in their relationships with group partners.
Chapter 4 Methodology
This chapter describes the development of a methodology used to examine the features of 
intragroup relationships as described by the propositions. The first part of the chapter 
identifies certain factors that have influenced the selection of the methodology used to 
study intragroup relationships. These factors include the scope of the research, the 
sensitivity of the relationships and the position of the researcher. The methodology that is 
developed in the second part has two main features. The perceptions of managers about 
their relationships are obtained by recording their responses to a number of hypothetical
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situations called ‘scenarios’. These scenarios are constructed to be relevant and 
true-to-life as possible. The method has been chosen to give a fuller and more realistic 
insight into the views of respondents, than provided by other research instruments such as 
questionnaires. Secondly, tape recorded interviews are analysed by a form of content 
analysis. This enables the identification, ordering and quantification of a wide variety of 
factors that influence the development of relationships in a group.
Chapters 5 - 1 0  Results
The presentation of the empirical results closely follows the development of the 
propositions.
In Chapter 5 we examine the influence of corporate centres on the trading relationships of 
their subsidiary companies. We identify the reasons why corporate management should 
directly intervene in relationships between group companies, and highlight the 
mechanisms that are employed to co-ordinate their activities.
In Chapter 6, we examine the effectiveness of corporate mandates expressed in the form 
of rules that govern interaction between group companies. We recognise that individual 
operating units may perceive that these mandates are not in their interests, and may act to 
diminish or neutralise their impact.
In Chapter 7, we investigate the impact of third parties, both internal and external to the 
group, on relationships between subsidiary companies. We recognise that interaction 
between operating companies is conditioned by indirect links with other group 
companies, as well as direct and indirect links with alternative customers and suppliers 
outside of the group.
In Chapter 8, we explore the flow of information in intragroup relationships. We identify 
factors in the group environment that are responsible for enhancing or reducing the level 
of information exchange between group operating companies.
In Chapter 9 we identify factors that influence the level of trust between parties in an 
intragroup relationship. We highlight the potential for corporate mandates to be
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opportunistically exploited against an internal trading partner. We also examine the 
potential for rivalry to develop between business unit managers.
In Chapter 10, we explore how conflict arises and is managed and resolved within a 
group setting.
Chapter 11 Conclusions
This chapter analyses the findings of the empirical research and points to significant 
conclusions. It describes the implications of these findings for the strategic management 
of relationships between group companies.
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we highlighted that the reasons companies form relationships are 
likely to be complex and multifactorial. Over the last fifteen years, marketing academics 
have become increasingly interested in identifying and understanding these factors, both 
singularly and in combination. Their views are expressed in a rapidly expanding body of 
literature, categorised under the general heading of ‘relationship management’.
This chapter presents a review of the literature relating to intragroup relationships. The 
task of the review is to develop a basis for studying relationships between companies or 
business units within a corporate group. Whilst a comprehensive study of relationships 
between group companies has not been identified in the literature, many writers have 
made reference to the group environment when discussing aspects of business 
relationship formation and development. This chapter draws on research from a number 
of fields including marketing, economics, organisational behaviour and corporate 
strategy. Its aim is to identify key concepts that can be used to analyse and comprehend 
the behaviour of companies within a group setting.
The review of the literature is presented in two parts.
• In part 1, we examine the critical contingencies that motivate companies to establish 
relationships. Oliver (1990) identifies six of these contingencies: necessity, 
reciprocity, asymmetry, stability, efficiency and legitimacy. Oliver’s work brings 
together a number of themes from across the business relationship literature to 
provide a unified and comprehensive analysis of the factors that motivate companies 
to form business relationships.
• In part 2, we examine relationships in the context of industrial networks.
A bibliography of all the references used in this thesis is presented in Appendix 1.
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2.1 Contingencies o f relationship formation
2.1.1 Necessity
Relationships that form out of necessity are sometimes termed mandated. Mandates, in 
the form of formal rules, may provide the impetus for a relationship that may not have 
occurred voluntarily. Hall et al (1977) recognise that relationships can take different 
forms depending on whether they are mandated based on formal agreement or are 
voluntary. They note that few inter-organisational relationships exclusively fall into a 
single approach. In a mandated situation for example, voluntary interaction may still take 
place. At any particular time organisations can be interacting with each other on a 
multiple basis.
Organisations can have different types of relationships with different partners. Whetten 
(1981) distinguishes between relationship structures of mutual adjustment (voluntary), 
alliance structures (intermediate) and corporate structures of co-ordination (mandated). 
The last description bears the hallmarks of an intragroup relationship where a corporate 
centre mandates interaction between various subsidiary units. Warren (1967) 
distinguishes between relationships where interaction is mandated by a higher authority 
and organisations that have the relative freedom to choose their own partners and patterns 
of interaction. Raelin (1982) recognises the importance of understanding how inter- 
organisational linkages affect the performance of a network in carrying out a policy 
mandate.
Eccles & White (1988) identify two forms of mandate in inter-profit centre transactions: a 
price mandate (expressed in the form of transfer prices) and an authority mandate. Price 
and authority have traditionally been regarded as alternative mechanisms for allocating 
resources. In markets, economists generally believe that resources are allocated through 
prices, whilst in hierarchies they are allocated through authority. Studies have shown 
however, that markets may contain authority properties found in companies and firms 
may contain pricing mechanisms found in markets. Eccles & White (1988) contrast the 
characteristics of multi-divisional firms in capitalist economies and note that they bear 
many similarities to socialist (centrally planned) economies in terms of their resource
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allocating mechanisms. Price and authority may therefore form the basis of mandates 
within intragroup relationships.
A number of writers have highlighted the influence of mandates on co-operation and 
conflict between parties in a relationship. Aldrich (1976) concludes that mandating a 
relationship increases the frequency of interaction between respective organisations; but 
he also found that interaction tended to be unbalanced in favour of one of the 
organisations and this was associated with lower perceived co-operation. Raelin (1982) 
notes that the effect which conflict has on inter-organisational networks of the mandated 
type is predicted to be normally negative except in those instances in which conflict 
serves as a catalyst for future constructive contact. However he concludes that the wider 
the conflict there is among actors in a mandated network, then generally that conflict is 
more frequent, more intense, more harmful and less resolvable. Islam, Rajagopal & 
Eadie (1993) note that centralised decision making leads to conflict rather than 
co-operation between members and can create tensions and pressures on subordinates.
Hall et al (1977) conclude that where the basis of agreements is a strong legal mandate, 
power issues are apparently resolved to the extent that they do not become part of the 
pattern. This is not to say that there are no power differences; these are apparently 
accepted by the parties and are no longer an issue. Also, with formal agreements, many 
of the issues involved in exchange are apparently resolved since the issues of competence 
of personnel performance and capability of operating philosophy no longer appear to be 
relevant. Their research concludes that contrary to Aldrich's findings, organisations can 
work together within the framework of legal mandates and achieve co-operation.
The necessity contingency prompts us to recognise that relationships may be 
mandated between companies in a group by a higher authority (a corporate centre). 
However it brings into question the effectiveness of mandates in achieving 




The contingency of reciprocity emphasises co-operation, collaboration and co-ordination 
among organisations. Relationships develop for the purpose of pursuing mutually 
common goals or interests. The major assumption underlying the reciprocity model 
according to Oliver (1990), is that resource scarcity induces co-operation rather than 
competition. The process of interaction is characterised by a balance of harmony, equity 
and mutual support. Partners to an exchange recognise that the benefits of interaction 
exceed potential disadvantages particularly in terms of the loss of decision making 
freedom and the cost of managing the linkage.
Co-operation therefore occurs when two or more parties have objectives that are mutually 
dependent. Bonoma (1976) argues that there are different levels of co-operation. 
Instrumental co-operation arises when parties hold different super-ordinate goals but can 
best meet them by co-operating in meeting some lower related goal. In contrast, 
collaborators may have common goals. A third form of co-operation is that in which the 
relationship becomes an end in itself.
Easton & Araujo (1992) recognise that an economic exchange relationship requires 
visible transactions among and between the parties and demands a minimum level of 
co-operation in order to take place. Easton & Henriques (1992) contend that the ultimate 
level of co-operation occurs when all parties are involved in joint activities in such a way 
that the rewards are substantial and are regarded as being equitably divided. Brito & 
Araujo (1993) note that companies can have common as well as conflicting interests and 
their relationships may be classified along a continuum from conflict to co-operation. 
Ford, Hakansson & Johanson (1986) recognise that all intercompany relationships have 
elements of both mutual and conflicting interests. Their relative importance depends on 
how the companies view each other. It is usually argued that a buyer seller relationship 
has its major mode as co-operation with conflict as a minor component (Easton & 
Araujo). Han Wilson & Dant (1993) in their review of purchasing trends in the US 
recognise that the benefits of closer co-operation between buyers and seller are manifest 
in shortening product development lead times, lower manufacturing and operating costs 
and improved management of quality and productivity.
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In the context of intragroup relationships, firms expect synergies to accrue when two or 
more SBUs (strategic business units) co-operate and share resources (Harrigan 1985). 
Vizjak (1994) recognises that synergy potential is the benefits that can be realised by 
exploiting inter-relationships between business units within a group. Synergies can 
accrue by exploiting opportunities to capture a wider added value margin, or through the 
need to protect quality, proprietary knowledge or manufacturing integrity. Henke et al 
(1989) claim that an in house supplier is sometimes considered by a buyer to be an 
integral part of the buyer's company. The advantage can include the sharing of 
information the buyer obtains from outside suppliers. This information can help the in 
house supplier to neutralise any advantage an outside supplier might have. Harrigan 
notes that since most industries become the settings for volatile competition at some point 
in their evolution, the long term benefits of collaboration between business units are often 
those of intelligence gathering or quality control. (Harrigan 1985). In fact there may be 
strategic reasons for firms to encourage their business units to buy and sell in house even 
if such intra-firm transfers do not appear to make economic sense.
Whilst co-operation may be seen as beneficial for the group, it may not be easy to 
develop between individual operating companies. Corporate management may need to 
enforce policies that encourage operating actors to communicate, share inputs, outputs or 
other exploitable joint capabilities. Vizjak recognises that many companies have 
preferred to trade off their synergy potential in order to give business units greater 
dependence where autonomous business unit heads are compensated according to unit 
results. He notices that there are important obstacles to the implementation of synergy.
Bottom up strategic planning devotes little attention to co-ordinating business unit 
strategies as autonomous operating actors undervalue benefits that accrue not to them but 
to the firm as a whole. They invariably pursue strategies that make intragroup 
relationships more difficult to co-ordinate. The problem is exacerbated by vertical 
organisational structures where information, decisions and resources flow only vertically. 
Well defined boundaries can lead to strong identities in different business units 
encouraging the development of different cultures within the same corporation. 
Differences in management styles and operating procedures can represent major barriers 
to synergy realisation.
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Vizjak recognises that a further barrier to intragroup co-operation is the uncooperative 
nature of business unit managers who are afraid to lose decision autonomy and fear being 
blamed for poor performance when they do not have full control over shared activities. 
This is acerbated when there are differences in size and strategy between business units 
and where the added value of the relationship accrues more to one party than to another. 
'Horizontal strategies cannot succeed unless they are accepted by business unit managers' 
(Vizjak).
Indeed far from promoting co-operation, intragroup relationships can be arenas for 
competitive behaviour. Easton & Arujo (1992) recognise that competition occurs when 
two actors have objectives which are in conflict, but the locus of their objective is under 
the control of a third party (the centre). They note that one of the most interesting forms 
is the 'quasi competition' that can occur between divisions of the same firm. They 
indicate that anecdotal evidence suggests that co-operation between intragroup units may 
be difficult to achieve. Competition for internal resources can replace competition for 
external resources as the spoils of co-operation come to be divided. Therefore holding 
companies frequently prefer the cleaner option of arm's length competition.
The reciprocity contingency indicates that group companies may co-operate 
together because they perceive it in their best interests to do so. Synergies may 
result from co-operation between internal business units that benefit the group as a 
whole. However the parochial outlook of business unit managers and the potential 
for competition to develop between them may represent limiting factors in achieving 
co-operation in intragroup relationships.
2.1.3 Asymmetry
The contingency of asymmetry refers to relationships prompted by the potential to 
exercise power or control over another organisation or its resources (Oliver 1990). Thus 
companies can be viewed as political entities where power is an outcome of social 
exchange. A central assumption behind this is that resource dependence between actors 
is an important basis of power. Resource scarcity motivates organisations to attempt to 
exert power, influence or control over other organisations that are perceived to possess 
the required scarce resources. Power and dependence are thus twin concepts.
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(Cunningham 1993). They are part of the atmosphere that affect, and is affected by, 
interaction of business actors.
An important determinant of the atmosphere notes Cunningham, is the power each actor 
perceives the other to hold. 'It is the perception of one's own power and that of one's 
opponent which dominates play'. The amount of power each member has (or is perceived 
as having) influences how relationships develop (Hanmer-Lloyd 1993). Power is one of 
the driving forces that determines the development of relationships. It is vested in all 
parties to a relationship to a greater or lesser extent, usually in differential amounts. A 
relationship where both parties are highly dependent on each other is termed 'highly 
cohesive'.
The development of business relationships almost always develops concerns of the loss 
of autonomy and control. The desire for control on the one hand and the reluctance to 
relinquish control on the other reflect contradictory (asymmetrical) motives in the 
decision of one organisation to react with another. This gives rise to various degrees of 
independence, dependence and interdependence between organisations which influence 
the scope for one party to exert power over another.
Power is a function of a number of variables both within, and outside of the organisation. 
At one level, power derives from a network position. A key determinant in this case is 
the structure of the market in which companies operate. Variables such as industry 
concentration are important determinants. Markets may be classified as supplier 
dominated or customer dominated. In many cases there may be no dominant party.
Porter (1980) recognises that power of customers is mainly a function of: output 
purchased, availability of alternative supply sources and search and transaction costs 
involved in identifying and changing suppliers. Hallen, Johanson & Seyed-Mohamed 
(1991) conclude that customer importance is the most reliable indicator of supplier 
dependence and product complexity is the most reliable indicator of customer 
dependence.
Many writers have described power in terms of various power bases possessed or 
available to organisational members. These bases are defined by Cunningham (1993) as 
the resources that a party can exploit to effect the behaviour of others. Any circumstance
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or condition which makes one party dependent on another forms a basis of power.
French & Raven (1959) identified a typology of five alternative bases of power between a 
source actor (S) and a receiver (R).
Reward power is based on R's perception that S has the ability to mediate rewards in R's 
favour. Coercive power however, is based on R's perception that S has the ability to 
mediate punishment for R. Legitimate power is based on R's perception that S has a 
legitimate right to exercise control over, and prescribe R's behaviour. Expert power is 
based on R's perception that S has some special knowledge or expertise that is of use to 
R. And finally, referent power is based on R's need to be associated with S.
When considering the contingency of asymmetry related to relationships between group 
companies, we must also take into account the power bases of the corporate centre, as 
well as group buyers and sellers, in mediating the behaviour of individual operating 
companies. The higher a unit's hierarchical position and thereby its authority, the greater 
its base for power (Anderson & Pahlberg 1992). Hickson et al (1971) recognise that a 
higher position in a hierarchy gives a unit better possibilities to survey the environment 
and also a greater ability to assess uncertainty.
The formal aspects of power can be countervailed by influence from subsidiaries. 
(Anderson & Pahlberg 1992). The possibilities to influence is a question of having a 
central position with access to resources needed by other parties. Henke, Krachenberg & 
Lyons (1989) note that it is important to understand how an in house supplier in an 
intragroup relationship will react to the possibilities of being replaced. This reaction is 
dependent in a large measure on their base which in turn impacts their capability to 
counteract potential replacement. They recognise there are instances where the in house 
supplier management approaches the corporate staff to convince them that it would be 
imprudent for the buying group to go outside of the supplier because of the overall 
implications of lost business to the group. This, they say, can raise a formidable hurdle to 
an external supplier. Cunningham (1993) notes that coalition formation is often done 
when companies belong to the same group. When work units are interdependent, 
influencing decision makers becomes more important and political activity is more likely 
(Welsh & Slusher 1986).
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The contingency of asymmetry introduces the notion of power and dependence in 
intragroup relationships. It suggests that a corporate centre may be able to exert 
control over subsidiary companies from the possession of various bases of power 
including the power of legitimacy and the power to mediate rewards and 
punishments. However operating companies may also seek to exert influence over 
the centre and over each other where they have access to resources needed by other 
parties.
2.1.4 Stability
The contingency of stability is characterised as an adaptive response to environmental 
uncertainty in terms of resource scarcity and imperfect knowledge about the general 
environment including alternative exchange partners. These variables prompt 
organisations to value stability, predictability and dependability in their relationships with 
other actors. Easton (1992) recognises that the reduction in uncertainty and an increase in 
stability may be very valuable objectives for many organisations. Long term 
relationships provide continuity and stability that increases each partner's ability to 
reduce costs and increase effectiveness. Early IMP studies recognised the existence of 
stable long term buyer seller relationships as basic elements of industrial networks. In a 
study by Henke et al (1989) of companies competing against in house suppliers, one 
multinational organisation reported that although it had a policy of using external 
suppliers when they proved more efficient or beneficial than an in house supplier, 
replacement of an in house supplier had not occurred over the previous 15/20 years. 
Easton (1992) contends that the stronger a relationship, the more closely will that 
relationship affect the behaviour of the partners towards each other, although the 
existence of weak relationships is not insignificant.
A major element of stability is inherent in the bonds which develop between partners as 
they adapt to each other over time. In network terms, strong bonds provide more stable 
and predictable structures which are more likely to withstand change and disruption.
Firms may be bound by contracts or ownership. Such bonds are highly visible but may 
be less binding than they outwardly appear indicating that other types of bonding may 
more substantial. (Easton 1992).
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A major component of the process of bonding is the development of trust between buyers 
and sellers. In social exchange theory, actors mutually and sequentially demonstrate their 
trustworthiness. Adaptations in business relationships are elements in a trust forming 
exchange process (Hallen, Johanson & Seyed-Mohamed 1991). Trust can be regarded as 
an accumulating business asset contingent on past experience and history of the 
relationship. Kmann (1993) sees trust and loyalty to be closely linked. Trust is seen to 
be present in a relationship where: one actor does not check the arguments of his 
counterpart, where the parties are not expected to be disloyal and where there exists an 
open and confidential information exchange. Trust is an implied willingness to rely on 
an exchange counterpart in whom one has confidence (Moorman et al 1992). One of the 
functions of trust is to minimise the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour of each of the 
actors which reduces the cost of monitoring the activities of counterparts, generating 
economic savings and improvement in efficiency. The development of trust thus implies 
a diminishing need for formal contracts and control.
Relationships characterised by mistrust are problematic as actors must devise 
mechanisms to guard against opportunistic behaviour and therefore such relationships are 
more likely to be conflict ridden and expensive to manage. Mistrust is more likely to 
exist in coercive relationships (Hadjikhani & Sharma 1993). Trust may break down for a 
number of reasons including counterparts engaging in opportunistic behaviour, one of the 
parties not fulfilling promises made in the past, or for reasons beyond the control of both 
parties.
Promises need not be written and can be tacit and overt. Indeed written contracts hinder 
the growth of trust (Young & Wilkinson 1991) suggesting that trust may be more 
difficult to achieve in highly mandated intragroup relationship. Eccles & White (1988) 
recognise the potential for opportunistic gaming behaviour between profit centre 
managers in bringing disputes and disagreements to the notice of the centre, although 
such action has potential risk for both parties as stakes become raised overtime.
The contingency of stability indicates that the formation of bonds between group 
companies may significantly influence the longevity and stability of relationships 
between companies in a group. It also highlights the importance of the formation of
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trust and the potential destructive aspects of opportunistic behaviour on the 
interaction of business units.
2.1.5 Efficiency
The view that efficiency may motivate the formation of trading relationships has 
traditionally been fashionable amongst transaction economists. (Williamson 1975,1985). 
This notion is based on the assumption that inter-unit relationships in which supplier 
assets are specialised have lower transaction costs inside an organisation than when 
relationships occur between organisations.
Transaction costs are those costs associated with economic exchange that vary 
independent of the market price of the goods or services exchanged. (Robins 1987).
They include search and information costs as well as costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contractual performance. Williamson identifies the uncertainty in determining 
appropriate (market) prices, difficulty in monitoring and enforcing performance and the 
necessity of specialised, transaction specific investments as major sources of transaction 
costs. He argues that these costs may be reduced by the organisation of exchange 
through a variety of non-market mechanisms including intra-unit transfers.
Many corporations face a variety of decisions whether their business units and subsidiary 
companies, should provide goods and services in house or purchase them from outsiders 
(Harrigan 1985). Organisations considering vertical integration must make decisions 
regarding the autonomy of these business units. The basic premise of vertical integration 
is that savings in the cost of transactions supersedes the autonomy needs of the business 
units. Vertical integration, according to Harrigan, will not allay transaction costs so long 
as business units and subsidiary companies negotiate with each other or with outsiders for 
some portion of their required resources. Only when a corporate decision has been made 
to force business units to deal with each other will the transaction costs Williamson 
describes be avoided. Indeed Harrigan concludes that if firms do not have internal 
mechanisms that balance the needs for SBU autonomy and corporate strategy 
requirements, they may exacerbate their problems with vertical integration. Although 
firms may integrate to escape associated transaction costs, there are costs to managing
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transfers across internal boundaries as well. If firms are unwilling or unable to bear these 
management costs , they may as well go to outside markets.
Many regard this as a fundamental weakness of the transaction cost argument. 
Transaction cost theory underestimates the cost of managing inter-unit relationships 
within an organisation. (Walker & Poppo 1991). The theory understates the bureaucratic 
and inter-unit bargaining costs that vertical integration entails. Evans & Grossman 
(1983) argue that a market-like incentive system is both more costly and less effective 
than the market itself. Eccles & White (1988) report that in a field study, most managers 
interviewed expressed the view that internal transactions were more difficult and costly 
than external ones. Eccles & White highlighted an irony that internal transactions often 
have a small discount (typically 5%-10%) applied to the 'market price' on the basis of the 
assumption that internal selling transactions are less costly owing to the lack of marketing 
and selling expenses, bad debts etc.
Eccles & White advocate higher transaction costs derive from problems of determining 
the price or value of the exchange. Vizjak (1994) claims that diseconomies may appear 
as a result of additional co-ordination and compromise between business units. The 
co-ordination process generates additional costs in areas such as scheduling, setting 
priorities or resolving problems.
Williamson (1975, 1985) also claims that internal organisation is not subject to the same 
kinds of difficulties characteristic of the market mechanism when disputes arise between 
the parties. Within internal organisations, when disputes arise, they are more easily 
resolved. When individuals pursue their own interests that are a disadvantage to the 
system as a whole, compensation can be varied by a central authority to reflect non 
co-operation; whilst requests to adopt a co-operative mode are more likely to be heeded. 
Again, many challenge this notion of organisational life. Morgan (1986) recognises the 
thrust of classical management theory is to suggest that organisations can or should be 
rationale systems that operate in an efficient manner as possible. He criticises classical 
theorists for giving relatively little attention to human aspects of organisation. Johanson 
& Mattsson (1987) highlight that among the assumptions in the transaction cost model is 
the postulate that mankind is basically 'opportunistic with guile and deceit'. Palmer et al 
(1987) highlight the parochialism of functional managers who have a natural tendency to
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behave opportunistically or to pursue self interest at the expense of the wider 
organisation.
The efficiency contingency suggests that the avoidance of transaction costs may be 
one reason for the formation of relationships between companies in a group. It also 
reinforces the notion of a corporate authority co-ordinating relationships between 
subsidiary units. However subsequent analysis has highlighted the importance of 
identifying potential barriers and blockages that arise from these relationships, 
which may inhibit the achievement of optimum efficiency identified by transaction 
economists. Evidence indicates that behaviour of business unit managers may be to 
pursue objectives that whilst maximising sub-unit efficiency, are not necessarily 
conducive with maximising the overall efficiency of the group as a whole. Finally, 
the efficiency contingency suggests that when conflicts arise, they inay be more easy 
to resolve inside a group because of the position and authority of a corporate centre 
to impose its requirements over individual operating companies.
2.1.6 Legitimacy
The contingency of legitimacy is a function of organisational need to justify activities and 
output. These pressures, note Oliver (1990), motivate organisations to increase their 
legitimacy in order to appear in agreement with prevailing norms, rules, beliefs or 
expectations of external constituents. Therefore the establishment of relationships is 
motivated by the need to improve reputation, image and prestige.
Oliver notes that few studies relating to legitimacy as a contingency of relationship 
formation have been undertaken. In the context of relationships between companies in a 
group, the legitimacy contingency suggests that business units may seek to interact with 
each other because they perceive it is the right thing to do, or that certain benefits may 
accrue from being associated with other group companies (or the corporate centre itself). 




The previous sections have highlighted six potential contingencies that may influence the 
formation of relationships between companies in a group. Oliver (1990) suggests that 
these contingencies may interact and occur concurrently. The rationale for the formation 
and development of relationships, is often based on a multiple of contingencies. In a 
particular situation, some contingencies may be influential over others in deciding 
whether one company chooses, or is directed, to interact with another. However these 
contingencies are likely to be interactive over time. For example, a mandate imposed by 
a corporate centre in an intragroup relationship may reduce uncertainty by prescribing the 
fundamental rules of interaction. This may lead to an enhancement of mutuality and 
co-operation between the two operating companies. It could potentially improve the 
efficiency of the companies by reducing duplication of effort. But organisations that are 
constrained by mandated relations may posses less influence and reduced feelings of 
power (Oliver 1990) which potentially engenders conflict and asymmetry.
An organisation's commitment towards a particular relationship may change overtime as 
the influence and domination of certain contingencies changes. Thus an intragroup 
relationship initially based on mandated criteria of reciprocity and co-operation may shift 
towards asymmetry and conflict as parties seek to increase their power and control.
Oliver recognises that a key question for future research is when, and under what 
conditions, each critical contingency is more likely to lead to the development of various 
types of relationship. A key to understanding the dynamics of intragroup behaviour is to 
recognise whether these relationships are characterised by a profile of contingencies 
where one or two are particularly dominant. This provides a useful reference by which to 
compare and contrast intragroup interaction with other forms of relationship, particularly 
inter-company relationships between autonomous actors. Understanding the impact of 
each contingency and its interaction with others represents one method of characterising 
intragroup behaviour.
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2.2 Relationships and networks
We now adopt a more macro perspective and look at relationships in the context of 
industrial networks. One approach is to regard these networks as aggregates of 
relationships between sets of connected firms or alternatively, sets of commercial 
relationships between firms (Hakansson & Johanson 1992). However Easton (1992), 
notes that the process of aggregation is unlikely to be simple or additive. ‘Adding 
together’ relationships provides the potential for structures to emerge which overlay the 
simple and apparent linkages. Easton recognises that relationships are important in 
determining network properties and a knowledge of their behaviour has important 
implications for understanding networks.
2.2.1 Features of industrial networks
Firms are organisations that require an inflow of resources from the outside (Hadjikhani 
& Sharma 1993) which they transform and transfer ( Hakansson & Johanson 1992) to 
become inflows of other firms. In undertaking this process, firms attempt to ensure that 
some form of economic surplus (profit) and future survival is derived from these 'activity 
cycles'. To secure these resources, firms engage in resource exchange and in doing so, 
interact with other organisations who possess and control the desired inputs. Firms 
therefore engage in networks in which each organisation contributes resources and in turn 
receives resources (Hadjikhani & Sharma 1993).
Networks are developed and shaped overtime through multifarious sets of transactions 
between organisations (termed 'actors'). Network identity of an individual actor is 
developed through the transactions with other units (Forsgren & Johanson 1992).
Through their activities in a network, actors develop relationships to secure access to 
important resources and sale of their products and services. Networks therefore consist of 
three basic elements: actors, resources and activities (Hakansson & Johanson 1992).
The result of network behaviour notes Kaman (1993) is synergistic surplus, where each 
actor attempts to maximise its share of that surplus. Actors are goal oriented and their 
general objective is to increase their level of control over a network. Struggles for 
control are one way of rationalising the dynamics of change in networks. The dilemma
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facing all actors is that they cannot fulfil their objectives without the assistance of other 
actors. A paradox arises where actors either remain independent to pursue their own 
means, or increasingly react with other actors and become more dependent on their 
actions and desires. Therefore each actor must balance dependency and freedom.
The nature of one relationship between two actors will influence all other actors in the 
network to a greater or lesser extent. A company is therefore a node in a widening 
pattern of interaction (Ford, Hakansson & Johanson 1986). This web of interaction is 
complex because in reality, it is difficult to define the boundaries of where networks 
begin and end. Johanson & Mattsson (1987) recognise that each firm in a network has 
relationships with customers, distributors, suppliers and sometimes direct relationships 
with competitors. Actors can also have indirect relationships with suppliers' suppliers 
and customers' customers
Companies interact with each other through a process of exchange. In industrial 
networks, actors are regarded as embedded in a system of social and economic exchange 
(Brito & Arujo 1993). Companies exchange goods and services, payments and loans as 
well as information, expertise and technical know-how. Social exchange relations evolve 
in a slow process (Johanson & Mattsson 1985). They relate to the creation of confidence 
and trust. The process of exchange and interaction creates adaptations in attitudes and 
knowledge of both parties. Either a mutual orientation develops, or the parties conclude 
that they are best served by developing relationships with alternative partners. In doing 
this, actors use their knowledge of networks as well as their relationships with other 
actors in order to increase their control.
An inter firm relationship is thus a mutual orientation of two firms towards each other 
(Johanson & Mattsson 1987). Whilst changing and developing, these relationships are 
often stable. Firms to a large extent buy from and sell to the same firms and compete 
with the same competitors. Transactions between firms take place within established 
relationships. Industrial networks are thus characterised by exchange which leads to the 
development of relationships. When these relationships are value creating for the 
individual parties, stability ensues. It is within this context that intercompany and 
intragroup relationships are developed and enacted.
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2.2.2 Networks and small nets
Easton & Henriques (1992) recognise that it is useful in industrial network research to 
study ‘small nets’ as an alternative to macro level studies of the network as a whole.
Such analysis allows the study of general ways of handling network phenomena which is 
independent of scale. It can also provide data concerning the ways that network 
boundaries affect the ability to model and understand networks. Looking at the network 
as a whole may mean missing out on the subtle processes of change that may occur 
within and between actors. Certain types of phenomenon, for example competition 
between actors, can only be defined in terms of specific roles. To understand how 
organisations compete in networks it is important to select actors who are involved in 
similar competitive positions.
Easton & Henriques (1992) focus on two suppliers and one focal customer as their basic 
unit of analysis. In some cases, they note, it is more appropriate to study triadic rather 
than dyadic structures. Triads compared with dyads take into account and reflect network 
effects and therefore represent possibly the smallest unit of network analysis. There are 
numerous examples of triadic relationships occurring between tripartite organisations 
each in adjacent network positions. Examples include relationships between component 
supplier, manufacturer and retailer, or between manufacturer, wholesaler and distributor.
An intragroup relationship may be regarded as being built around a basic triadic structure 
of two operating companies and a corporate centre. The most common form of this unit 
occurs where the subsidiary companies operate in adjacent network positions, giving the 
potential to form customer supplier relationships. An illustration of this structure, and 
other triadic linkages that potentially occur within a group, are provided in Fig 2.1. The 
focus of this study is on the first of these (buyer, seller and centre). The reason for this is 
that these relationship structures are the ones most likely to involve significant economic 
exchange between group buyers and sellers. Fig 2.1 illustrates the important point that all 









Whilst the triad forms the basic unit of analysis, 'near' actors will also be influential in 
shaping intragroup interaction. Of particular importance are alternative suppliers to the 
buying company which are competitors to the selling actor and also alternative customers 
of the selling company which are competitors to the buying actor. Other subsidiary 
companies within the group may also have an influencing effect on the triad, either 
directly or indirectly.
Network analysis indicates that intragroup relationships are unlikely to be enacted 
in isolation but in a complex web of interaction where group actors are connected 
both directly and indirectly to other actors that define a network. Relationships 
between two actors inside a group are likely to be influenced by other internal 
relationships inside the organisations as well as relationships between actors outside 
its boundaries. Network analysis also suggests that the study of small nets may 
represent a useful analysis tool when investigating relationships where actors are 
connected through common ownership.
2.3 The context
The aim of this chapter has been to place this study in the context of current and previous 
works relating to intragroup relationships.
We have seen that whilst academics have recognised the existence of these relationships 
in the general body of marketing literature, there have been relatively few studies that 
have taken intragroup relationships as their central theme. One of the aims of this thesis
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therefore, is to fill a gap in the literature on business relationships by giving prominence, 
and highlighting the importance of interaction between companies in a group.
In describing relationships generally, past studies have provided a number of useful 
concepts and analytical tools by which to explore and characterise relationships that form 
in a group setting. We have seen that the contingencies of necessity, reciprocity, 
asymmetry, stability, efficiency and legitimacy are likely to be as applicable in 
characterising the formation and development of intragroup relationships as they are in 
describing intercompany interaction between unrelated parties. We have also postulated 
that intragroup interaction may be described in terms of a specific profile of these 
contingencies, that some how make them unique.
We have highlighted that studies of industrial networks are also useful in describing the 
nature of intragroup interaction. These prompt us to view intragroup relationships within 
a complex web of action and interaction where group actors are both directly and 
indirectly connected to other actors, internal and external to the group. Networks 
simultaneously constrain and define the potential for actors to achieve their goals and 
objectives. They also prompt us to question the true nature of organisational boundaries, 
that have traditionally defined the existence of a group.
We now go on to utilise and apply these concepts and ideas to develop a series of 
proposition that explain how actors develop and manage relationships in a group setting.
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Chapter 3 
Development of propositions about intragroup 
relationships
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to develop a series of propositions about intragroup 
relationships. The purpose of these propositions is to help describe and account for the 
behaviour of actors involved in relationships within a group. These propositions are 
tested using a methodology developed in the next chapter.
The chapter draws on a number of the concepts identified in the literature review 
presented in Chapter 2. These are expanded and developed to apply to the group 
situation. Development of the propositions has also been supported by conversations with 
managers involved in intragroup relationships. Over twenty semi structured interviews 
were undertaken prior to the main body of the field research to initially assess the 
applicability of these concepts to relationships between group actors.
The propositions concern the following aspects of intragroup relationships:
• The influence of the centre.
• The effectiveness of mandates.
• The influence of other actors inside and outside of the group.
• Information exchange between actors.
• Opportunistic behaviour of actors.
• Rivalry between actors.
• Conflict and conflict resolution.
The above points capture the main themes identified in initial research interviews, 
indicating what respondents perceived were important factors influencing the formation 
and development of relationships inside a group.
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3.1 Influence o f the centre
In the previous chapter we introduced a number of concepts that were used to describe 
relationships in the context of industrial networks. We identified that triads compared to 
dyads potentially represent the smallest unit of network analysis and can be regarded as 
useful basic units in network research. We saw that applying this concept to the group 
situation suggests that an intragroup relationship can be regarded as consisting of a basic 
triadic structure of two operating units and a corporate centre. A common form of this 
analysis unit occurs where the subsidiary companies operate in adjacent network 
positions forming customer-supplier relationships inside a group.
Outside the context of the group situation, interaction between the subsidiary actors is 
likely to be subject to what might be termed normal network influences. Network theory 
suggests that these actors will develop relationships with parties that best satisfy their 
network objectives. Both parties will continue to interact with each other if they perceive 
benefits of exchange as value creating (by whatever means they measure it). Whilst 
actors are goal oriented, they recognise that they do not necessarily achieve these goals 
by interacting with each other.
This situation is modified in the context of intragroup relationships. The key to 
developing an understanding of intragroup behaviour is to recognise how the situation is 
influenced by the presence of a central actor. This in turn relates to the resources 
controlled by the centre and the activities it undertakes. Easton & Henriques (1992) note 
that when the unit of analysis shifts to the triad, both the mediating impact of the focal 
actor (in this case a corporate centre), and the totality of the relationship among all three 
participants become important areas for analysis.
Whilst operating actors are likely to be concerned with individual network positions, a 
corporate centre will be more sensitive to the performance and position of the group as a 
whole. It may regard relationships between companies inside the group as a way of 
avoiding transaction costs and increasing organisational efficiency. Similarly, it may 
value the co-operation between group actors to achieve synergies that capture a wider 
added value margin. Under these circumstances it may exert its authority to mandate 
relationships between group actors that may not have occurred voluntarily. This in turn
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restricts their choice of partners and is likely to influence their patterns of interaction. 
Corporate mandates may therefore represent important factors in determining the 
behaviour of actors inside a group.
Our first proposition (PI) therefore contends that:
Intragroup relationships are built around a basic triadic structure where 
interaction between buyers and sellers (the operating actors) is influenced by the 
presence of a central actor in terms of the nature and extent to which it mandates 
interaction between them.
3.2 The effectiveness of mandates
Our second proposition concerns the effectiveness of mandated intragroup relationships. 
We use the term ‘effectiveness’ in the sense of whether operating actors comply with, and 
obey the terms of mandates issued by corporate centres. We identified in the literature 
review that a number of writers have questioned the effectiveness of mandates in 
achieving co-operation between actors, pointing out the potential for heightened conflict 
between them. Operating actors may perceive that mandates which direct them to interact 
with other group companies may not be in their individual interests, even though they 
may benefit the group as a whole. They may value relationships with other network 
partners outside of the group. Therefore the effectiveness of a corporate mandate will be 
influenced by an operating actor’s perception of the meaning of the mandate from its 
position.
The capacity for a corporate centre to impose mandates over operating actors will depend 
on the power base of the centre. We have seen that when considering the contingency of 
asymmetry, we must take into account the power bases of the corporate centre as well as 
those of group buyers and sellers, in mediating the behaviour of individual operating 
companies. The power of legitimacy as well as coercive and reward power are likely to 
represent important sources of power for the centre and will be influential in determining 
the success or otherwise of mandated directives.
Our second proposition (P2) is divided into two parts and states that:
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2A - The effectiveness of mandated rules governing intragroup interaction is a 
function of:
* Operating actors’ recognition of the authority of the centre to impose mandates 
on group companies.
* Each actor’s perception of the meaning of the mandate.
* The strength of associated policing and control mechanisms.
2B - Whilst the centre may mandate interaction between operating actors for the 
benefit of the group, operating actors themselves may favour external relationships 
over internal relationships in pursuit of their network goals and objectives. Under 
these circumstances:
* Operating actors may seek to influence the centre to modify the terms of the 
mandate in ways advantageous to themselves.
* Operating actors may seek to challenge or circumvent a mandate that limits 
their interaction with counterparts external to the group.
3.3 Influence of other actors
Whilst organisational hierarchy focuses on vertical relationships between the centre and 
its subsidiaries, the study of networks recognises the potential for horizontal relationships 
between subsidiary units. (We use the term ‘horizontal relationship’ in this context to 
describe internal buyer-seller links. ‘Vertical relationships’ depict links between 
subsidiary units and a central actor. We acknowledge that the terms ‘horizontal’ and 
‘vertical relationships’ may have different meanings outside the context of intragroup 
relationships. E.g. vertical relationships between buyers and sellers in a value adding 
chain).
Actors within a network can take on a variety of roles depending on the viewpoint taken. 
Johanson & Mattsson (1987) recognise that each firm in a network has relationships with 
customers, distributors, suppliers and sometimes direct relationships with competitors. 
Actors can also have indirect relationships with suppliers' suppliers and customers' 
customers. A subsidiary company inside a group can be a supplier to, or a customer of,
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another subsidiary. Subsidiary companies may be complementary suppliers to a common 
group buyer. Subsidiary companies may potentially be direct competitors.
Whilst the triad forms the basic unit of intragroup analysis, we must recognise that 'near' 
actors will also be influential in shaping interaction between group companies. Of 
particular importance are alternative suppliers to the buying company which are 
competitors to the selling actor and also alternative customers of the selling company 
which are competitors to the buying actor. Other subsidiary companies within the group 
may also have an influencing affect on the triad, either directly or indirectly. Any change 
instigated by one subsidiary may indirectly affect the position of all subsidiaries. Thus 
the allocation of scarce funds by the centre to one subsidiary automatically limits the 
funds available to others. We must therefore take into account the influence of actors 
outside of the triad when studying the behaviour of actors in intragroup relationships.
Proposition (P3) is also divided into two parts and contends that:
3A - Interaction between operating companies in an intragroup relationship is 
conditioned by:
* Indirect links with other group companies outside of the basic triad.
* Direct and indirect links with alternative customers and suppliers outside of the 
group.
3B - Internal and external customers of the supplier may be competitors of each 
other in downstream markets. Similarly, internal and external suppliers to the 
buyer may also be competitors. Therefore:
* Relationships between operating actors conditions potential interaction with 
alternative buyers and sellers.
* Relationships between alternative buyers and sellers may also affect 
relationships between the operating actors.
3.4 Information exchange between actors
The forth proposition concerns the affect of the group environment on the flow of 
information between actors.
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Episodes which occur in business relationships often involve a series of exchanges 
between the parties. (IMP Group 1982). One of the reasons for the existence of long 
term relationships is that customers and suppliers require extensive knowledge about each 
other which may be complex and difficult to acquire. Whilst the transfer of goods and 
services often represents the core of exchange process it is usually accompanied by 
financial, informational as well as social exchange elements.
Information is the ‘currency’ of inter firm relations which all exchange processes operate 
through (Easton 1992). The collection of information is an activity that actors engage in 
to reduce uncertainty about trading partners. Information creates its own networks; and 
the relative ease of exchange and transmission means that it can flow around these 
networks very efficiently. Actors acquire information to build knowledge about other 
actors. Knowledge may therefore be regarded as an investment that a firm can make in 
respect of a particular counterpart. (Easton 1992).
The flow of information is influenced by the way actors are connected to each other, and 
to more distant actors within a network. In intragroup relationships, whilst information 
may be exchanged directly between operating actors, there may be opportunities for these 
actors to communicate indirectly through the corporate centre. At the same time, the 
centre will have discrete exchange relationships with each of its operating actors. A 
centre therefore represents an additional node in a communications network, potentially 
connecting all actors within the group. The existence of additional communication 
channels has the potential to increase the information flow between actors and enhance 
the level of knowledge group operating companies have about each other.
We therefore contend in proposition P4 that:
The group context is likely to increase the level of information that each party has 
about the other and the breadth of interaction between them. This is likely to affect 
the perception of each other's position.
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3.5 Opportunistic behaviour of actors
We saw in the previous chapter that a major component of the bonding process between 
actors is the development of trust. Trust is seen as a willingness to rely on a counterpart 
in whom one has confidence in, thereby reducing the need for formal contracts and 
control measures. One of the causes of the breakdown of trust occurs when one, or both 
of the parties in a relationship engage in opportunistic behaviour to exploit transaction 
partners as a means of gaining short term advantage.
A prediction of transaction economists is that ‘locked in’ partners can become the victims 
of opportunistic behaviour. A lock in occurs where resources are dedicated to certain 
business relationships that are difficult to recover or redirect. Actors may also be ‘locked 
together’ when they are mandated to interact with each other. We must therefore 
recognise the opportunity for group operating companies to behave opportunistically 
where they are locked together in a mandated relationship. Trust may be more difficult to 
achieve because of the propensity for operating actors to behave opportunistically in their 
dealings with other group companies.
We therefore contend in proposition P5 that:
In a situation where the centre mandates interaction between the operating actors in 
an intragroup relationship, the mandate may affect the nature of the relationship. 
Actors may regard the terms of a mandate as an opportunity to behave differently 
towards a partner.
* An intragroup seller may give proportionately less commitment to an 
intragroup buyer in terms of service, quality and other exchange variables.
• An intragroup buyer may demand a proportionately higher level of commitment 
from an internal seller.
The potential to opportunistically exploit the terms of a trading mandate will 
therefore influence the level of trust between actors in intragroup relationships.
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3.6 Rivalry between actors
We also saw in the previous chapter that intragroup relationships may be arenas for 
competitive behaviour where quasi-competition can develop between divisions of the 
same firm. Competition occurs when two actors have objectives which are in conflict but 
the locus of their objectives is under control of a third party. Thus operating companies 
may be in competition for resources within the group that are controlled by, and allocated 
from the central actor.
The relationship between the central actor and its operating subsidiaries is essentially one 
of resource exchange, in the same way that exchange takes place between subsidiary 
units. Resource exchange interconnects the actors within the triad and develops 
dependence. The centre provides the capital inputs that individual actors require to grow 
within their networks. By their nature, these resources are finite potentially leading to 
competition between the beneficiaries who may also be parties in an intragroup 
relationship.
A central actor may also have control over other resources valued by subsidiary actors, 
not least remuneration benefits and advancement opportunities available to senior 
managers within these units. This can add a competitive dimension between managers 
within operating subsidiaries who may perceive themselves as rivals. This is further 
likely to influence the level of trust between the parties because actors are less likely to 
trust trading partners who they also consider to be their competitors.
We must also recognise that one of the consequences of the triadic nature of intragroup 
relationships is that interaction between operating actors is likely to be more visible and 
transparent to senior management at the centre when compared to relationships with other 
partners external to the group. This provides an opportunity for the centre to assess the 
effectiveness of managers. It also presents an environment where rivalry can be 
expressed in terms demonstrations of superiority and one-upmanship. Managers may 
therefore feel more exposed and at risk in this environment which will also influence the 
level of trust between the parties.
Proposition P6 therefore proposes that:
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Trust between parties within intragroup relationships may be affected by the 
influence of the centre. For example:
* Operating actors may regard themselves in competition with each other for 
group resources and rewards.
* Operating actors may perceive that their competence and performance is being 
evaluated through their involvement in the relationship.
Therefore, individual actors perceive the relationship as involving higher personal 
risks.
3.7 Conflict and conflict resolution.
Elements of conflict are inherent in all business relationships and have to be regulated 
and tolerated permanently. Actors have shared and contradictory interests; if they do not 
learn how to deal with the contradictory ones, the outcome is conflict. (Hakansson & 
Gadde 1992).
The way conflict is managed and resolved between group operating actors is likely to be 
influenced directly or indirectly by the presence of a central actor. Firstly, conflict 
resolution is likely to be affected by a mandate. Disputes are likely to be more difficult to 
resolve where actors are locked together by a mandate that prohibits them from 
withdrawing from their relationships. This situation will be problematic where intense 
and long term disputes characterise the atmosphere in which interaction takes place 
between the actors. Actors may also perceive that withdrawing from relationships with 
internal partners may have negative consequences in terms of the reaction of the centre 
where group prosperity is compromised. Actors may therefore be locked together 
through less formal ties.
We saw when discussing the contingency of efficiency that conflict is more easily 
resolved in the group situation. Williamson identifies that when disputes arise between 
parties, compensation can be varied by a central actor, and requests to adopt a more 
co-operative mode more likely to be heeded. Corporate centres may therefore be 
motivated to regulate conflict between actors in intragroup relationships.
We therefore contend in proposition P7 that:
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The resolution of conflicts between actors in a group may be affected by a mandate 
because:
* Termination of their relationship may not be allowable under the terms of the 
mandate.
* Intragroup actors may regard acts of deselection as involving personal risks to 
themselves.
* The centre may take some role in resolving conflicts between operating actors. 
Therefore exchange may take place between operating actors even within an 
atmosphere characterised by high levels of conflict and disagreement.
3.8 Conclusion
We have used this chapter to generate a series of propositions that describe various 
characteristics of intragroup relationships. These propositions have been derived from:
• Review of the literature on business relationships and related areas.
• The author’s intuitive ideas about intragroup relationships.
• Conversations with practitioners involved in managing and co-ordinating intragroup 
relationships.
We have identified various themes and ideas that marketing academics have developed to 
generally describe business relationships. They have provided us with a number of useful 
concepts and analytical frameworks which have been used to derive the propositions 
presented in this chapter. Our analysis would suggest that whilst intragroup relationships 
are not ‘fundamentally’ different from other types of business relationships, they do have 
certain characterising features that make them somehow different and distinct. The 
propositions help us to differentiate these points of uniqueness and distinction.
Each proposition provides us with a framework for the analysis of data on various aspects 






This chapter describes the development of a methodology used to examine the features of 
relationships between companies within a group. The propositions put forward in the 
previous chapter indicated the different factors which require investigation in order to 
understand the nature of intragroup relationships. The methodological task is therefore to 
develop a process which explores these propositions and provide a judgement on their 
validity in one particular case, that of a corporate group called Agrifood. The first part of 
the chapter covers the factors that have influenced the selection of the methodology used 
to survey intragroup relationships. The second part deals with the practical way these 
techniques have been applied in the field research and data analysis.
4.1 Selection o f methodology
4.1.1 Methodological orientation
A fundamental decision facing researchers at the beginning of research projects is 
whether to orientate their design to follow a deductive or inductive stance. Deduction is 
concerned with explanation generated from causal relationships or universal laws.
Highly structured research methodology is employed to ensure replicability to allow the 
testing of hypotheses in highly defined and controlled situations. A deductive orientation 
is captured in the rigour of laboratory experiments.
Many researchers have cast doubt on the applicability of such methods in complex social 
situations. True experiments by their very nature can only involve a small number of 
people which poses problems of how findings can be generalised to wider populations. 
Lewin (1946) stresses the limitations of studying complex social events in a laboratory 
and highlights the artificiality of isolating single behaviour elements from an integrated 
and complex system. The presence of an experimenter or researcher can unintentionally 
influence events and distort results. 'The behaviour of participants in laboratory studies is
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concrete, quantifiable and analysable, but what goes on in their minds is difficult to 
assess'. Ford (1980).
The focus of this project has been to invoke an essentially inductive orientation to 
develop explanation through understanding of subjective meaning systems. (Although in 
the latter stages of the research we seek to identify a set of generalised findings which we 
speculate could apply to relationships inside other corporate groups). An inductive 
stance is committed to research in everyday settings. The social world cannot be 
understood in terms of relationships that do not take into account the context in which 
actions are based, and an actor's interpretation of events in terms of his or her meanings, 
intentions, motives, attitudes and beliefs.
Much marketing research notes Ford (1980) is concerned with the measurement of 
attitude as predictors of behaviour. However Harre & Secord (1972) in their 'common 
sense' principles note that there is a difference between attitudes which are avowed in 
quiet discussion (in standard questionnaires or exploratory interviews for example) and 
those which are acted out in real life situations. They note that there is also a difference 
between attitudes that are manifest in hot situations (e.g. events that may incur high 
rewards or punishments to the individual involved) and attitudes that are manifest in 
more mundane and repetitive circumstances that have less significance to individuals and 
where commitment may only be theoretical. Ford (1980) advocates that'.... attitudes 
should be observed in situations approximating as far as possible to a context of genuine 
commitment'.
It was against these contextual limitations that methods primarily based around 
questionnaires or techniques that record responses to various statements were deemed 
inappropriate to the study of intragroup relationships. Whilst these methods provide data 
which is relatively easy to analyse, it was recognised from initial interviews that this type 
of questioning would produce a superficial and potentially erroneous idea of respondents 
real views. The situation is well summed up by Oxenfeldt (1964) when he observes that
'Every student of business practice should recognise the difference between what
executives actually do and what they believe they do; both are often different from what 
they say they do'. A potential solution to 'Oxenfeldt's dilemma' is to undertake a large 
number of in-depth interviews however this type of methodology is recognised by
40
Oxenfeldt as 'costly and cumbersome' and has the drawback of lack of uniformity of 
procedure in subsequent analysis.
4.1.2 Scope of research
An early decision in the design of methodology was to concentrate research in one focal 
organisation. The objective was to achieve the depth of analysis inherent in a focused 
case. Given the under researched nature of the subject and its limited treatment in the 
literature it was felt that pursuit of a broad understanding of the principal characteristics 
of intragroup relationships was preferential to an in-depth analysis of any particular 
facet, derived over a large number of individual studies. Also, the alternative of thinly 
spreading resources over a very large number of organisations was believed to be less 
desirable and had the danger of generating data that was likely to be regarded as trivial.
As generalisibility was recognised as a particular concern of this type of methodology, 
small scale studies were also undertaken in a number of secondary organisations to 
compare and contrast results from those obtained from the focal organisation. The 
danger of 'over generalising' the findings over a wide number of organisations should 
therefore be undertaken with caution. Whilst it has been traditionally prudent to 
recommend further studies to confirm and validate the main findings of a particular 
study, the writer advocates further research in the area of intragroup relationships across 
different types of organisation in contrasting industry settings.
Examples of'small studies' are not uncommon in ethnographic research. Gill and Pratt 
(1986) favoured in-depth treatment of a limited number of cases in an under researched 
and relatively novel area. The difficulty of generalising from the small sample chosen 
was a recognised drawback. Mintzberg (1979) has argued that small samples, such as 
groups of five managers, especially in exploratory research should be encouraged rather 
than '..less valid data that were statistically significant'. Patton, Puto & King (1986) in 
their study of group buying decisions recognised the value of intensive case study 
examination of a few co-operating industrial firms engaged in modify rebuy selection 
decisions.
41
A further consideration in the decision to focus on one organisation was the issue of 
access. Gill & Johnson (1991) note that access is time consuming and often difficult, 
particularly when the researcher lacks powerful support. In this case, the researcher had 
been a member of the focal organisation for a number of years, thereby facilitating access 
to individual respondents. Gill & Johnson (1991) further note that the use of all possible 
sources, including business contacts, has frequently been found to be useful in successful 
entry strategies.
The focal organisation under investigation, recognised the potential value of the research 
and was supportive across all aspects of the study. There is an increasing tendency these 
days to preferentially support research that is devoted to problems judged to be important 
and of practical application. (Gill & Johnson 1991). Sponsors within the organisation 
were enthusiastic to obtain feed back on progress and findings. There were however 
occasions during the study when the researcher was reluctant to share provisional 
findings for fear of invalidating later stages of the investigation. The issue of 
confidentiality was recognised as a area of sensitivity. It was agreed at the beginning of 
the project that the identity of all organisations had to be disguised and the anonymity of 
individuals preserved. Thus references to the various companies described in the study 
is done through the use of pseudonyms.
4.1.3 Potential sensitivity of intragroup relationships
The issue of access is related to the perceived sensitivity of intragroup relationships. Gill 
& Johnson (1991) note that topics concerned with sensitive areas such as redundancy, 
competitive markets or managerial stress, while potentially interesting and useful 
research areas, may be difficult to access. They comment that potentially the most 
rewarding research topics are often those which are also the most inaccessible requiring 
ingenuity and persistence in methodological design and implementation.
Renzetti & Lee (1993) define a sensitive topic as '.... one that potentially poses for those 
involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the 
researcher and/or the researched, the collection, holding and/or dissemination of research 
data.' They recognise the areas where research can be threatening include:
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• Those where the research intrudes into the private spheres of individual respondents or 
examines deeply personal experiences.
• Those where the study is concerned with deviance and social control.
• Those which impinge on the vested interests of powerful persons.
• Topics which deal with matters sacred to those being studied which they do not 
wished profaned.
A study of intragroup relationships was recognised as being sensitive to the second and 
third of these categories.
The relationships examined in the study were live and active commercial relationships 
where the parties - group buyers and sellers - may be withholding information from a 
trading partner as a normal aspect of competitive interaction. Certain data was therefore 
likely be considered sensitive, for example, interaction with other suppliers and/or 
customers outside of the group. In this respect, respondents would have to divulge 
information that could be of value to a trading partner who was also a respondent within 
the survey.
Renzetti & Lee (1993) recognise that different social groups attribute different meanings 
to requests for participation in research. It may be that a study seen as threatening by one 
group would be thought innocuous by another. Thus whilst the centre in an intragroup 
relationship may be very supportive of such a study, individual operating companies may 
be suspicious of its motivations. It was recognised that group companies involved in 
intragroup relationships could be following agendas that were in contradiction to group 
policies and mandates. Thus whilst on the surface, a company or individual may espouse 
the virtues of collective co-operation, in reality they could be adopting tactics to achieve 
the opposite. To obtain admission of this was seen as particularly difficult. In terms of 
methodological design, it was recognised to be important to adopt research tactics that 
could gain access to and expose 'the darker side' of intragroup relationships.
For respondents to admit the existence of such behaviour put them in a potentially 
threatening position even to the point of endangering future career opportunities if such 
views became widely known. This was particularly evident in some of the early 
exploratory interviews. Sensitive topics present problems because research into them
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involves potential costs to those participating in the research (Renzetti & Lee 1993). 
There was therefore an issue around the trust and integrity of the researcher in convincing 
the respondents of absolute confidentiality of the research data. This was regarded as vital 
to avoid potential concealment and dissimulation by respondents. The fact that the 
researcher was also a member of the focal organisation in some respect facilitated that 
confidentiality but to other respondents potentially represented a threat.
In studying sensitive relationships, Finch (1987) has advocated the use of the vignette 
technique to mimic experiments. A basic story is presented that remains constant, but the 
outcomes are varied and responses recorded and analysed in survey fashion. She notes 
that 'Asking concrete questions about third parties has the affect of distancing the issues'. 
Questions become less personally threatening. The technique also has the advantage of 
breaking away from the limitations imposed by personal experiences and circumstances.
4.1.4 Position of the researcher
Issues of sensitivity relating to the fact that the researcher was also a member of the 
organisation under investigation have already been mentioned. Such a situation is not 
without precedent in other studies (Dalton 1959, Golding 1973), and was an important 
consideration in the design of the methodology used to investigate intragroup 
relationships.
A major advantage of having been involved in these relationships for over twenty years, 
was to be in a position to draw on previous experiences and observations to develop 
initial themes and ideas, identify major issue areas and speculate on motives driving 
interaction between the various actors. This was particularly important at the beginning 
of the study for identifying and developing broad areas of investigation during initial 
exploratory interviews.
Being personally involved in relationships inside Agrifood had a number of other 
advantages. It was recognised that the experience of the researcher could have a positive 
affect of making respondents reticent to deliberately misrepresent situations and events, 
recognising that this could be identified. Douglas (1976) notes that participant 
observation can enable the researcher to penetrate '...various complex forms of
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misinformation fronts, evasions and lies that are considered endemic in most social 
settings including business'. He advocates the 'immersion in and saturation by the setting 
through allowing oneself to experience that setting as much as possible in the same way 
as any other organisational member'. Similar sentiments are echoed by Kamann & 
Strijker (1992) who advocate '...familiarity and inside knowledge are the requirements for 
successful network analysis'. And Erikson (1964) notes that '...one can study the nature 
of things by doing something to them, but can really learn something about the essential 
nature of living beings only by doing something with them or for them'. Insider 
knowledge enables access to what people actually do (the informal organisation) as 
opposed to what they may claim they do (as influenced by the formal organisation).
Whilst participant observation allows the researcher to 'live' the experiences, there is the 
danger that in becoming embroiled in the everyday lives of subjects the researcher 
develops biases and frames and is unable to take a dispassionate view of events. 
Throughout the study it was deemed important to be continually reflective and attempt to 
understand the potential affect of the researcher in the research setting. Alderfer &
Smith (1982) in their study of intergroup relationships advocate that the '...traditional 
goal of objectivity by which investigators separate themselves from the phenomena they 
study should be replaced by a notion that calls on researchers to search for their own 
biases and then to build compensatory mechanisms into their research programmes'.
Thus whilst familiarity and previous experience were useful in the early stages of the 
programme it was important during the main body of research to move to a more 
structured analysis where direct participation of the researcher was minimised as much as 
possible.
4.2 Methodological Design
4.2.1 Scenarios and vignettes
The approach adopted in this project has been to attempt to determine expectations in 
certain structured and realistic situations, a method used by social scientists over many 
years. (Harre & Secord 1972, Osgood, Saporta & Nunnally 1956).
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The methodology adopted uses a form of the vignette introduced earlier, termed 'scenario 
analysis'. Vignettes, notes Finch (1987) are short stories about hypothetical characters in 
specified circumstances to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond. The 
situation may be short and simple or long and complex. At its simplest a vignette can be 
a one-sentence description of a hypothetical situation.
It is more common, notes Finch, to base the analyses of vignettes on a set of fixed choice 
questions e.g. by asking simple yes/no/don't know responses to each. Less common, is a 
non-directive use of the technique in the form of open ended responses. Used in this 
open ended form, scenarios allow respondents to define the meaning of a particular 
situation. Scenario analysis may therefore be regarded as an open ended application of 
the vignette technique. Scenarios make possible a particular form of open ended 
questioning which is situation specific. The scenarios constructed in this analysis depict 
structured situations that representatives would recognise as realistic. In certain cases, 
they may have been described by respondents in initial exploratory interviews. They are 
hypothetical in the sense that they make no reference to specific trading relationships or 
named individuals. (For fear of compromising the confidentiality and trust of 
respondents.) In all other aspects, they could be regarded as realistic.
The general technique has a number of important advantages:
• Scenarios enable the researcher to develop questions in survey format that are of a 
concrete nature which helps to avoid a series of answers that are simply bland 
generalisations that may be difficult to interpret. Because the situations described by 
the scenarios are ‘realistic’, this increases the likelihood of eliciting responses based 
on respondents’ experience in confronting similar situations or events to those 
depicted in the scenarios. This was designed to decrease the likelihood of respondents 
giving responses based on abstract hypothetical opinion and speculation.
• Defining hypothetical situations has the effect of distancing the issues from the 
respondent and his or her relationships with other people. This makes the questions 
less personally threatening and therefore may be more likely to elicit real responses. 
Scenarios can be based around fictitious characters to which questions can be asked in 
the form of'What should these people do next?’ In this project, the sensitivity of the
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issues were judged to be of a nature that respondents could be asked how they would 
react personally to the scenarios described. The need to distance sensitive issues and 
alleviate potential threats of the enquiry (as perceived by respondents), was the main 
reason why the scenario method was preferred to more conventional survey methods.
• Scenarios offer the opportunity to explore issues in a way which approximates to the 
complexities with which these issues are surrounded in reality. These complexities are 
often disregarded in other forms of survey analyses, and particularly in fixed response 
questionnaires. Scenario analysis offers a way of studying complex issues and at the 
same time capitalising on the strengths of survey methods. Finch (1987) notes that 
data can be more reasonably used as the basis for generalisations about a given 
population.
The use of the scenario technique however also has limitations which are important to 
understand and recognise. Firstly, used in this way, they are subject to the general 
criticisms of open-ended questions, namely that one sacrifices some comparability 
between respondents. Secondly, there are technical issues based around the construction 
of the scenarios whether they can be readily followed and understood by the respondent. 
This can be alleviated to some extent by pretesting each scenario with a number of 
respondents prior to the main body of research. Also, whilst the scenarios should be 
constructed to reflect the issues under investigation, they must be suitably open-ended 
and non-directional so as not to lead the respondent to a particular line of thinking and 
bias responses. It is therefore important to strike a balance between completeness and 
open-endedness.
In scenario analysis it is difficult to specify which specific element in a hypothetical 
situation triggers which particular response. This is partly because it is difficult to 
identify additional details and assumptions that are being 'filled in' by respondents that 
are not directly conveyed to the researcher. Whilst it is possible to vary systematically a 
number of elements in a particular scenario, this has the problem of generating a large 
number of scenarios which may be unmanageable. This problem can be alleviated to 
some extent by building common elements into different scenarios which act as a check 
on each other in subsequent analysis. However at best, scenario analysis can be used to 
elicit general tendencies rather than to specify direct causal connections.
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The scenario-based methodology used in this study consisted of the following steps:
• Respondent identification and selection.
• Exploratory interviews.
• Scenario identification and construction.
• Scenario interviews.
4.2.2 Respondent identification and selection
Identification and selection of respondents for initial exploratory and main interviews 
reflected the following criteria:
• The need to include managers who have, or have had, significant involvement with 
intragroup relationships as a formal part of their job functions. They would therefore 
be able to express opinions based on real experiences rather than second hand hearsay.
• The need to ascertain views of the three main categories of actors: intragroup buyers, 
sellers and corporate management at the centre.
• The need to reflect views across a number of different relationships, including 
companies in different divisions within the group, or between companies within the 
same division.
• The need to ascertain views at various levels of seniority including main board 
directors, business unit and functional managers (mainly in sales, purchasing, 
marketing and technical functions).
Twenty five respondents took part in a series of initial exploratory interviews. These 
were all selected from the focal organisation. The number here was not predetermined. 
Interviews ceased when no new insights were being gained and the subject matter was 
becoming repetitive rather than generating new themes or ideas.
Forty respondents were involved in the main scenario interviews of which thirty came 
from the focal organisation. Ten respondents were interviewed from other organisations.
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A sample size of 40 was deemed to be large enough to allow the use of certain statistical 
tests later in the analysis. Respondents within Agrifood in both stages of the research 
represented business units throughout the corporation as well as corporate management 
situated at the centre. Further details of respondent organisations, business units and 
respondent functions are presented in Appendix 2
Responses are the views of individuals rather than those of specific business units. 
Individuals are taken to be a representative sample of the business unit. No comparison 
of responses was made in the study between respondents of the same business unit. In a 
significant number of cases, respondents were involved with a number of internal 
relationships inside Agrifood (and other groups), rather than a single, specific 
relationship. In these cases, their opinions were taken as a composite view.
4.2.3 Initial exploratory interviews.
The first series of interviews in the study were open ended and unstructured. Issues and 
themes identified in the literature search and previous experiences of the researcher were 
used to generate a list of open ended questions. This form of the interview was designed 
to avoid artificial limitations and allow the respondent to answer in his or her own terms. 
Also, the interviewer was able to request clarification on certain issues or explore 
interesting topics in more depth, as seemed appropriate. Thus data was gathered at this 
stage with no special concern for consistency. The idea was to elicit information with 
greater depth and meaning revealing insights into pertinent issues. The issues were 
expressed in the respondents' phraseology.
The duration of the interviews averaged around 45 minutes to one hour and were 
recorded on tape. They were deemed complete when issues became repetitive between 
respondents and no new topics emerged.
Most of the interviews were transposed to word processor where various themes were 
identified and coded, producing a number of categories. The interviews were 
subsequently merged and sorted by category. Examples of these categories included:
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Influence of the centre. Influence of the mandate.
Risk & trust Distance & communication.
Conflict resolution & deselection. Value of the relationship.
Following this first stage categorisation, a number of propositions were developed 
identifying those variables responsible for influencing the behaviour of intragroup actors. 
These propositions were presented in the previous chapter.
4.2.4 Scenario identification and construction
The next stage of the project was to develop a range of scenarios to cover the issues 
identified earlier in the process. Generally, each scenario focused on a particular event or 
issue, however in some cases, a number of scenarios were used to examine a single issue 
from different perspectives. This was useful to monitor the consistency of respondents. 
In other cases, there was considerable overlap between scenarios. Some scenarios were 
written from the perspective of the buying company and in other cases, from the 
perspective of the selling company. They therefore represented 'mirror images' of each 
other and again were a useful check of consistency.
Scenarios were constructed as near as possible in respondents own language. Thus 
through out the research, the term 'intercompany relationship' was used rather than the 
more strictly correct description of'intragroup relationship' because this was how they 
were identified by respondents. Each scenario was usually no more than two sentences in 
duration reflecting the necessity to provide sufficient comprehension without being 
overly complex or confusing. Length and content of the scenarios also reflected the need 
to be open ended and set a particular scene rather than lead the respondent to a particular 
conclusion or line of thinking. Thus a scenario initially constructed as:
'Y o u r  g r o u p  c o n t i n u o u s l y  e n c o u r a g e s  g r e a t e r  c o - o p e r a t i o n  b e tw e e n  i n t e r n a l  c o m p a n i e s  
y e t  a t  th e  s a m e  t i m e  v a l u e s  in d i v id u a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a n d  f o c u s e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
a c h ie v e  in d i v i d u a l  b u d g e t s  a n d  ta r g e ts .  Y o u  f e e l  a t  t i m e s  th e r e  c a n  b e  a  c o n tr a d ic t i o n ' .
was subsequently modified to omit the second sentence. Each scenario was critically 
examined in this way and modified as necessary to ensure the correct balance between 
comprehension, completeness and objectivity. The number of scenarios was not
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predetermined but was the number found necessary to cover the issues raised. Forty eight 
scenarios were finally selected. These are listed in Appendix 3.
The scenarios were pre-tested with a number of respondents to clarify comprehension and 
understanding. In some cases, answers deviated strongly from the themes the scenarios 
were explicitly designed to explore, therefore requiring further modification.
4.2.5 Scenario interviews
Scenario interviews represented a mirror image of the earlier exploratory interviews.
With the latter, discussion was used to generate issues and themes, whilst in the scenario 
interviews, issues (expressed in the scenarios) were used to generate discussion and 
dialogue, presented in a more standardised and comparable format. The respondents were 
generally open and had little difficulty in understanding the descriptive situations 
presented. Only infrequently was repetition by the interviewer necessary. This was 
perhaps not surprising as many respondents were middle or senior managers used to 
formulating, exploring and sharing concepts and ideas. Many were graduates and a 
number were PhDs.
At the beginning of the interview, each respondent was instructed to assess the scenario 
from a number of standpoints. Firstly, in terms of its relevance by broadly categorising 
the scenario as follows:
• Indicative of events happening at the moment.
• Indicative of events that have happened in the past.
• Has the potential to happen, but not something yet experienced.
• Generates a neutral or unsure reaction.
• Unlikely to happen in reality.
• Does not reflect reality at all.
Secondly, respondents were asked to consider the scenario from the standpoint of:
• Issues raised.
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• What might be going through a particular person's mind when confronted with the 
scenario.
• What might be the concerns.
• How the respondent might react.
Respondents were requested to draw on their experiences in current or past roles or in any 
previous organisations. It was stressed to them that they could keep their answers general 
and not relate specific details in terms of names of individual companies or personnel. In 
reality, many did describe specific relationships and people involved. A number 
requested reassurance on confidentiality which was emphasised by the interviewer at the 
beginning of each session.
The scenarios were sequenced in such a way that related topics were discussed at 
different points within the process to check for consistency and variability of answers.
The interviews generally lasted between one and a half to two hours. All were recorded 
on tape. There was no relationship identified between length of scenario and length of 
response. Some scenarios elicited long and relatively complex answers, other were 
described or dismissed quickly. In many cases, interviewees became interested in the 
scenarios themselves. Typical reactions were that they represented situations that they 
recognised or perceived as thought provoking. Some scenarios were greeted with ironic 
humour by certain respondents.
The involvement of the interviewer in the interview processes was deliberately 
anonymous, limited to reading the scenarios and ascertaining when the respondents had 
completed their answers. This was deemed to be particularly important given the history, 
status and involvement of the interviewer in the focal organisation as described earlier. 
Further questioning was avoided.
An underlying assumption of this approach is that if a subject was deemed important by a 
respondent, it should trigger a 'top of the head' response. By inference, no mention of a 
particular issue was taken to be indicative of low importance (at least to that particular 
respondent). This is perhaps the major draw back of this type of methodology in that the 
scenarios cannot be guaranteed to trigger all the important responses. Respondents can 
forget details or fail to make the necessary associations. In the end, it was decided that
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Discussion of the scenarios by respondents gave rise to a large amount of recorded data, 
expressed in the words, language and subjective meanings of those respondents. 
Symbolic communication in the form of writing or words must largely be transcribed in 
formal terms, before they can be used for data processing and inference. One such 
method of achieving this 'transcription' is content analysis. Holsti (1969) defines content 
analysis as 'any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages'. Stacey (1969) sees content analysis as 
particularly useful for the analysis for documentary evidence, essentially regarding it as a 
technique of reducing qualitative data to quantitative terms.
Holsti (1969) regards content analysis as particularly valuable when the respondent's own 
language is important to the investigation. It enables the ordering and quantification of 
respondents views over a wide range of areas and issues whilst at the same time, 
quantifiable data can be traced back to actual words and precise context of their 
expressions. It also provides an important means of comparison between respondents.
Content analysis pays particular attention to the issue of reliability of its measures and 
validity of its findings through the precise count of word use. The methodology of 
content analysis is to essentially list units to be measured (component themes) and 
undertake a simple count of the items. Important factors are those which relate to coding 
namely: clear and unambiguous categorisation and consistency.
Smith (1981) recognises that whilst content analysis is a useful tool for the analysis of 
'manifest content' (those items physically present in words or texts), extension of the 
technique to the interpretation of'latent content' (symbolism underlying the physical data 
present) has inherent dangers. However as Krippendorff (1980) recognises, messages do 
not have single meanings and data can always be looked upon from numerous
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perspectives especially when they are symbolic in nature. Thus messages may convey a 
multitude of contents even to a single receiver. This is an important limitation of this 
form of methodology.
4.3.2 Coding and content frames
The process of the development of scenarios produced a list of issue areas and from these 
a list of categories of analysis. Integration of these produced a number content frames. 
Content frames consisted of a lull listing of all the categories into which respondent 
views were analysed. These categories were intended to be sufficiently comprehensive 
so as to accommodate and differentiate all important aspects of intragroup relationships 
as covered by the seven propositions. A list and description of content frames is 
presented in Appendix 4.
The unit of analysis in the study was taken as the ‘theme’. Holsti (1969) points out that 
grammatical units such as sentences or paragraphs do not usually lend themselves to 
classification into a single category. Because of this, they are rarely used as recording 
units. Also, raw data in this case was transcribed speech. In some cases, it was not in 
full grammatical sentences. For this reason, sentences were reduced to component 
themes before being placed in the proper categories.
A number of rules were developed to identify these themes and prevent confusion in 
categorisation. For example, differentiation was made between what respondents 
reported was actually happening and what they believed should be happening. Thus a 
statement that ‘The centre specifies rules around who we should trade with within the 
group’ was categorised under the frame ‘Trading mandate - actual’, whereas a statement 
which contented that ‘The centre should specify who we trade with inside the group’ was 
categorised as ‘Trading mandate - desired’.
Where immediate repetition occurred, it was not coded twice. For example:
• Where a statement was made and was followed by some assertion for emphasis.
• Where a statement was reinforced using an example from personal experience.
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The system of categorisation was finalised after extensive checking. This was to ensure 
consistency. This means that no theme could be placed in more than a single frame.
The next stage was to decide a system of enumeration. The simplest system is that of a 
straight forward frequency count. (For example, themes relating to ‘trading mandate’ 
were mentioned x  number of times by a particular respondent). In this case however, it 
was necessary to distinguish between statements coded in each frame. It was required to 
separate statements according to whether respondents claimed that events ‘did’/’did not’ 
or ‘should’/’should not’ happen. For example ‘There are rules’ compared to ‘There are 
no rules’ (Actual category); or, ‘There should be rules’ as against ‘Rules should not be 
applied (Desired category).
We need however to develop the argument one step further because the above analysis 
implies an underlying assumption that each unit should be assigned equal weight. 
Clearly, it is important to differentiate between such statement as:
• ‘There are extensive rules’.
• ‘There are some rules’.
• ‘There are few rules’.
• ‘There are no rules’.
The measurement of intensity of content units is one of the more difficult aspects of 
content analysis. (Holsti 1969). The technique finally adopted in this study was 
developed as a simplified form of ‘Evaluative Assertion Analysis’. The technique uses 
coded units on a five point scale from +2 to -2 as detailed in the following table:
+2 Statements of strong assertion
+1 Statements of weak assertion
0 Neutral or ‘Don’t know’ statements
-1 Statements of weak rejection.
-2 Statements of strong rejection
The transcribed interview for each respondent was analysed scenario by scenario. Each 
reply was broken down into themes and each theme was coded. There was only one 
coder in is this study and hence problems of inter-coder reliability did not arise. Each 
interview was coded three times. Although this proved particularly time consuming it
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provided a useful check for accuracy and consistency. The total score in each category 
was arrived at by adding algebraically the scores across different scenarios. The number 
of times each category was mentioned was also recorded. The total score by category 
was then divided by the number of mentions to provide an average score by category 
ranging from +2 to -2. An example of the scoring process is presented in Appendix 5.
A strong advantage for this technique is that data for each respondent can be aggregated 
over scenarios. This facilitates comparison between respondents in the focal organisation 
and also between respondents in the other organisations. By checking the individual 
analysis sheets it is possible to see on which scenarios a respondent recorded a particular 
score. It is then possible to refer to the transcribed interview and determine the precise 
words used. Thus, the analysis of respondent views can be checked against the scenario 
which prompted the response, the precise context in which the view was expressed and 
the actual words used by the respondent.
Respondents were faced with a large number of diverse but realistic situations. These 
covered a wide range of different aspects of intragroup relationships. It seems valid to 
assume that if a particular factor was not mentioned in response to any of these situations 
then that factor was not considered important or relevant to these situations. On the other 
hand, if a respondent mentions a particular factor many times in response to different 
situations then that factor can said to figure largely in his consideration or be highly 
relevant to him.
The system of enumeration which has been used has enabled differentiation between the 
strength of individual responses. Therefore, it is assumed that a respondent who recorded 
a high (or positive) average score in a particular category believes that the magnitude of 
that category to be greater than does a respondent who recorded a lower (or negative) 
total score.
4.3.3 Comparison and significance
This study has involved the investigation of a wide range of different aspects of the views 
and activities of practitioners involved in intragroup relationships. One of the aims of the 
methodology has been to permit the ordering, classification and interpretation of a large
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amount of data, without losing the richness of that data. The intention has been to let the 
data - the speech and views of respondents - stand on its own as far as possible.
The analysis theme has been developed to identify and explain similarities and 
differences between individuals and groups. It is a tool for exploring the data. The 
content frames are essentially a shorthand for the transcribed data. They point to 
recurrent themes and tendencies. From these, it is possible to suggest or explain these 
indications by referring: firstly, to the individual respondents who produced the overall 
score and secondly, to the transcribed data to ascertain the precise words and context of 
the responses.
Much of the analysis in this study concerns the mean scores of groups of respondents in 
particular categories. Also, some indication of the dispersion of scores has been 
calculated, to ascertain whether these means are the result of statistical coincidence or 
whether they do indicate trends among different groups of respondents.
The analysis builds on aggregations of responses to individual scenarios. The initial 
aggregation is of each interviewees’ responses to the individual scenarios. The second 
level of aggregation is to compare and contrast respondents views in the focal 
organisation (Agrifood, N=30) and other organisations (N=10). In terms of the latter, 
analysis could be further carried out at the individual company/group level. However as 
the number of respondents at this level is either one or two for the groups analysed, it was 
decided that the sample sizes were too small to justify detailed analysis. These are 
therefore treated as a single sample. Hence the mean is used as an indication of the 
average or common view taken together.
The selection of the statistical analysis techniques used in this thesis is based on an 
underlying assumption that the scaling used to record respondent views (Likert-type 
scale), can be considered and treated as robust interval data. Whilst some statisticians 
argue that Likert scaling is ordinal in nature, it is not uncommon for marketing analysts 
to treat them as interval. This allows the calculation of mean scores and standard 
deviations for each variable and permits further use of parametric-type tests. (An 
assumption that the data is ordinal only permits the calculation of the median and inter
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quartile range as measures of central tendency and dispersion. It also limits the use of 
analytical techniques to less powerful, non parametric statistics).
Statistical analysis has focused on investigating two fundamental aspects of the data:
• Firstly, if respondents collectively, have recorded strong feelings (positive or negative) 
within a particular frame, or express ambivalent and neutral views.
• Secondly, if there are differences in the views of the two groups of respondents.
(Type 1 Agrifood respondents, and Type 2 other respondents).
In terms of the first of these, use of a one sample t-test is justified as all respondents are 
treated as one group (hence N is greater than 30). The null hypothesis is that the sample 
mean for each variable (frame) is equal to zero. The further the mean deviates from zero, 
(towards +2 or -2), the stronger the feelings expressed by respondents to a given 
statement expressed in the frame. The one sample t-test is the more important of the two 
tests in that it is used to support the validity of the propositions through the various 
content frames. The results of this test are presented in Appendix 6.
The test for differences between the two distributions (2 samples - Type 1 & Type 2) has 
been undertaken using a Mann Witney (non parametric) test. The latter has been used 
because the sample size for Type 2 (non Agrifood) respondents is too small (less than 30) 
for the Central Limit Theorem to apply. Given the assumption that normality for the 
underlying variable cannot be justified, the t-test would thus be invalid. The results of 
this test are reported in Appendix 7. Comparison between the two groups is of lesser 
importance. Non significant differences between the two groups of respondents, 
reinforces the view that the findings are not just Agrifood-specific.
For both the Mann Witney and t-test, significance has been calculated at the 0.05 level.
We should finally emphasise that comparison between samples is not simply made on the 
basis of scores. Differences in scores point to some differences in attitude between 
respondents. These are investigated by working back through the individual content
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frames to find precisely what was said by whom and in what context. This provides a 
more thorough explanation of the different views which show up in the scores.
4.3.4 Presentation of findings
Details of the findings of the field research are presented in the next six chapters. Each 
chapter focuses on a specific proposition as outlined in Chapter 3. (The exception is 
Chapter 9 which deals with two related propositions on the subject of trust between 
actors). A brief theoretical perspective is presented at the beginning of each chapter to 
set the scene for the main presentation of the findings. Statistical results are then 
interpreted in qualitative terms that describe and account for the behaviour of actors 
within group relationships. Respondent quotes are used to reinforce particular themes 
and events.
Where individual frames are referenced in the text, they are accompanied by a summary 
of the level of response and the total number of mentions. (For example, a frame with a 
response of 27/8, indicates that 27 out of 30 Agrifood respondents, together with 8 out of 
10 other respondents, mentioned a theme recorded in this particular frame).
Each Chapter concludes with a statement of whether the findings from the field survey 
lead us to support or reject the main elements of the propositions outlined earlier.
5. Conclusion
The methodology that has been developed in this chapter has been formulated to support 
the arguments put forward in the propositions. Development of these propositions 
indicates that the analysis of a wide variety of factors is necessary to understand the 
nature of intragroup relationships. The methodological task has been developed to 
accommodate these factors within the research design which also reconciles the following 
requirements:
• The need to focus research towards one focal organisation to achieve the depth of 
analysis inherent in a focused case study.
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• The need to take into account potential sensitivities of respondents in intragroup 
relationships and overcome problems associated with access and misinformation.
• The need to take into account the status of the researcher as a member of the focal 
organisation.
• The need to investigate responses to specific issues and situations important to the 
respondents themselves rather than generalised expectations.
• The requirement to orientate the field research to allow respondents to freely express 
perceptions and beliefs about their involvement in intragroup relationships.
These prerequisites have led to the development of a methodology with two key 
properties.
• Data is gathered in the form of tape recorded responses to a number of hypothetical 
scenarios.
• Raw data is analysed in the form of content analysis.
The orientation of this research is essentially qualitative in nature. It is designed to 
explore the perceptions of managers involved in intragroup relationships, to help 
understand the nature of these relationships by uncovering key traits and characteristics 
that make them special and unique. The methodology also helps us explore certain ideas 
about intragroup relationships, expressed in the individual propositions. The statistical 




Influence of the centre
Introduction
This chapter examines the influence of corporate centres on the trading relationships of 
business units. It seeks to identify the reasons why corporate management should 
intervene in the relationships between group actors and highlights the mechanisms it 
employs to co-ordinate their activities in line with its corporate strategy. By analysing the 
role of the centre, we will examine evidence in support of the first proposition PI which 
states that:
Intragroup relationships are built around a basic triadic structure where 
interaction between buyers and sellers (the operating actors) is influenced by the 
presence of a central actor in terms of the nature and extent to which it mandates 
interaction between them.
The theme of this chapter is to explain how corporate centres co-ordinate the activities of 
internal actors. In section 5.1 we see that traditional writers have identified hierarchical 
and market influences as important mechanisms for co-ordinating the activities of actors 
in industrial systems. We note that further studies have emphasised the importance of 
networks as distinct forms of co-ordination based on their own internal logic and system 
of governance. We go on to examine evidence for corporate centres applying these 
distinct models of co-ordination as a basis for managing relationships between 
companies within a group.
In section 5.2, we define the conditions under which a corporate centre is likely to adopt a 
particular form of co-ordination as a basis for its strategy for managing intragroup 
interaction.
Finally, in 5.3, we comment on the nature of the centre and note that corporate groups 
may consist of more than one centre co-ordinating activities between internal actors.
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5.1 The co-ordination of intragroup relationships
5.1.1 Markets, hierarchies and networks as co-ordination mechanisms
A key task for all multi-divisional corporations is to co-ordinate the activities of their 
business units. Co-ordination implies bringing into a relationship otherwise disparate 
activities or events (Thompson et al 1991) and is usually viewed as a sign of efficiency. 
By co-ordinating a set of activities, something can be achieved that otherwise would not 
be. The challenge for corporate management is to define how an organisation can create 
a whole which is so much greater than the sum of its parts.
Coase (1937) defined a sharp delineation between markets and hierarchies as methods of 
co-ordinating activities in industrial systems. Organisational forms fall between markets 
and hierarchies as ‘ideal types’. These ideal types were seen as a useful starting point for 
studying the organisation of industry (Ouchi 1980, Williamson 1985).
Markets represent spontaneous co-ordination mechanisms that impart rationality and 
consistency to the self interested actions of individuals and firms (Powell 1990). 
Co-ordination takes place via the guiding hand of market exchange and the price system 
it supports. Prices are presumed to capture all relevant information for exchange. By 
contrast, in a hierarchy, administrative control is overtly exercised if co-ordination is to 
be efficiently achieved. The visible hand of management supplants the invisible hand of 
the market to co-ordinate supply and demand. (Powell 1990). Authority is exercised 
through rules in the form of edicts and orders which act as informational devices. 
Hierarchy is captured in the bureaucratic form, operating through a system of 
surveillance, evaluation and direction.
Traditional economists regarded these forms as mutually exclusive. The hierarchical 
form is more likely to prevail when frequently recurring transactions involve uncertainty 
in their outcomes and require substantial transaction specific investments in money time 
and energy. Under these conditions, organisations are likely to co-ordinate their activities 
‘in-house’. A market interface is more likely to prevail where exchanges are straight 
forward, non repetitive and require no specific transaction investment. The pursuit of 
optimum efficiency is a fundamental assumption in defining the nature of organisations.
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Any collectivity which has an economic goal must find a means to control diverse 
individuals efficiently (Ouchi 1980).
The idea of markets and hierarchies as being mutually exclusive means of allocating 
resources has been questioned by many later academics (Johanson & Mattsson 1987, 
Powell 1990). Bradach & Eccles (1989) note that markets may exhibit traits of 
hierarchies and hierarchies may display properties of markets. No where is this mixing of 
price and authority mechanisms more visible than in the modem multi-divisional form. 
Distinct organisational control mechanisms are operated simultaneously for the same 
function by the same firm.
Co-ordination is not achieved through a central plan or an organisational hierarchy. Nor 
does it take place through the mechanism of the market. Co-ordination is the outcome of 
firms operating in networks in which price is just one of several influencing variables. 
(Johanson & Mattsson 1987). Networks represent distinct forms of co-ordination of 
economic activity where individuals are engaged in reciprocal, preferential and mutually 
supportive actions. Networks typically describe an environment where there is no 
common ownership or legal framework between the parties, and where items exchanged 
between buyers and sellers often possess qualities that are not easy to measure or specify. 
Networks represent means of co-ordination that emphasise more informal mechanisms 
embedded in social, political and economic relationships.
For some writers, networks are distinct from market transactions and hierarchical 
governance structures representing separate and different modes of exchange with their 
own ‘logic’ (Powell 1990). Other analysts consider networks as the most general 
category of co-ordination which incorporate both market and hierarchical structures. 
(Thompson et al 1990).
Analysis of relationships between companies within a group, must therefore identify and 
account for the extent to which co-ordination is achieved through:
• A formal hierarchy expressed in official rules and procedures formulated and actioned 
from a central authority (the centre).
• Market exchange through an accompanying price system.
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• Network mechanisms that incorporate long term mutually beneficial relationships 
based around trust and co-operation.
The purpose of this section is to identify the extent to which market, hierarchical or 
network mechanisms are used to co-ordinate activities between operating companies in 
the corporations investigated in the field research. We will then go on to define the 
conditions under which the various mechanism predominate.
5.1.2 Trading and transfer mechanisms
Before we examine the evidence for the existence of various forms of co-ordination, we 
must first make an important distinction between trading and transfer mechanisms. 
Co-ordination of activities in a multi-divisional company implies some form of 
involvement or intervention by a corporate centre in the activities of business units. 
Involvement is manifested in the form of policies that regulate relationships between 
actors and define ways in which they relate to each other. Analysis of the field research 
indicates that policies are presented in two forms:
• Intragroup trading policies, and
• Intragroup transfer policies.
Intragroup trading policies relate to the concept of an 'authority mandate' defined by 
Eccles & White (1988) and prescribe the degree of freedom internal business units are 
given in selecting and developing relationships with trading partners internal or external 
to the group. Stated simplistically, intragroup trading policies define the parameters of 
'Who you can trade with'.
Intragroup transfer policies relate to Eccles & White's concept of a pricing mandate. 
They define mechanisms by which transactions are carried out in intragroup 
relationships, particularly relating to the pricing of goods and services transferred within 
a group. Transfer policies define the parameters around 'How you trade'.
We now go on to examine the concepts of trading and transfer policies in more detail.
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5.1.3 Intragroup trading policies
Intragroup trading policies guide or direct group actors in the selection and development 
of potential trading partners. Three forms of intragroup trading policy were identified 





Mandated trading policies explicitly define who internal companies will, or will not trade 
with. Typically, they direct internal companies to source from, or sell to other group 
companies and prevent internal actors from developing relationships with potential 
partners external to the group. Mandated trading is operationalised in the form of rules or 
edicts which essentially enforce co-operation between actors and lock them together. 
Rules are designed to govern the organisation through the exercise of power and 
authority over subordinate business unit managers, and reflect the hierarchical form of 
co-ordination identified earlier. Mandated trading was described by respondents in the 
following terms.
". when we first came into the group, we were told we had to buy all our (products) from Millpro...."
Respondent 7.
"... we've got a company where the centre isn’t encouraging, it's told the business to move to this in house 
company". Respondent 25
"There is a clear edict that we buy from X  (an internal company). That was an edict that was put in 
writing by the Chairman some five years ago, almost on pain o f extinction. You have to deal with X ”. 
Respondent 37
Mandated trading rules externally formalise a relationship between group companies. 
Formalisation in the context of relationships refers to the extent to which the relationship 
is agreed upon and made explicit (Ford & Rosson 1982). Formalisation according to 
Hall, Haas & Johnson (1967) is the degree to which rules define roles, authority relations, 
communications, norms, sanctions and procedures.
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One of the features of a mandated trading policy is that group actors may be directed to 
trade with other group companies in instances where they perceive their best interests are 
served by selecting alternative trading partners external to the group, thereby involving a 
degree of sacrifice. A number of respondents commented that edicts may be imposed by 
the centre for them to co-operate with group companies in circumstances they would not 
have chosen given 'market' or 'network' freedom.
"They force you to deal with people that you shouldn't be dealing with from a commercial point o f view" 
Respondent 1
"(Group company A) would have happily de-listed Tastetec, but they weren't allowed to because the centre 
said you mustn't" Respondent 5
"...sometimes you would have to deal with people perhaps you don't feel that it's right to be dealing with in 
a sense o f a situation where you could improve the business if you could deal with some other person" 
Respondent 12.
By directing that internal companies must co-operate with each other, the centre may 
specifically exclude interaction between internal companies and certain external actors. 
This may occur where internal business units are in competition with external companies 
in up stream or down stream markets and there is danger of information leakage through 
an internal trading partner. This situation is examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
5.1.3.2 Voluntary trading
A voluntary trading policy represents the opposite end of the scale to mandated trading in 
that the centre makes a deliberate and conscious decision not to influence trading 
relationships between operating actors and distances itself from customer or supplier 
selection decisions. These are left up to the operating companies to formulate for 
themselves. Under this form of co-ordination, no rules, edicts or procedures are specified 
by the centre as network influences prevail over hierarchical mechanisms in the formation 
of trading relationships. Group companies have the freedom to select trading partners by 
the same processes, and using similar selection criteria, they employ when interacting 
with external customers or suppliers outside of the group. They co-operate with each 
other, only if each perceives it to be in its individual interests.
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A voluntary policy expresses the network form of co-ordination identified earlier where 
individual actors engage in reciprocal and mutually supportive actions to further 
individual goals and objectives. It was described by respondents in the following terms:
".....trade is generated by people within the operating companies and therefore the operating companies 
link with each other no matter what is said at the centre". Respondent 4
"I don’t believe that interaction between sister companies in Brit Chemicals is influenced by rules defined 
by people at the Centre. We work pretty much as autonomous business units and the relationships are 
defined by the autonomous business units themselves" Respondent 32
"We are free to buy wherever we like....... There is no policy what so ever that favours any internal
companies " Respondent 3 8.
5.1.3.3 Encouraged trading
An encouraged trading policy represents a hybrid of the mandated and voluntary forms, 
combining network and hierarchical mechanisms to co-ordinate internal relationships. 
Under this regime, the centre signals to internal operating actors that certain behaviour is 
appropriate (for example, giving a favoured status to an internal supplier), but refrains 
from fully mandating that such behaviour will occur, leaving this to be decided by the 
individual business units. Rules take the form of signals rather than direct edicts or 
commands and are expressed as 'suggestions' and ‘desires’. Informal persuasion prevails 
over formal directives where interaction between business units is seen as desirable rather 
than obligatory. Co-ordination is achieved by the centre through facilitating or brokering 
co-operation between operating companies as a ‘neutral’ third party. The occurrence of an 
encouraged trading policy was extensively reported by Agrifood and non Agrifood 
respondents in field interviews.
"...it's highly unlikely that there will be a clear edict from the centre that the companies have to actually 
trade together. There will be a strong hint from the centre that companies should trade together." 
Respondent 8.
"...the centre does give some guidance about inter-group relationships....and tends to set a pattern, and 
from that point o f view I'm sure the centre does have an influence around all the subsidiary companies in 
terms o f really setting the scenario and setting the pattern and setting an example or at least indicating 
what they would like to see followed". Respondent 19.
"....I don't think anybody's ever said 'Millpro you will buy all your (raw material) from Agrivite' but there 
are clearly strong suggestions that that would be an appropriate course o f action". Respondent 28.
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One form of the encouraged trading policy is for the centre to direct that internal 
companies should have a preferential status as potential suppliers or customers, in that 'all 
things being equal' internal partners will be favoured over external. Such a status was 
described by respondents in the following way:
"I think we do have rules which say all else being equal you should give a sister company preference in 
terms o f supplying or trading compared with an outsider, on the grounds that it makes the best use of 
Group assets ". Respondent 19.
"Agrifood’s policy is to favour internal companies. I  don’t interpret that as one hundred percent supply, 
but I still think if  that's the case you need to have goodjustification, goodjustifiable reasons as to why you 
want to go somewhere else ".Respondent 29.
"...there is a. preferred supplier status that exists. We'd always give them the benefit o f the doubt and try
to support our sister company". Respondent 37.
Eccles & White (1988) identified that when a policy of exchange autonomy is in force, 
even though internal transactions are not mandated they may be encouraged in a variety 
of ways. Top management may use its authority to require a buying centre to source 
internally if the selling centre’s price is within a certain percentage of its best outside 
alternative. They may require that a selling profit centre assigns a salesman to call on 
internal customers, or that a buying profit centre source a certain percentage of its total 
requirements internally.
5.1.4 Evidence of trading policies in respondent organisations
As part of the field research, content frames were constructed to determine the incidence 
of the various forms of trading policies operating within respondent organisations. 
Scenario 44 suggested to respondents that ‘Interaction between sister companies in your 
group is influenced by rules defined by people at the Centre, telling you who you 
should be trading with \  Frame 1 identified responses that indicated the use of 
mandated trading mechanisms to co-ordinate activities between internal business units. 
(Frame 1. Trading rules - actual. Mentions 170. Response 30/10 - i.e. all interviewees 
recorded some form of response measured by this frame). In Agrifood, there was diverse 
opinion over whether trading mandates were adopted by the corporate centre (reflected in 
a mean score amongst respondents of -0.2 with a standard deviation of 1.4). Whilst 
co-ordination through mandated trading mechanism applied to certain relationships, it 
was not a universal feature of all internal interaction. Thus whilst certain internal
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relationships were mandated through the imposition of rules, in other instances, 
respondents perceived that no rules applied suggesting that voluntary mechanisms 
predominated. Non Agrifood respondents generally confirmed that trading relationships 
were not co-ordinated through mandates, but again there was a diversity of opinion 
recorded amongst respondents. Overall, the one sample t-test showed no significant 
difference from zero across all respondents. The Mann-Whitney Test indicated no 
significant difference between both groups.
Frame 4 ascertained whether respondents perceived that they were encouraged by their 
corporate centres to co-operate with other internal companies. (Frame 4. Trading 
encouragement. Mentions 87. Response 29/8 - i.e. 29 out of 30 Agrifood respondents 
recorded responses, and 8 out of 10 non Agrifood respondents). Mean scores for both 
Agrifood and other respondents at 1.9 and 1.6 respectively, strongly indicate that 
encouraged trading represents the dominant form of co-ordination mechanism across 
respondent organisations. This is confirmed by the one sample t-test, which indicated a 
significant difference from zero. No significant difference of opinion was identified by 
the Mann-Whitney test between groups.
5.1.5 Intragroup transfer policies
Group trading policies may be accompanied by the use of transfer policies. Intragroup 
transfer policies define the mechanisms by which exchange takes place between group 
actors by regulating the value of goods and services exchanged between internal 
companies in the form of transfer prices.
In comparison to trading policies adopted by the centre, only two types of transfer policy 
were evident from the field research, those incorporating voluntary mechanisms and 
those that are mandated. The centre either formulates a rigid transfer policy that is 
imposed on the operating actors or refrains from defining any rules at all. Existence of an 
encouraged, hybrid, form was not evident from the field research.
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5.1.5.1 Mandated transfer policies
Mandated transfer policies reflect hierarchical mechanisms similar to mandated trading 
policies in that rules and procedures such as transfer pricing formulae are used to 
calculate the value of goods and services transferred within the group. These formulae, 
defined by the centre, apply consistently to both parties in an intragroup relationship and 
are nonnegotiable. Mandated transactions are usually made at cost or at the prevailing 
market price (Bradach & Eccles 1989).
"We have rules very tightly defined about things like 'this is the price you will pay for (raw material X) and 
this is the price that you will trade (material Y) ". Respondent 9.
"There is a calculation which has been developed over a period o f time by someone at the centre, in our
case that is Brussels by a senior financial guy. This has been developed over a period o f time.
Everybody works to the same formula". Respondent 39.
5.1.5.2 Voluntary transfer policies
Voluntary transfer policies exhibit similar characteristics to voluntary trading policies in 
that the centre deliberately refrains from involvement in decisions of how actors value the 
price of goods and services exchanged between them. Actors are left to reach negotiated 
settlements reflecting market prices and other network influences.
"We've always tried to be at arms length trading". Respondent 14.
"Not any specific rules set. In terms of the way we work with Millpro, we work on a formula basis. Nobody 
from Agrifood gets involved". Respondent 29.
"There's no rules on transfer pricing. That's one o f my concerns that in other companies I've workedfor 
it's been quite clear what those are". Respondent 30.
5.1.6 Evidence of transfer policies in respondent organisations
The use of transfer mechanisms was widely evident in Agrifood and other respondent 
organisations. Scenario 5 told respondents that ‘You hear that people at the Centre have 
recently set rules and guidelines on intercompany trading to ensure matters are 
conducted in an orderly way and ensure individual companies are not disadvantaged*. 
Frame 5 was set up to ascertain the extent to which transfer rules were employed across
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various business units. (Frame 5. Transfer rules - actual. Mentions 65. Response 
21/10). Similar scores were recorded for Agrifood and other respondents (means 0.9 and
1.1 respectively) with no significant difference identified between groups by the 
Mann-Whitney test. Overall, the one sample t-test was significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the use of transfer rules was common across respondent organisations. In 
Agrifood, there was evidence of voluntary and mandated transfer mechanisms in 
operation, whilst in other organisations mandated mechanisms seemed to predominate in 
exchange transfers.
No responses were recorded for Frame 8 (Transfer encouragement) indicating that 
corporate centres either mandate transfer rules between business units or leave these units 
to develop their own mechanisms.
5.1.7 Models of intragroup co-ordination
The previous sections have identified that corporate centres co-ordinate relationships 
between group actors by adopting various forms of trading and transfer policies, 
emphasising different aspects of governance. The means by which a corporate centre 
manages relationships between its business units can therefore be described in terms of 
combinations of these trading and transfer mechanisms as illustrated in the matrix in Fig 
5.1. The model identifies six potential combinations which describe how a corporate 
centre may chose to manage interaction between group actors and may be used to identify 







Encouraged ........... 3 .......... 4
Voluntary
5
....  .....6 .......
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In the case of cell 1 (mandated trading, mandated transfer), the centre defines precise 
rules regarding interaction between group companies in terms of their customer/supplier 
selection decisions and the value of goods and services exchanged between them. This 
represents a close form of full vertical integration and gives actors little flexibility to 
pursue alternative options with customers or suppliers outside of the group. Mandated 
trading/mandated transfer expresses the extreme form of the bureaucratic mode of 
governance where the authority of the centre dominates all other considerations.
In cell 2 (mandated trading, voluntary transfer), the centre defines that group companies 
will trade together but refrains from defining any rules by which this is done. A number 
of internal relationships in Agrifood were described in this way. We will see in Chapter 9 
that relationships based on this combination tend to be vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour of both parties, but particularly the seller who is able to exploit a lock 
advantage of the mandate.
In cell 3 (encouraged trading, mandated transfer), the centre encourages internal 
companies to favour sister business units as customers and suppliers, but specifies that 
certain transfer rules will apply if group companies decide to trade together. Respondents 
38 and 39 from Branded Foods described this as the co-ordination mechanism operating 
in their organisation.
In cell 4 (encouraged trading, voluntary transfer), the centre encourages group companies 
to selectively favour internal customers and suppliers but allows actors to define how 
transactions are enacted in terms of pricing etc... This essentially represents the 
intragroup co-ordination strategy of Agrifood PLC.
Co-ordination strategies described in cells 3 and 4 represent partial or quasi forms of 
vertical integration. Vertical integration notes Harrigan (1985) involves decisions 
whether corporations through their business units should provide certain goods and 
services in house or purchase from outsiders. She applies the term ‘taper integration’ to 
an organisational form where firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on 
outsiders for a portion of their supplies or distribution. We can see that vertical 
integration is a relative rather than absolute concept that can be defined in terms of
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varying degrees of control exerted by a corporate centre over the activities of its business 
units.
Co-ordination mechanisms described in cell 5 (voluntary trading, mandated transfer) are 
similar to those in cell 3 except that in this case the centre gives its operating companies 
absolute and unrestricted freedom to chose customers and suppliers, exerting no pressure 
to favour internal partners. However, internal exchange between actors, where it occurs, 
takes place in the context of defined transfer rules. This form of co-ordination is likely to 
favour internal buyers who have the option to source from group suppliers when transfer 
rules give advantageous terms compared with outside suppliers, but can freely switch to 
other sources (given suitable alternatives are available), to the detriment of sister 
companies.
Finally, in cell 6 (voluntary trading, voluntary transfer), the centre refrains from exerting 
any influence on its business units in terms of trading or transfer mechanisms and is 
sometimes referred to as ‘arms length trading’ in the context of intragroup relationships. 
Under this co-ordination strategy hierarchical influences are superseded in favour of 
network mechanisms. Intragroup relationships are therefore indistinguishable from 
external relationships group companies may have with outside suppliers and customers. 
Until recently, this formed the basis of Agrifood’s intragroup co-ordination strategy.
We can observe from the field research that different forms of co-ordination strategy may 
operate within a single corporation. Feedback from respondents indicates that one 
dominant form tends to represent the basis of the group’s co-ordination strategy of its 
business units, as defined by the corporate centre. However certain relationships may be 
co-ordinated through alternative trading and transfer mechanisms depending on 
individual circumstances. We can also see from respondent feedback that co-ordination 
strategies can change over time (albeit infrequently) depending on the philosophy and 
beliefs of the corporate centre around the benefits of intragroup interaction. It is therefore 
important to identify and examine the factors that influence a group’s selection and 
adoption of a particular form of co-ordination strategy. Under what circumstances, for 
example, would a corporation adopt a voluntary trading policy in favour of one based on 
the mandated form? What factors therefore determine the selection of various forms of 
trading policy by corporate groups?
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5.2 Factors influencing the adoption of various forms of co-ordination
5.2.1 Determinants of trading policy selection by corporate groups
The decision to favour a particular form of trading policy is influenced by two principal 
factors.
• The perceived need to derive synergy from related activities across the group.
• The perceived need to assign individual accountability and responsibility to clearly 
defined areas of the organisation.
5.2.2 Synergy needs
Synergy is the potential benefit that can be realised by exploiting interrelationships 
between business units, and is often employed as justification for acquisition (Vizjak 
1994). The desire to exploit synergies between business units is a significant 
consideration in the selection and adoption of various forms of trading policy by a 
corporate centre. The result of network behaviour is synergistic surplus and the objective 
of each actor in a network is to maximise the share of that surplus through resource 
exchange (Kaman 1993). Synergy in the context of intragroup relationships is created 
when operating companies in near or adjacent network positions co-operate to maximise 
the value of resource exchange for the group as a whole rather than allowing part of it to 
be lost to alternative trading partners external to the group. Corporations rationalise this 
in terms of maximising profitability from in house operations. A corporate centre may 
therefore dictate that certain products or services are transferred exclusively between in 
house companies where they bestow unique advantages in downstream markets. 
Synergies also occur when transaction costs are avoided by combining activities of 
buyers and sellers within a group. The desire for corporate centres to exploit synergies 
between business units was recognised by many respondents.
"I think people are being made aware, particularly the managing directors o f the individual business units
that Agrifood cannot afford to lose opportunity outside the Group if there is any opportunity that can
be taken within the Group". Respondent 22
"There's an initiative at the moment looking at improving our purchasing process and that may well be 
starting to identify the synergies between sister companies, trying to identify more clearly what benefits 
there are between closer links. Respondent 32.
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Corporate centres may therefore take an active role in working with actors to identify, 
evaluate and exploit synergy benefits that derive from interaction between various parts 
of the group. A centre’s detachment from the distractions of routine management 
activities and its pivotal and unique position at the hub of the organisation provides an 
opportunity to take a wider, long term and more objective evaluation of the potential 
value of various interactions and relationships.
"People at the centre have an overview without getting bogged down in the detail and therefore supposedly 
can see the big picture and will then try and look at what is the overall benefit o f Agrifood. Whereas you
might be saying as Tastetec I'm losing £300,000 if  that means we're gaining three million for the
group, then that clearly is a better thing to see". Respondent 18.
"It often is the case however that when you're sitting at the centre away from the particular operating 
businesses you can visualise what's better for the overall concern and I guess that's why we sometimes put 
these people at the centre to actually work on these overall strategies and make sure the building blocks go 
in place ". Respondent 34.
5.2,3 Autonomy needs
The requirement for autonomy and accountability of business units also represents a key 
consideration in the adoption of various co-ordination strategies. In a multi-profit centre 
organisational structure, at least some respect must be paid to the autonomy of profit 
centre managers. (Eccles & White 1988). Multi-divisional companies typically organise 
tasks into units usually on the basis of product or geographic markets to which their 
output is sold. This form of decentralisation is often employed to overcome the problems 
of increasing corporate complexity. Each business unit controls the operations of a fairly 
self contained part of the organisation’s activities. They are perceived to have superior 
knowledge of customers, markets, competitors etc.. and best placed to derive strategies 
that maximise return on the resources invested in them by the centre. Autonomy therefore 
represents the capacity for business units to manage their own affairs and make their own 
judgements. Autonomy is accompanied by accountability. Many corporate managers 
prefer consistent organisation with clear performance measurements (Vizjak 1994). This 
allows an unambiguous allocation of profit responsibility to business unit managers who 
are motivated to achieve performance comparable to that of independent entrepreneurs. 
The fear of dampening entrepreneurial spirit may represent a deterrent to the centre 
involving itself in the activities of its businesses. Corporate management may be reluctant 
to intervene as this may be perceived as compromising the accountability of individual
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businesses to agreed committed objectives, particularly in terms of short term financial 
performance.
"We are part o f a Group and yet each company within that Group, or each operating division within that 
Group, has its own focus, targets, budgets and should be met at any costs" Respondent 1.
"A lot o f our success is that we have individual regions that are very fired up to make an annual budget 
and to grow their own businesses". Respondent 14.
"...the short term stock market focus of the organisation tends to drive people toward their individual
accountabilities and achieving their targets. That’s how people are monitored and managed" Respondent 
32.
5.2.4 Conditions favouring the adoption of voluntary mechanisms
When the philosophy of the group is to value autonomy above the creation of synergy 
then corporate management will tend to favour the adoption of voluntary co-ordination 
mechanisms and refrain from intervening in the relationships between group buyers and 
sellers. In this case, the centre trades off synergy to give its business units greater 
freedom and independence and business managers exclusive authority and responsibility 
for creating value. The realisation of synergies between independent units is usually 
limited to shared finance, legal, accounting and human resource management (Vizjak 
1994). Corporate groups based on voluntary co-ordination mechanisms tend to be 
described as ‘decentralised’. The rationale for adopting decentralised forms of 
co-ordination was described in the following terms.
"...at any one time, all the traders would be seeking to gain the maximum price and the buyers would be 
seeking to get the minimum price and therefore if they can both achieve their ambitions they are unlikely to 
trade with each other. Well I ’ve said that a few times too, to justify the position we were in, but the silo 
management concept division by division being entirely independent and separate was heavily cultivated". 
Respondent 20.
Policies of voluntary interaction are likely to be associated with 'financially controlled 
companies' (FCCs) as identified by Goold & Campbell (1987). The FCC's headquarters 
give their subsidiary businesses clear financial targets, usually of a short term horizon. 
Business managers are left to determine their own strategy to achieve an agreed financial 
target. Goold & Campbell recognise that the head office in financially controlled 
companies is traditionally less committed to the continuation of any business suggesting 
it attaches less value to potential synergy between actors in FCC groups.
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5.2.5 Conditions favouring the adoption of mandated mechanisms
Mandated co-ordination mechanisms are likely to be favoured by corporate management 
when the desire to achieve synergy between business units out weighs the needs for their 
autonomy and independence. Mandated relationships are likely to arise where the centre 
perceives that business units have a tendency to pursue sub-optimal strategies if left to 
their own devices that compromise the attainment of synergy that enhances the prosperity 
of the group. The benefits of co-ordination in these circumstances are seen to outweigh its 
costs. A mandated policy is more likely to be associated with ‘strategic planning 
companies’ (SPCs) using Goold & Campbell’s (1987) classification, where the group 
head office is significantly involved in setting strategies for the group’s businesses and 
ensures that individual subsidiary companies are moving in a consistent direction in 
accordance with the its overall aims and objectives.
Corporate management may also favour mandating interaction between business units to 
avoid undesirable behaviour of actors that compromises the creation of synergy or leads 
to inefficiencies. Examples of such behaviour include excessive rivalry or intense long 
term conflict between group companies.
"There's been an edict from the Chairman but that meant years o f hassle, he just got fed  up with listening 
to it. That's why he did it. A fit ofpique". Respondent 37.
"(Group HQ) does not lay down hard andfast rules, but we do have a good trading relationship...and we 
both understand the game as it were, that we both have to trade successfully with each other and I dare say 
the rules would come if  we started to be silly". Respondent 14.
One of the reasons quoted by respondents for corporate centres adopting mandated 
transfer pricing mechanisms outside of legal and fiscal requirements was the need to 
avoid conflict and argument between business units by defining order and avoiding 
ambiguity.
"I think that if  you can actually set and agree rules to ensure that individual companies are not 
disadvantaged, I think it helps the process. I think if you don't have a process, then you bicker constantly". 
Respondent 16.
"What we're finding is by introducing inter-company pricing mechanisms that are identical across the 
group, then it's taking away a lot of the points o f conflict actually". Respondent 34.
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5.2.6 Conditions favouring the adoption of encouraged mechanisms
An encouraged policy is likely to prevail when corporate management recognises 
potential synergy benefits between business units but at the same time values the 
attributes of autonomy and accountability. It therefore seeks to adopt policies to pursue 
both simultaneously whilst recognising the outcome is likely to be sub-optimal in terms 
of attaining each individually. In doing this, the centre encourages individual companies 
to co-operate but refrains from authorising that interaction between business units will 
happen leaving local business managers responsible for their own policies and decisions. 
Biotec PLC, in a recent annual report, described the themes of encouraged co-ordination 
mechanisms in the following terms:
"In running our individual businesses we're committed to the principle o f decentralisation  We're now
organised in 13 business units replacing our previous group structure to give each business more 
autonomy in its operations, aspirations and culture. We expect each business to have a clear strategy, 
ambitious financial expectations and outstanding people. But in addition to autonomy we expect a lot of 
interaction among our businesses: to save cost by avoiding duplication, to take advantage o f scale (as in 
purchasing), to draw on each other's skills, to serve common customers better, to operate more effectively 
in unfamiliar geography and to create new business opportunities".
Encouraged interaction is likely to be associated with Goold & Campbell's (1987) 
description of a 'strategically controlled company' (SCC), in which SCC head offices 
assist individual business units in devising their competitive strategies but expect them to 
take the main responsibilities for themselves in terms of formulation and implementation.
5.2.7 Co-ordination mechanisms as ideal types
Before we conclude this section on the adoption of various co-ordination mechanisms by 
corporate centres, we must make the observation that mandated and voluntary forms 
represent ideal types rather than absolute examples. It is unlikely that a corporate centre 
would, in practice, sacrifice all opportunities to exploit synergies by exclusively pursuing 
the outright autonomy of its business units, and therefore take no interest in the 
interaction between group companies. Absence of any synergy potential between its 
constituent parts could fundamentally question the rationale for the existence of the group 
in the first place. On the other hand, total pursuit of synergy at the expense of autonomy 
would compromise the status of group actors as separate and individual entities with 
independent management resource and performance targets. In reality, we can say that
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relationships between group actors tend towards being mandated, voluntary or some form 
of hybrid, rather than absolute representations of one form.
5.3 Nature of the centre
5.3.1 Multicentre groups
Our analysis up to now has identified that a primary role of a corporate centre is to 
co-ordinate the activities of its business units to achieve corporate goals and objectives 
that advance the organisation as a whole. In doing this, we have implied that the entity of 
the centre is contained in corporate headquarters or corporate head office as the sole 
policy defining unit of the organisation. Evidence from respondent interviews indicates 
that large multi-divisional groups may have more than one centre that defines intragroup 
trading and transfer mechanisms between individual business units. The concept of a 
multi-centre group was described by respondents in the following terms:
"What’s the definition of'centre'? There are a number o f centres in the group. It could be (group head 
office). It could be a divisional chief executive". Respondent 30
"I think there are two definitions of the centre actually where we are. One is centre as in management 
group, so we are part o f a European management group and therefore within the management group 
certain rules are defined. However within the overall concern, so for instance Euro Industries PLC in that 
sense, there are also certain rules that have been defined there..." Respondent 34
If the centre is defined by its authority to formulate rules and policies around intragroup 
trading, a number of centres can exist in the context of a single corporate entity. Whilst a 
centre may be identified in terms of the corporate head office, trading and transfer 
policies may be formulated at different levels throughout the organisation. A centre may 
operate at a divisional level, where a number of operating companies or business units 
report to a divisional management team or chief executive. Interaction between operating 
companies within the same division may be influenced by co-ordination mechanisms 
defined at the divisional level. At a lower level, where an individual operating company 
is organised into independent business units, an operating company business manager or 
management team may also constitute what can be defined as a centre. This was 
particularly noticeable in one of Agrifood’s subsidiary companies where the unit was 
structured around independent regional businesses and where trading between them was 
significant in terms of the supply of raw materials and the transfer of finished products.
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Whilst respondents generally recognised that the authority of the centre could be invested 
in some form of management group, for example the group main board, or a divisional 
management team, many mentioned the influence of certain individuals in defining 
intragroup trading polices. In Agrifood, many recognised that the current policy on 
intragroup trading originated from, and was driven by, the group CEO, who was 
frequently mentioned in name by respondents. A similar theme was expressed by 
respondent 37 from Western Provisions PLC, who noted that:
"... once the Chairman's issued an edict, everybody that doesn't fa ll in line is in trouble." Respondent 37
Whilst respondent 2, in describing the influence of a new divisional chief executive noted 
that:
". in a short time that X (a new divisional CEO) arrived, he's made very positive inter company
co-operation essential". Respondent 2
Evidence from respondents in this study would indicate that the notion of a single 
management team universally defining intragroup trading and transfer policies across the 









In the example shown in Fig 5.2, corporate management may define interaction between 
divisions A, B and C. Divisional management B may define trading and transfer 
mechanisms between operating companies 1,2 and 3, whilst Operating Company 1 senior 
management may define interaction policies between business units Y and Z. It is 
therefore possible to find the use of voluntary, encouraged and mandated co-ordination 
mechanisms simultaneously operating within the same corporate group at the same time.
5.3.2 Groups as networks
The presence of more than one centre in a group has important implications for the 
pattern of relationships between actors. Whilst the concept of an intragroup triad between 
internal buyer, seller and centre presents a useful micro-analytical tool to examine 
relationships within a group, in reality, intragroup relationships must be considered in a 
wider network context even inside the boundaries of the organisation. In networks, actors 
typically participate in a social system involving many other actors who are significant 
reference points in one another’s decisions (Knoke & Kullinski 1982). The nature of the 
relationships a given actor has with other actors within a group may affect that focal 
actor’s perception, beliefs and actions. Network analysis must take into account both the 
relationships that occur and those that do not directly exist among internal companies. 
Actors in a group may be more extensively connected to some group members than 
others. Whilst internal buyers and sellers may have strong connections with a divisional 
centre, they are also indirectly influenced by co-ordination mechanisms operating in other 
parts of the group.
In our example in Fig 5.2, Operating Company 1 may have a direct trading relationship 
with an operating actor in Division A (say Operating Company 4). Interaction between 
actors 1 and 4 will be conditioned by the attitude of divisional management A and B’s 
beliefs of how internal activities should be co-ordinated. This will be further conditioned 
by the attitudes and beliefs of the corporate centre or head office. The existence of a 
number of centres can add significant complexity to the management of relationships 
within a group. In the above example, interaction between operating companies 1 and 4 
will be influenced to some extent by the relationship between centres A and B. This is an 
important theme which we will return to in Chapter 7 when we examine the influence of 
external actors on relationships between group companies.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with the way corporations co-ordinate the activities of 
their business units. We have examined intragroup relationships in Agrifood and other 
corporate groups and in so doing have presented evidence to support our first proposition 
PI, which states that ‘Intragroup relationships are built around a basic triadic structure 
where interaction between buyers and sellers is influenced by the presence of a central 
actor in terms of the nature and extent to which it mandates interaction between them’.
We have examined the nature and extent to which corporate centres mandate interaction 
between operating companies in Frames 1 and 4 (measuring the use of trading rules in 
respondent organisations) and Frames 5 and 8 (similarly measuring the application of 
transfer rules).
We can conclude that the influence of the centre on relationships between group actors 
depends on the mechanisms it adopts to regulate:
• Who internal actors select as trading partners (The trading policy).
• The value of goods and services transferred between them (The transfer policy).
We have seen that corporate groups may chose to co-ordinate activities through the 
application of rules and procedures - expressed in the form of trading and transfer 
mandates - that represent a direct form of hierarchical control.
At the opposite extreme, a corporate centre may favour the autonomy and clear 
accountability of its business units and refrain from exerting any direct influence on the 
trading or transfer decisions of its operating actors. In doing so however, it indirectly 
signals to business units its wishes and intentions around intragroup trading which shapes 
the expectations of group companies in the way they relate to each other.
We have identified a hybrid form of co-ordination, incorporating both hierarchical and 
network governance mechanisms, which occurs when a corporate centre encourages, 
rather than directs, that operating actors should behave in a certain way towards each 
other.
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Evidence from the field research therefore supports the notion that interaction between 
group actors is conditioned to a greater or lesser extent by the influence of a corporate 
centre.
Finally, we must make one important caveat when applying the first proposition in that 
whilst intragroup relationships can be viewed at a basic level in terms of a triadic 
structure, in reality they form part of a much wider network of relationships. Internal 
actors are directly and indirectly influenced by the activities of other actors inside and 




The effectiveness of rules governing intragroup 
relationships
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we identified that a corporate centre may become involved in 
relationships between operating actors within a group by mandating or encouraging 
interaction between them. We defined the conditions under which a centre is likely to 
take a more interventionist approach in co-ordinating relationships between internal 
business units. We also recognised that intragroup transfer policies may be formulated to 
accompany internal trading rules by regulating the value of goods and services exchanged 
between actors.
We now turn to examine mandated relationships from the standpoint of the operating 
actors and assess the effectiveness of rules governing interaction between group 
companies. Our analysis will be developed to examine evidence to support the main 
elements of Proposition P2 which is presented in two parts.
2A - The effectiveness of mandated rules governing intragroup interaction is a 
function of:
* Operating actors’ recognition of the authority of the centre to impose mandates 
on group companies.
* Each actor’s perception of the meaning of the mandate.
* The strength of associated policing and control mechanisms.
2B - Whilst the centre may mandate interaction between operating actors for the 
benefit of the group, operating actors themselves may favour external relationships 
over internal relationships in pursuit of their network goals and objectives. Under 
these circumstances:
* Operating actors may seek to influence the centre to modify the terms of the 
mandate in ways advantageous to themselves.
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* Operating actors may seek to challenge or circumvent a mandate that limits 
their interaction with counterparts external to the group.
We begin in section 6.1, by examining the conditions for the development of effective 
rule structures governing intragroup interaction. (Part 2A of the proposition). We 
highlight the importance for operating actors to accept that the centre has the legitimate 
right to impose rules over their internal relationships. We recognise the significance of 
internal actors committing to certain fundamental principles that underlie these rules. We 
see that clarity of rule structures and the power of policing and control mechanisms are 
also important variables in devising effective internal trading and transfer policies.
In section 6.2, we investigate how actors respond to the imposition of mandates. (Part 
2B). We recognise that in some circumstances actors may welcome rules governing their 
interaction with other group companies. We also acknowledge that actors may perceive 
that rules and mandates are undesirable from their perspective and may therefore seek to 
limit and minimise their impact.
Finally, in section 6.3, we make some general observations about the effectiveness of 
rules governing intragroup relationships.
6.1 Conditions for effective rule making governing intragroup relationships
The acceptance of quasi-legal rules is the basis of much organisational behaviour (Weber 
1947). Most social activities are governed by rules which are either explicitly defined, or 
unstated and implicit. Indeed the observance of rules has become a generalised value in 
modem society (Katz 1964). Compliance with rules can bring about reliable role 
performance. It is because rules are shared that the activities of many individuals can be 
fitted together and brought into an organised pattern. In this way, rules regulate 
relationships between actors (Worsley 1970). It is through the existence of shared rules 
that stable and predictable patterns of social interaction arise and are maintained. Shared 
mles make for the predictability of actions and the fitting together of activities. In this 
way, mles are formulated to ensure that the activities of actors complement each other.
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A rule of conduct may be defined as a guide for action recommended because it is 
suitable or just (Goffman 1956). In this sense rules represent exogenous and explicit 
commands or edicts. Rules impinge on individuals directly as obligations (in that an 
individual is morally constrained to do something), or indirectly as expectations (in terms 
of the perceptions of others of how an individual actor should react). Obligations involve 
constraint to act in a particular way binding actors either legally or morally. In some 
circumstances, the obligation may be something that is felt ought to be done and may 
stimulate a person to act in a particular way because it is perceived as ‘the right thing to 
do’. On the other hand, an actor may view the rule as burdensome or tedious and regard 
it as either something that has to fulfilled grudgingly (grin an bear it), or something to be 
avoided completely.
The use of rules must take into account three conditions for maximum effectiveness (Katz 
1964).
• The appropriateness of the symbols of authority and relevance of the rules to the 
social system involved. (Legitimacy).
• Clarity of rule structures.
• Reinforcing character of sanctions.
6.1.1 Legitimacy and authority
The acceptance of directives and rules on the basis of legitimacy requires the use of 
symbols and procedures recognised as having the proper and appropriate sources of 
authority. In the case of group policies formulated by a corporate centre that direct that 
operating actors should or must trade together, in order for those rules to operate 
effectively, operating actors must recognise and accept the authority of the centre and its 
legitimate right to formulate and impose such rules within the group environment.
Recognition of the authority of the centre in terms of its right to impose policy mandates 
over operating actors was investigated in Scenario 9. Respondents were required to 
comment on a scenario that “Someone in the centre (of their organisation) argues that 
they have the right to impose any policy they wish on intercompany trading even if  that 
might be to the detriment o f an individual business unit”. Frame 14 was set up to
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measure respondent views whether it was legitimate for the centre to impose trading 
policies on operating companies. (Frame 14. Centre legitimacy. Mentions 50. Response 
22/8). The Mann-Whitney test indicated no significant difference between type 1 
(Agrifood) and type 2 (other) respondents. Mean scores of 0.7 and 0.3 are significantly 
different from zero and suggest that the authority of the centre is not regarded by 
respondents as absolute, as is illustrated in the responses below.
The ultimate authority of the centre in terms of its position at the top of the organisational 
hierarchy was generally recognised and accepted by respondents across the board. 
Authority in this context can be considered as the power or right to enforce obedience.
“I think the important thing is that at the end of the day, the centre are the boss. They set the rules. IfX  
(the Group CEO) finds he doesn ’t want to decentralise the company, we 7/ have a centralised company. 
That’s fine. As a manager you just have to operate within the environment that your senior up the line 
wants you to work within ”. (Respondent 17).
Whilst the authority of the centre was clear however, the issue of legitimacy of policy 
implementation in the way that authority is exercised, is more complex. In circumstances 
in which a mandated trading policy is imposed on actors who are both in agreement with 
the policy directive, the issue of legitimacy does not arise. Complications occur where 
the centre imposes mandated policies that are perceived to favour one actor at the expense 
of another. In these circumstances, whilst the authority invested in the centre remains 
beyond challenge, this authority is bounded by certain obligations incumbent on the 
centre, that make the exercise of that authority legitimate. Thus the arbitrary imposition 
of intragroup trading policies was not considered legitimate by respondents. Actors 
believed they had the right to challenge corporate decisions, whilst the centre was 
obligated to defend and justify its positions around intragroup trading. Such factors were 
considered vital to the successful implementation of intragroup trading policies. Even in 
circumstances where a policy change was recognised as benefiting the group as a whole, 
the centre was deemed to have a duty to follow certain norms of behaviour in seeking 
counsel and consultation with the actors affected by the policy. Many respondents also 
highlighted an obligation on the centre to ensure that operating actors are compensated 
where they have been disadvantaged by policy changes in terms of adjusting 
measurement and reward processes. Policy changes that failed to accommodate this, were 
not considered legitimate.
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“Well ultimately o f course they do have the right, but it would be a very stupid thing to do I t’s really, if
rules are imposed without full explanation they will be disregarded, got round or the circumstance will be 
circumnavigated in some other way, such as ceasing to trade with the group company. I don’t think that 
should happen. I don’t think the centre can impose policy without consent”. (Respondent 4).
“I  don’t believe that within our business, somebody at the centre does have the power to impose without 
being heavily questioned and being challenged”. (Respondent 6).
"I think that i t ’s very wrong that somebody at the centre tried to impose a policy without fully 
understanding every individual business unit, the way it works with other companies and what benefits and
disadvantages each individual business unit would have......  They couldforce the business units to trade
with each other but the only thing that will come out o f that will just be negative. (Respondent 29).
We can conclude that whilst the authority of the centre is acknowledged by operating 
actors, its freedom to impose trading and transfer policies is bounded by certain 
behavioural norms and expectations that limit its ability to arbitrarily impose mandates 
without at least seeking some compliance with actors. We shall see later that where 
actors dispute the legitimacy of trading and transfer mandates, they are more likely to 
engage in activities that seek to subvert these mandates and undermine their 
effectiveness.
6.1.2 Legitimacy and rule acceptance
A related concept to legitimacy is that of rule acceptance and approval. A rule which sets 
a particular standard or pattern of behaviour must be geared to what the majority of actors 
believe is acceptable and are prepared to do. The essence of rule compliance rests upon 
the belief by actors that there are specific imperatives which should be obeyed by all. 
Underlying these imperatives are a set of normative values that the majority of actors 
generally commit to. If there is doubt about what the imperative is, or there are varying 
interpretations of its meaning, the legitimacy basis of compliance is undermined. Thus in 
the group context, if operating actors don’t recognise the fundamental need or imperative 
to trade together, independent of the wishes of the centre, they may be reticent to form 
internal relationships with other group companies where they don’t perceive them to be in 
their interests. In extreme cases, there may be so many defections that the rule itself 
breaks down.
Underlying many transactions associated with internal trading are fundamental 
philosophies or values based around:
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• The desirability of internal companies to co-operate, and
• The welfare of the group as a total entity.
Intragroup trading mandates or signals of encouragement to co-operate together are more 
likely to be countenanced by actors where there is an underlying belief that co-operation 
between group companies is a desirable attribute no matter what the outcome is to 
themselves, or where group interests take priority over those of individual actors. 
Intragroup trading and transfer policies are less likely to succeed on the other hand, where 
individual operating actors put their own interests above those of the group, or where 
they believe co-operation can only be justified where their is a positive benefit to 
themselves no matter what the impact is on other parties.
Williamson, in his analysis of the firm, notes that problems and costs of organising 
transactions depends both on the nature, and also the characteristics of decision makers. 
(Williamson 1984). He uses a model of human nature based around three behavioural 
attributes: bounded rationality, opportunism and dignity. Opportunism in this context is a 
devious kind of self interested behaviour which assumes that at least some people might 
behave in strategic, guileful ways if they can do so undetected and thereby promote their 
own interests. Whilst the assumption of opportunism is something that might be 
regarded as a cynical view of human nature, Williamson recognises that its importance 
only requires that some, not all, people behave in this way and it is therefore difficult to 
tell who is opportunistic and who is not. Williamson’s theories would therefore suggest 
that actors will tend to promote their individual interests above those of the group as a 
whole and only view co-operation with other group companies as a desired activity when 
the perceived outcome is to further these interests and improve their positions 
individually.
6.1.2.1 Desired co-operation
To gain further insight into this issue, scenarios were constructed to investigate an 
apparent dichotomy between group and individual interests. Scenario 48 suggested to 
respondents that ‘Even though the Centre refrains from defining rules on 
intercompany trading, there still seems to be pressures for internal companies to trade 
together \  Frame 66 was set up to measure respondents perceptions around the
89
desirability of co-operating with other group companies. (Frame 66. Co-operation - 
desired. Mentions 76. Response 24/8). Analysis of the one sample t-test produced a 
result significantly different from zero, indicating that the majority of respondents who 
mentioned co-operation between group companies universally regarded it as a desired 
and positive attribute. No significant difference was detected between groups.
In expressing the desire for group companies to co-operate, respondents talked about it in 
terms of being ‘emotively’ right, a ‘fundamental feeling’ that it is the right thing to do. 
Views were expressed that co-operation should somehow occur ‘naturally’ as if there is 
some ‘unwritten pressure’ guiding the action of individual actors even in an environment 
where there are no clear rules or directives mandating or encouraging such co-operation. 
Other descriptors included the notion of intragroup co-operation being ‘intuitively right’, 
a ‘natural inclination’, a ‘first principle’ and a ‘basic instinct’. One respondent raised the 
issue that internal co-operation was something that other stakeholders in the business 
(shareholders and employees) would expect to occur.
'7 think that there is an element o f human nature here that says that its common sense to make the most o f
dealing together even without rules I think as a good manager you will always try to deal internally
first". (Respondent 1).
" nobody has ever said to me you must trade with this business yet I too experience that sort o f  
unwritten pressure to try and do business with them ”. (Respondent 2).
‘7  think emotively people see it as the right thing to do. I don't think that there is anybody in the 
management structure who will say it doesn ’t make more sense to do it, to trade more intergroup ”. 
(Respondent 17).
The desirability of giving a sister company favoured status, particularly in providing 
access to key decision makers was also recognised by respondents. An advantage of 
group membership should be to circumvent and overcome barriers and gatekeepers that 
traditionally deny access to buyers and sellers in dyadic interaction. The requirement for 
co-operation between group companies in the absence of rules and policies imposed by 
the centre was highlighted by some respondents.
"If there were no rules, we would be very proactive in trying to trade with Euro Industries ’ companies, and 
they with us ”. (Respondent 34).
"You ’d  say, 'Well i t ’s got to be right and you don’t need anybody up the line to tell you ’ ”. (Respondent 
40).
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6.1.2.2 Group welfare and individual interests
This issue of group welfare was reinforced when respondents discussed and commented 
on the importance of group prosperity and well-being over that of individual operating 
companies. Scenario 46 was constructed to elicit respondent views around the desirability 
of putting the needs of the group above those of individual actors. Responses were 
recorded and measured in Frame 46. (Frame 46. Group welfare over individual - desired. 
Mentions 133. Response 26/10). The Mann-Whitney test indicates no significant 
difference between type 1 (Agrifood) and type 2 (other) respondents, whilst the one 
sample t-test was significantly different from zero. This indicates a strong sense of 
feeling amongst both groups that the needs of the total organisation should be considered 
above those of individual operating companies.
Respondents generally agreed that it was incumbent on senior business unit managers to 
take into account the implications of their actions on other parts of the group and for 
business unit decisions to be considered in the context of overall group welfare. Altruism 
amongst managers was regarded as a positive trait where policies are pursued that offer 
no advantage to an individual business unit but benefit the group as a whole.
Respondents 32 and 33 continually mentioned the requirement to judge the effectiveness 
of business unit strategies in terms of their enhancement of the ‘Brit Chemicals £’. The 
notion that group interests should prevail over those of individual units was seen as a 
‘philosophy’ and ‘mind set’ that needed to be developed amongst all senior managers. A 
continuous theme expressed by many respondents was that of ‘group loyalty’ and the 
notion that all managers were ultimately connected through a network of activities that 
should be focused on enhancing overall group effort. Conflicts of interests between actors 
should always be resolved in terms of their benefit to the wider organisation
'7 would have thought that people at least understand where their primary loyalties are, which is to the 
group ”. (Respondent 23).
"... the moment you start doing intercompany trading, you ’re automatically moving from concerns just
solely about your business, to overall concern about the group but in a way you've got to actually take
the two parts and say what’s the advantage to the sister company, and therefore what's the overall group 
advantage. That’s important”. (Respondent 34).
"... managers have to be big enough to understand the overall issues”. (Respondent 40).
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Whilst business managers might espouse the desirability of internal co-operation and the 
need to prioritise corporate welfare above that of the individual parts, in practice they 
recognise a different picture characterises organisational life. Frame 44 measured 
respondent views of whether actors actually place the needs of the group above those of 
their own, in practice. (Frame 44. Group over individual welfare - actual. Mentions 125. 
Response 25/10). Results of the one sample t-test were significantly different from zero. 
Analysis of the data suggests that managers, particularly in Agrifood, tend to be driven by 
the priority of their own needs, whilst feedback amongst non Agrifood respondents tends 
to be split around where priorities are actually directed. However the Mann-Whitney test 
showed no statistical difference between each group.
Many Agrifood respondents highlighted the apparent difficulty for actors to broaden their 
span of concern outside the boundaries of their individual business units causing local 
issues to continually dominate management agendas. Actors were described as 
introspective and inward looking pursuing policies that were directed primarily at 
satisfying their individual interests, even at the expense of the wider group. In extreme 
cases, this is characterised by actors pursuing an opportunistic drive for reward (profit) at 
the expense of other group companies. Encouraging actors to appreciate corporate 
problems and opportunities was seen to be difficult to achieve. This inward focus was 
perceived to be particularly strong where a business unit faced severe adverse conditions 
(poor results) or was fighting for survival. In practice therefore it would seem that group 
actors tend to be driven by individual needs and considerations whilst the entity of the 
group seems to be a secondary factor in influencing their behaviour. Given this order of 
priorities, the imposition of a rule that is perceived to disadvantage a particular business 
unit is less likely to succeed in achieving its desired outcome.
“Getting managers o f individual business units to do things that in their eyes are o f no significant 
advantage to them, but could be a significant advantage to the group is very difficult, if  not impossible”. 
(Respondent 5).
“I would put myselffirst. I would put my business first”. (Respondent 13).
" the individual group manager will do what’s right for his unit and he can put in all sorts o f bonus 
structures o f 'well there’s 30% it’s your own budget and 70% into the group budget’ but at the end o f the 
day he wakes up and thinks individual”. (Respondent 35).
Respondents reinforced this concern for self interest when they discussed the legitimacy 
of mandates imposed on them by the centre. In Scenario 3, respondents were asked to
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react to a situation where: ‘Suppose you have a successful relationship with an external 
company fo r  many years and have developed strong personal links with its people,
And suppose your relationship with a similar sister company is not so good. Suddenly, 
the centre is encouraging you to give more of your business to your sister company 
Frame 67 was set up to measure respondents views of the acceptability of the centre 
imposing trading mandates on group actors particularly where the intended internal 
supplier (or customer) is perceived to be inferior to alternatives outside of the group. 
(Frame 67. Inferior trading partner undesired. Mentions 65. Response 20/5). Feedback 
from both groups highlights a considerable reticence to selectively favour internal trading 
partners who are perceived to be inferior. This is confirmed by the one sample t-test 
which is significantly different from zero. The Mann-Whitney test shows no significant 
difference between respondent groups.
Respondents generally believed it was unacceptable for the centre to impose a trading 
mandate that obligated a group buyer to preferentially support an internal seller whose 
product or service performance was perceived to be inferior. It was seen to be 
particularly undesirable to be made to support an ailing sister company by demanding 
other parts of the group attribute it preferential status in their trading relationships. 
Respondents expressed a reluctance to transfer business to favour a sister company where 
the action destabilised existing trading relationships or where there were long standing 
loyalties to external partners. In summary, actors seem reluctant to favour internal 
partners in circumstances when it undermines their own positions.
“I think it would be entirely wrong to do it (move business internally) just on the basis o f being a sister 
company (Respondent 7),
"It would bother me that you are being forced to do that”. (Respondent 10)
" You do see ill informed comments 'well they should trade together and that's the end o f it I think that 
certainly applies to Agrifood companies (Respondent 17).
It would be incorrect however to say that operating actors always pursue their own 
interests as a universal statement. Interviews with respondents 38 and 39 from Branded 
Foods Corp. painted a picture of a company where the group was perceived to be the 
dominant consideration and where individual interests were considered subservient to 
those of the wider organisation.
93
i
"If i t’s right for my business and i t’s right for the global business then nobody would resent that at all. I f it 
was right fo r my business but not for the global business, I wouldn't be making the recommendation ”. 
(Respondent 38).
“The company culture has adapted to this change and gone through the pain barrier in order to achieve its 
targets, i t ’s mission statement if  you like. So with us, the group is more important than the individual 
operating companies. I think that's true ”. (Respondent 39).
6.1.2 Conclusions around legitimacy
We can conclude that trading and transfer rules are enacted in an environment where the 
enactors interpret these rules against the criterion of group and individual interests. The 
centre and the operating actors may have different views of what is defined as legitimate 
and acceptable. The centre may believe rules designed to advance the position of the 
group are wholly legitimate whilst operating actors may perceive that it is undesirable to 
impose rules that compromise their positions individually.
Underlying imperatives of intragroup co-operation and group welfare seem to be 
accepted by actors as desirable attributes of intragroup interaction suggesting that 
mandated rules or intimations of encouragement for actors to work together are regarded 
as legitimate if they increase the welfare of the group as a whole. In practical terms 
however, what actors feel to be right in theory and how they behave in practice may not 
correspond. Williamson's description of actors being driven by guileful self interests is 
perhaps an unfair representation as managers may have ambivalent feelings and confront 
difficult dilemmas in balancing their individual needs against those of the group. 
Therefore predictions that actors will behave in defined ways in response to imposed or 
implied rules is difficult to make with high degrees of certainty.
One prediction that is strongly suggestive from the data centres around the individuality 
and independence of actors. Observation of the data would indicate that the more the 
culture of the group reinforces an autonomous and independent view of actors the more 
likely it is that operating companies will prioritise their own interests above those of the 
group and question the legitimacy of mandates that compromise their individual interests. 
Culture in this context refers to the way things are traditionally done within the group 
environment and is a subject that we will return to in more detail in Chapter 8. We now 
turn to the issue of rule clarity and its impact on actors in intragroup relationships.
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6.1.3. Rule clarity
A related condition for the acceptance of legal norms is the clarity of authority symbols 
expressed in the rules themselves and the content of ‘legitimised’ decisions and rulings. 
Lack of clarity, according Katz (1964), can originate from vagueness of the stimulus 
situation or conflict between opposed stimulus cues and alternative rule structures. We 
can therefore examine the issue of clarity around the following themes:
• Clarity of rule substance.
• Clarity of rules in the context of other rules.
6.1.3.1 Clarity of rule substance
Specific laws can be ambiguous in their substance. They can be so complex, so technical 
or so obscure that people will not know what the edict represents. Ambiguity occurs 
when rules give rise to multiple interpretation. Thus a policy that encourages co-operation 
between group companies ‘where desirable’ is open to wider interpretation than, say, a 
policy that dictates that internal buyers must exclusively source raw materials from in 
house companies. In the first example, actors who are subject to the rule may have 
multiple and varying interpretations around the meaning of ‘co-operation’ and the 
definition of what is deemed as ‘desirable’. We have seen in the previous section that 
what may be desirable for the group may not necessarily be so for individual actors. 
Similar ambiguities arise when rulings are based on notions of giving internal companies 
‘favoured status’ or ‘first opportunity’. In one example cited in the field research, an edict 
that dictated that an in-house supplier should have the majority of group business was 
open to interpretation, and at times hostile debate, around the meaning of the term 
‘majority’. We can therefore say as a general rule that policies that merely encourage 
certain behaviour between actors will always be less precise and open to broader 
interpretation than those that mandate that certain activities will always occur.
The theme of rule clarity was featured in Scenario 7 which suggested to respondents that 
“You seem to be continually in disagreement with a sister company over the meaning 
of group policy on intercompany t r a d in g Frame 11 was set up to measure responses 
that suggested that actors place different interpretation on the meaning of group rules and
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policies of intragroup trading. (Frame 11. Rule interpretation - differences. Mentions 37. 
Response 21/7). The Mann-Whitney test indicates no significance difference between 
groups. A positive mean score of 1.2 recorded by each group, indicates that multiple and 
varying interpretation of mandates is not an uncommon occurrence in intragroup 
relationships. This is supported by the one sample t-test which is significantly different 
from zero.
The issue of multiple interpretation was highlighted by many respondents. For some it 
seemed to be a constant theme of their relationships and a potential source of intense 
conflict when allowed to continue unchecked. The more prescriptive the group becomes 
in its involvement in intragroup trading the more relevant this seems to be an issue.
“What I  find is, there are general rules and general guidelines saying how you should work between your 
sister companies, but nobody's actually precise and it’s left up to the interpretation o f the senior managers. 
So we ’re finding that different managers interpret different rules which is creating quite a lot o f  
confusion (Respondent 40).
Respondents highlighted instances where the ambiguity of rules was deliberately used by 
actors to further their own interests especially in situations where they objected to their 
content. Arguments over interpretation were variously described as a ‘delaying tactic’, 
‘playing ping pong’, and ‘a way of getting round the rules’. Disagreements were seen as 
a way of ‘avoiding doing business’ by putting up ‘artificial and false barriers’.
“I recognise this as a first class excuse for why the relationship hadn’t progressed or the business activity
hadn’t increased.  ‘We ’re satisfying that group policy. We’ve done enough. This is our understanding
o f it. D on’t understand your rationale ’ ”. (Respondent 3).
A counter dynamic to successful rule enforcement may therefore be a tendency to use 
legal loopholes to defy the spirit of the rules. Any complex maze of rules in an 
organisation will be utilised by what Katz (1964) refers to as the ‘guardhouse lawyers in 
the system’ to their own advantage. Disagreements around priorities may be intensified 
where actors deliberately seek to interpret the rules in ways most favourable to 
themselves.
The theme of favourable interpretation was featured in Scenario 8. Frame 12 attempted 
to measure respondent views of whether actors have a tendency to selectively interpret 
mandates in terms most beneficial to themselves. (Frame 12. Rule interpretation - 
selectivity. Mentions 24. Response 12/5). Overall, the one sample t-test was
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significantly different from zero. Although less than 50% of respondents expressed 
views recorded in this frame, those that did, almost exclusively mentioned selective 
interpretation as a feature of existing or past relationships. No significant difference was 
ascertained in responses between groups.
Tactics of using the rules ‘to your own advantage’ or ‘reading meanings’ into rules that 
best fits peoples’ interests was highlighted by a number of respondents. The problems 
associated with ‘rule bending’ were again identified as possible sources of conflict in 
intragroup interaction.
"I suspect that you would always be trying to interpret the policy statement in your favour Everybody is
bound to interpret a policy to their favour and you are bound to get tensions around that”. (Respondent 
18).
“I suppose i t ’s human nature that they interpret those policies in the most positive light to themselves”. 
(Respondent 37).
We conclude that whilst the centre might deliberately define rules in a loose way so as to 
give operating actors leeway in reaching their own decisions and agreements, this 
necessarily blurs the clarity of the rules and introduces ambiguities and potential for 
disagreements. Ambiguity in rule definition gives rise to multiple interpretation of 
meaning that actors will tend to exploit by deciphering rules in ways that best fit their 
individual interests. Differences in interpretation can be used by actors to impede the 
process of interaction with other group companies and may become sources of conflict 
within their relationships.
6.1.3.2 Rule clarity and the influence of opposing rule systems
In some organisations, symbols of authority manifested in rules and regulations are 
sharply enough defined, however the relationship with competing symbols may give rise 
to ambiguities that undermine the clarity of differing rule sets. All organisational 
behaviour is influenced by explicitly defined or implicitly derived sets of rules. Trading 
and transfer policies are enacted in an environment where actors are subject to rules that 
constrain their behaviour in many ways. Rules may define what is ethically and morally 
acceptable in defining how people relate to each other within organisations. Actors are 
guided by general laws that govern society at large. (For example: health & safety 
legislation, employee rights etc.). These rule sets are not discrete and overlap each other
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in many ways. In certain instances, they may complement and reinforce each other. In 
other cases, they may act as contradictory and opposing forces that may undermine each 
others’ effectiveness.
Intragroup trading and transfer rules do not operate in a vacuum or within discrete 
organisational boundaries. They will be impacted on, and simultaneously influence, 
other rules that shape how actors behave and how they define various priorities. One such 
rule set that has a particular influence on the functioning of trading and transfer mandates 
embodies those rules that define how actors are measured and rewarded.
We have seen that multi-divisional companies that are organised into fairly self contained 
business units, commonly reward managers on the basis of financial performance of those 
units in achieving predetermined budgets and targets. The head of each division is 
responsible for its operating performance which is judged by indicators of its success in 
its markets. Indicators include measures such as operating profits, sales growth or market 
share (McGuinness 1996). Repeated failure to perform to required standards usually 
evokes punishments that penalise business unit managers’ personal remuneration or 
status. Business units may lose their identities by being integrated into other parts of the 
group or divested to other organisations. For many companies, the message to business 
unit managers is a simple one, ‘achieve targets or beware the consequences’.
Group actors are likely to be sensitive to trading and transfer rules that they perceive have 
a detrimental impact on their attainment of performance targets (for example by being 
forced or encouraged to use a group supplier whom they regard as inferior to existing 
suppliers outside of the group). In certain circumstances, rules defining the success (or 
otherwise) of operating actors may contradict policies around intragroup trading and 
transfers. Actors may face real dilemmas in defining priorities between various rule sets.
The issue of potential contradictory tensions between trading mandates and performance 
measures was identified at the preliminary research stage of the survey. In Scenario 13, it 
was suggested to respondents that “Your group continuously encourages greater 
co-operation between internal companies yet at the same time values individual 
accountability andfocused responsibility to achieve individual budgets and targets”. 
Frame 21 was set up to record statements that suggested that individually-focused
98
measurement and reward systems were consistent (+) or incompatible (-) with mandates 
enforcing intragroup co-operation. (Frame 21. Measurement/mandate compatibility. 
Mentions 77. Response 27/8). Whilst the mean scores for both groups were negative 
(type 1 respondents -0.4, type 2-1.1) indicating some incompatibility, there was a 
diversity of opinion between respondents whether individually-focused measurement 
processes were conducive to fostering co-operation between actors. Overall however, the 
one sample t-test was significantly different from zero. The Mann-Whitney test indicated 
no significant difference in responses between groups.
The difficulties of reconciling the requirements of both systems was identified by some 
respondents as ‘a fundamental clash’, ‘a paradox and dichotomy’, ‘a real dilemma’ and 
something that was ‘great in theory, but difficult to implement’. The situation is well 
summed up in the following quotation.
“That is, I think, the great problem o f large companies. We ’re all expected, and I ’m being absolutely 
hammered when I ’m below budget, and I must achieve come hell or high water. But I ’m also being asked 
to work with my colleagues and understandfor the greater good o f the group. We need to be more lenient
with sister companies if  you like. I t’s an area I don’t think is understood well enough you ’re asked to
co-operate and understand the other parts o f the group but you are also asked to achieve a very precise 
targeted figure. The two aren’t compatible often ”. (Respondent 40).
Respondents pointed to the fact that mandates diminish or confuse accountabilities of 
individual actors. The more that co-operation is ‘forced’ between actors the less 
accountable they become for their individual actions, and the more the centre assumes 
indirect responsibility for eventual outcomes. Mandates can potentially become excuses 
for under-achievement.
“Agrifood.... is in this transition where it has individual profit centres and yet i t ’s trying to form some type 
of co-operative and it doesn ’t work because you fur the edges and a lot o f the responsibilities and 
accountabilities now within the organisation, aren’t clear ’’. (Respondent 21).
Even where respondents believed there was some degree of compatibility between 
mandate and accountability, the need for ‘trade offs’ and ‘balances’ was still seen as an 
important requirement to accommodate the demands of both policies.
Feedback from the research also shows that the effectiveness of mandates for intragroup 
co-operation is impacted by rules that define the reward systems of actors. Respondents 
pointed to the fact that personal incentive schemes operating within their organisations
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can inhibit rather than enhance co-operation between various parts of the group by 
encouraging actors to put their own interests first. We have seen in a previous section 
that the more actors put their interests above those of the group, the more they are likely 
to challenge the legitimacy of trading and transfer policies that compromise their 
individual positions.
To summarise, trading and transfer policies do not operate in isolation. They may have 
to compete with other organisational rules that simultaneously exert influences on the 
behaviour of actors. Rule execution may require trade offs and compromises which can 
undermine their effectiveness. Competing rule systems may give rise to ambiguities when 
interpreted together. Corporate decision makers need to be aware of potential 
contradictions amongst various rule sets when designing policies around intragroup 
trading and understand the possible limitations that these impose.
6.1.4 Reinforcement
To maintain the acceptance of legitimate authority there has to be some form of 
reinforcement in the form of penalties for violation of the rules. If there is no policing of 
rules they may lose their force overtime for many people. Where there is no enforcement 
by authorities and no sanctions for violations the rule in question may become nullified 
and ineffective.
6.1.4.1 Formal monitors and controls
Policing relationships in multidivisional companies is, by its very nature, a tall order.
The centre cannot be involved in every transaction or every episode of interaction 
between group actors. To do so would soon reach the limits of ‘bounded rationality’. 
Operating actors may resent intrusion on their ‘privacy’ and regard intervention as an 
illegitimate incursion on their domain, signalling a lack of trust on behalf of the centre. 
Yet there may be times when the centre perceives the need to monitor progress of its 
internal relationships, especially where it suspects that policies are not being adhered to.
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Frame 15 was set up to highlight the use of formal reporting and feedback mechanisms 
by which individual operating actors report details of their relationships to the centre. 
(Frame 15. Formal monitoring - actual. Mentions 16. Response 8/3). Examples of 
formal controls potentially include monitoring the level of internal business transacted 
between group companies, monitoring the proportion of a buyer’s business supplied by in 
house companies or regular reporting of joint initiatives and projects. In Scenario 12, 
respondents were told that ‘The policy of your group has changed to encourage more 
interaction between sister companies. Someone at the centre has stated that the only 
way this can be achieved is to develop formal reporting and control systems ’. The low 
level of response recorded in Frame 15 suggests that policing through formal monitoring 
and control processes tends not to feature strongly in the relationships examined in this 
study. Results from the one sample t-test are not significantly different from zero.
Respondents tended to voice stronger opinions around whether formal monitoring should 
be adopted by the centre. (Frame 16. Formal monitoring - desired. Response 27/8. 
Mentions 73). On average, responses tended not to favour the use of formal control 
mechanisms and questioned their effectiveness in enhancing closer co-operation between 
actors. (Mean scores -0.5 type 1, and -0.3 type 2). However the wide diversity of 
opinion expressed by each group indicates that results are inconclusive in this frame. 
Again, the one sample t-test shows no significant difference from zero.
'Of course you ’ve got to have some way o f monitoring what's actually happening otherwise people will 
just say we 're doing it and it won’t be happening. So I don't have any problem with formal reporting and 
control systems not as long as they are relevant and un-bureaucratic and not burdensome and are 
reporting events that matter. (Respondent 23).
7 know pretty well which intercompany relationships work and which don’t, and you can report a bad 
relationship till the cows come home, but i t’s not going to make it a good one. All that does is to record 
the symptom, it doesn’tprovide the cure ’. (Respondent 26).
6.1.4.2 Punishments and sanctions
An alternative form of reinforcement that can be utilised by the centre to implement its 
policies is through the imposition of sanctions and punishments on business unit 
managers who flout or ignore its wishes. These may vary in their extremity from a ‘slap 
on the wrist’ to loss of position and ultimate dismissal as the following quotes illustrate.
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"Personal punishment is usually that your next year's bonus isn't done on the same basis or your lines o f  
progression within the company, I suppose, slow down ". Respondent 1.
"I'd be under no doubt that if  the Chief Executive felt and could determine that there was real benefits by a 
greater degree o f co-operation and collaboration within a group, and an operating unit which isn't doing 
that well is not taking advantages o f these opportunities, then ultimately there's only one course o f action 
open to you, you make changes to the people involved, because the group's potential value is being 
diminished as a result o f the actions o f individuals". Respondent 28.
Whilst various punishments are, in theory, available to the centre, evidence from the field 
research indicates that the imposition of sanctions seems not to feature strongly in the 
management of internal relationships in the organisations under review. There is little 
evidence of operating actors or individuals being formally punished for failure to respond 
to group policies and mandates. Frame 17 recorded respondent perceptions of whether 
punishments were used by the centre to enforce policies in their organisations. (Frame 
17. Punishment - actual. Mentions 63. Response 23/5). Average score recorded for 
Agrifood respondents measured -0.7 and other respondent -0.9, indicating a perceived 
absence of punishment mechanisms. Results from the one sample t-test were significantly 
different from zero. No significant difference was found between the groups. For some, 
punishment was seen as a tactic of last resort to be used only when other measures had 
failed.
"I mean there might be a slap on the wrist but there's rarely any more stringent action taken than that 
which perhaps only encourages people not to follow the rules too carefully if it suits them. I suppose what 
I am saying is that there might just be a hell o f a row about it, the storm blows over and life carries on". 
Respondent 24.
There was some recognition however that the likelihood of sanctions was proportional to 
the importance the centre attaches to intragroup trading. Therefore the probability of 
penalties and punishments being wielded under a mandated trading policy is greater than 
where the centre merely encourages interaction between its business units. (The latter 
represents the dominant form of trading policy of groups featured in this study). We can 
conclude therefore that whilst sanctions may not be presented as codified frameworks or 
formalised punishments, the threat of their imposition may shape the expectations of 
actors in the way they behave towards each other and their relationships with the centre.
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6.2 Reactions of actors to rules governing intragroup trading
Ii previous sections we have defined conditions for maximum effectiveness of rules 
governing intragroup trading. Legitimacy, clarity and the reinforcing character of 
sanctions have been highlighted as significant influences for successful enactment and 
implementation. These variables need to be considered by policy makers at the centre 
when deriving internal trading strategies. We now turn to examine rules from the 
standpoint of the actors who are the focus of edicts and directives surrounding intragroup 
trading.
We must first of all make an obvious point that where actors are in agreement with the 
content and substance of trading or transfer rules then implementation seems not to be an 
issue. We have seen that rules are likely to be accepted when actors perceive that their 
interests are furthered by adopting the terms of the ruling. They are also likely to 
countenance rules where they support and commit to the underlying principles that form 
the basis of particular rulings. Problems arise when actors do not perceive that their best 
interests are served by following a particular rule or where they disagree with the 
fundamental imperative on which the rule is based.
When actors are in disagreement with the terms of mandates governing internal trading 
they essentially have two course of action available to them.
• Seek to change the rule.
• Seek to subvert the rule.
We shall go on to examine evidence of actors adopting these particular responses, but 
before we do so, we must first recognise that there are circumstances where actors may 
favour the adoption of rules governing their interaction with other members of the group.
6.2.1 The desire for rules governing intragroup relationships
Clarity of purpose aligned with well defined rules is often presented as a condition for 
making a particular system or situation attractive. People know what is expected of them
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and what they should expect in turn from others. They may much prefer this clarity to a 
state of uncertainty and ambiguity that may accompany an absence of rules.
Respondent views of the desire for rules governing interaction with sister companies was 
recorded in Frames 2 and 6. The former focused on the desirability of rules in the form of 
tiading mandates. (Frame 2. Trading rules - desired. Mentions 32. Response 15/2). The 
low level of response, is attributed to the fact that when respondents talked about trading 
rules and mandates they tended to do so in terms of their effectiveness rather than their 
desirability and this was recorded within a different frame (reported later in this chapter). 
It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions from the data at this stage.
Frame 6 measured respondent views of the desirability of transfer rules. (Frame 6. 
Transfer rules - desired. Mentions 48. Response 19/6). Responses recorded in this 
frame were more conclusive. In situations where respondents talked about transfer rules 
they tended to do so in terms of their desirability with the results of the one sample t-test 
being significantly different from zero. Mean scores for Agrifood respondents were 1.0 
and other respondents were 1.7. The Mann-Whitney test showed no significant 
difference in responses between groups.
The attractiveness of explicit and uniform transfer rules was identified by many 
respondents. We saw in Chapter 5 that one of the rationales for adopting transfer rules 
was to minimise debate, argument and disagreement between actors. Rules were seen as 
assisting the process of interaction by eliminating the requirement for time wasting 
negotiation and debate. They provide a degree of consistency and predictability which 
actors can commonly identify with, and which act as a ‘catalyst to trading’. Transfer 
mechanisms were seen as a way of avoiding conflict.
"I think that individuals at the operating level who have to carry out these sorts o f trading relationships 
wouldfeel at least there is now if you like a discipline in the way things operate, because a lot o f time and 
energy is wasted on, for example, internal transfer o f product and the negotiations on price, and this seems 
totally ridiculous to do that when you ’ve got customers outside (Respondent 32).
The data suggests that actors may not desire the imposition of trading rules. However in 
circumstances where the centre imposes a mandate that dictates that companies interact 
and work together, operating actors may find it preferable for the centre to further define 
the terms of interaction by specifying rules covering the transfer of products and services,
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thus avoiding potential conflicts and disagreements. In certain circumstances therefore, 
operating actors may welcome intervention by the centre in defining the terms of their 
relationships.
6.2.2 Lobbying tactics for change
When operating actors disagree with the terms of a trading or transfer mandate, one 
course of action open to them is to seek to change the terms to those they perceive as 
more favourable to themselves. Actors may therefore seek to persuade and influence the 
centre to modify its policies to reflect their positions as they see them. Interaction 
between operating actors and the centre may take on the characteristics of a political 
lobbying process where various factions campaign to persuade legislators to make laws 
favouring their particular interests.
Evidence of the use of influencing tactics by actors was featured in Scenario 6 where 
respondents were told that “You hear on the grapevine that a sister company has been 
trying to influence people at the centre to change the rules on transfer pricing in 
favour of their b u s in e s s Frame 13 measured respondent views of whether actors seek 
to persuade the centre to change the terms of mandates in their favour. (Frame 13. 
Lobbying - actual. Mentions 96. Response 30/10). Results from the one sample t-test 
show a significant difference from zero indicating that the use of lobbying tactics seems 
common amongst operating actors who challenge, and seek to change, the terms of group 
policies. (Mean scores type 1 respondents 1.3, type 2 1.6). No significant difference in 
responses was recorded between groups.
Actions targeted at making the centre re-evaluate or abandon its policies on internal 
trading were highlighted by respondents, some of whom admitted to having been 
involved in similar campaigns. For some, it was considered a ‘fact of life’ of intragroup 
trading, what one respondent saw as ‘strategic influencing’. Others associated it with 
symptoms of a deteriorating relationship. Actors may perceive the need to lobby as a 
defensive measure in the expectation that the other party is following a similar course of 
action. Lobbying may take on the characteristics of a classic prisoners dilemma where a 
favourable outcome for one party is likely to be detrimental to another. The lobbying 
process itself, may take many forms. Formal approaches include the use of Tetters of
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persuasion' or, as one respondent recounted, a petition signed by senior managers of the 
business unit. Informal influencing tactics may take the form of surreptitious approaches 
in ‘side conversations in the corridor’ or over the dinner table.
“This often comes down to clout o f course, so the bigger companies if  they are going to be disadvantaged 
will play all kinds o f games, set up major campaigns to have rules altered, changed in some way”. 
(Respondent 34).
“This does happen. In fact, I ’ve been guilty myself. We all do i t”. (Respondent 40).
A more extreme form of the lobbying process occurs when one party tries to bring to the 
attention of the centre, the shortcomings of another. By highlighting the inadequacies of 
an internal supplier for example, a group buyer may try to prove that a trading mandate is 
unfair and unjust. In Scenario 38, respondents were confronted with a situation where 
‘You know that a group company are reluctant to deal with you. You hear on the 
grapevine that it has been attempting to discredit you with people at the centre by 
revealing recent service problems’. Frame 59 recorded responses which suggested that 
internal companies seek to influence a centre’s perception of each other. (Frame 59. 
Centre perception influence. Mentions 75. Response 30/9). Whilst overall scores in the 
one sample t-test were significantly different from zero, the Mann-Whitney test indicated 
a significant difference between Agrifood and other respondents. ‘Strategic influencing’ 
seemed to feature more predominantly in Agrifood relationships (mean score 1.3) than 
other relationships (mean score 0.3). One respondent in Agrifood cited an extreme 
illustration where two operating companies in the same division made separate but 
co-ordinated approaches to the centre to complain about the performance of a common 
group supplier.
Whilst actors may seek to influence the centre’s perceptions of their trading partners to 
their own ends, the use of lobbying carries with it some significant risks. The centre may 
lose patience with continuous arguments between its operating companies. The level of 
trust can rapidly diminish between actors when one suspects that the other is attempting 
to take advantage by manipulating it’s position with the centre to change the terms of a 
mandate; particularly where it believes its reputation within the group is being 
manipulated by a trading partner.
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6.2.3 Subversion tactics
When actors object to the terms of a mandate, they may seek to resist its implementation 
by:
• Directly refusing to execute its terms as specified.
• Erecting barriers and obstacles that reduce its effectiveness or render it inoperable.
In Scenario 29 respondents were asked to comment on a situation where “Suppose that 
the centre directs that you have to purchase a proportion of your raw materials from a 
group supplier despite the fact that there are better suppliers within the market”.
Scenario 28 featured a similar event, but from the perspective of an internal seller. Frame 
48 was set up to measure responses which suggested that operating actors would seek to 
resist or circumvent a mandate they objected to and disputed. (Frame 48. Mandate 
opposition - actual. Mentions 108. Response 26/8). We saw earlier in Frame 67 (section 
1.2.3) that respondents believed it was undesirable for the centre to mandate interaction 
with a trading partner that was regarded as inferior to those outside of the group. Frame 
48 strongly indicates that when a mandate is not perceived to be in their interests, actors 
have few reservations in seeking to oppose or resist its introduction. Results were similar 
across both groups of respondents. (Mean scores 1.5 and 1.2. No significant difference 
recorded by the Mann-Whitney test). Scores for the one sample t-test were significantly 
different from zero.
Many respondents described their resistance in forceful terms.
"I’ve been dragged screaming and kicking into the Tastetec agreement". (Respondent 3).
“I f  it meant that our business volumes wouldfall I would totally resist it”. (Respondent 7).
“I t ’s no good you saying you ’ve got to do it’ because it will never happen. People will fight against it”. 
(Respondent 16).
"I’ve consistently been asked to stop dealing with this company and put all production into us (within 
group), and I ’ve come up with the reasons why you shouldn ’t do that”. (Respondent 40).
In seeking to avoid the terms of a mandate, respondents described ‘constructing ways of 
preventing trading relationships’ by ‘making it difficult to trade’ and doing things to 
‘hinder the imposition’. Respondents talked about accentuating and publicising all the
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problems associated with the implementation of a mandate by being hypersensitive to 
nuances of product performance, service quality and other problems and difficulties.
"Ifyou were forced to do something like that and it would cause problems, you would tend to publicise the 
problems it caused, for sure”. (Respondent 6).
Concealed barriers, that inhibit imposition of a trading mandate, can be constructed in 
numerous ways. Respondents described means of concealing information from sister 
companies and in extreme cases, deliberately falsifying data to their own ends. One 
respondent recounted an incident where it was believed that an internal buyer was giving 
a fuller information disclosure of product development requirements to an external 
company to bias advantage in their favour.
It is extremely difficult for the centre to prove the existence of these artificial hurdles due 
to its remoteness from the mainstream activities and episodes that define relationships 
between sister companies. Feedback from the field research essentially dispels the image 
of the centre as an all-pervading power, issuing edicts and commands around intragroup 
interaction and transaction which operating actors dutifully implement no matter what the 
consequences to themselves. In circumstances where the centre mandates that group 
companies must interact and exchange goods and services, there is no guarantee of that 
happening; which leads us to challenge the effectiveness of mandates that essentially 
attempt to ‘enforce’ co-operation between group actors.
6.3 The effectiveness of rules governing intragroup relationships
Throughout their interviews, respondents continually made reference to the effectiveness 
of trading mandates. This was a area where respondents seemed to have strong 
impressions and views. Frame 3 was set up to record and measure respondent comments 
on the effectiveness of rules that are intended to invoke and enforce co-operation between 
actors. (Frame 3. Trading rules - effectiveness. Mentions 80. Response 24/7). Results 
from the one sample t-test are significantly different from zero indicating that when 
respondents discussed the effectiveness of trading mandates they did so in negative terms. 
This applied to both groups of respondents in Agrifood and other organisations. (Mean 
scores -1.6 and -1.8 respectively). No significant difference was recorded in responses 
between groups.
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A theme underlying many responses suggests that far from engendering an atmosphere of 
co-operation between actors, in practice, rules often achieve the opposite and are 
counterproductive in bringing actors closer together. There are a number of reasons why 
rules may be inefficient in promoting co-operation. Firstly, managers may resent the 
intrusion of rules which limit their freedom of choice and compromise their 
independence. They may see the imposition of rules as representing unacceptable 
incursions in their particular domains and therefore seek to minimise their impact. The 
more the group promotes the independence and autonomy of its business units, the more 
likely it is that managers will be averse to rules that constrain and limit their behaviour.
"This is a very sensitive area for the business. People do not like being told where to buy. They like to be 
responsible for all the day to day issues that happen in business (Respondent 7).
"They have encouraged very actively the development o f autonomous business units  So anybody
coming down heavy handed, trying to impose policy wouldfind it difficult to achieve. (Respondent 32)
A second reason why rules may be inefficient in developing co-operation is because 
actors may suspect ulterior motives behind their introduction. They may be suspicious 
that a trading partner has somehow engineered the rules by manipulating the centre to 
favour its particular interests. They may regard trading mandates as a form of indirect 
influence exerted through the centre. We have seen in a previous section that it is not 
uncommon for actors to lobby the centre to change rules to suit their interests.
A number of respondents highlighted the fragility of relationships when discussing the 
effectiveness of mandates. Results from other studies suggest that for relationships to 
develop into stable patterns of interaction, actors need to feel comfortable with each other 
as they gradually develop trust in each other’s abilities and intentions. Such a process was 
recognised by Ford (1980) when he identified a number of sequential stages that 
characterise the formation of relationships between actors in networks. Conclusions from 
this study indicate that processes that seek to shortcut the bonding between actors, by 
artificially bringing them closer together through the use of edicts and commands are 
more likely to fail in developing close co-operation between actors. Mandated 
relationships tend to be more fragile and more susceptible to breakdown particularly if 
the circumstances that defined their creation, change (for example, where the mandate is 
removed when one of the operating actors is divested by the group).
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In the view of many respondents, the best position that the centre can hope to achieve is 
to catalyse the process of bonding between actors, but it can never effectively provide the 
bond itself. Central authority cannot substitute for actor desire and motivation in the 
formation of stable relationships between actors.
“Inter company trading policies can be established, but you can’t force companies to trade (Respondent
4).
“I think I  would summarise by saying that you can't force sets o f rules, you have to get agreements ". 
(Respondent 15).
“I think that to get a good smooth operation between sister companies, there’s got to be a desire o f the 
people inside those companies to actually want to trade. I don’t think that being set rules and policies can 
actually make you want to do it. I think that it is a philosophy in the mind rather than rules 
(Respondent 16).
“I  think very much you can encourage people to trade together and you can do this both through incentive 
schemes if  you like and general encouragement. To lay down rules to make sure it happens I think is very 
difficult and non productive ". (Respondent 19).
“The relationship will be stronger ifpeople feel they are doing it out o f choice rather than doing it by 
dictate (Respondent 20).
“I  (a divisional CEO) can’t tell them to do it. I can only persuade them and get them together". 
(Respondent 26).
Corporate centres wishing to engineer co-operation between reluctant parties should be 
aware of the problems created by the imposition of mandates and recognise the potential 
fragility and instability of the resulting relationships. We can conclude that corporate 
centres choosing to directly influence relationships between their business units through 
the use of mandates and directives should consider the possible pitfalls and drawbacks 
before arbitrarily implementing their policies across the group.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with the effectiveness of rules governing intragroup 
relationships presenting evidence in support of Proposition P2. The first part of the 
proposition (2A) defines the conditions for the effective operating of rules and proposes 
that the effectiveness of mandates governing intragroup interaction is a function of three 
factors:
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• Operating actors’ recognition of the authority of the centre to impose mandates on 
group companies.
• Each actor’s perception of the meaning of the mandate.
• The strength of policing and control mechanisms.
We have examined evidence in support of these elements of proposition P2 through the 
use of a number of content frames. Frame 14 investigated whether corporate centres are 
seen to have the right to impose trading mandates over operating actors. Frames 66,46,44 
and 67 examined certain fundamental principles underlying intragroup trading. They 
indicate that the authority of rules themselves must be based on specific imperatives 
which are supported and obeyed by all. In terms of actors’ perceptions of the meaning of 
mandates, Frame 11 and 12 highlighted how actors can attribute different meanings to 
corporate mandates, particularly where they advance their individual positions. Frame 21 
showed how the meaning of mandates cannot be interpreted in isolation and must be 
evaluated alongside other organisational rules that simultaneously exert influences over 
the behaviour of actors. Finally, Frames 15 and 16 examined evidence for the use of 
formal controls by corporate centres in the imposition of rules over operating actors, 
whilst Frame 17 investigated whether these are supported by formal policing policies in 
the form of penalties and punishments for non compliance.
Our evidence indicates that the imposition of rules over operating actors is not straight 
forward. A corporate centre needs to ensure that certain conditions are met if mandates 
are to operate effectively. Our analysis shows that relationships between group 
companies are likely to be problematic when the objectives of the operating actors (either 
one or both of them) deviate from those of the centre. When a corporate centre wishes to 
impose its requirements on reluctant trading partners it must ensure:
• It’s authority is recognised by both actors.
• The clarity of rules ensure narrow and precise interpretation.
• Operating actors perceive the existence of policing mechanisms and the threat of 
associated punishments.
These conditions would tend to support the first part of Proposition (2 A); however our 
analysis also shows that rules may be compromised because:
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• Whilst the authority of the centre may not be disputed, its freedom to impose trading 
and transfer rules over operating actors is bound by norms that define legitimate 
behaviour.
• Actors may disagree on fundamental principles that underlie trading and transfer 
rules, particularly those that promote group interests above those of individual actors.
• Rules may be ambiguous in their substance and subject to broad interpretation which 
actors may use to further their own interests.
• Trading and transfer rules cannot be considered in isolation of other organisational 
rules which may constrain and influence actor behaviour in complementary or 
opposing ways.
The second part of the proposition (2B) deals with the response of actors to the 
imposition of rules and proposes that whilst the centre may mandate interaction between 
operating actors for the benefit of the group, operating actors themselves may favour 
external relationships over internal relationships in pursuit of their network goals and 
objectives. Under these circumstances:
• Operating actors may seek to influence the centre to modify the terms of mandates in 
ways advantageous to themselves.
• Operating actors may seek to challenge or circumvent a mandate that limits their 
interaction with trading partners external to the group.
We have examined this part of the proposition by investigating whether operating actors 
use lobbying tactics to seek to change the content of mandates (Frame 13), or whether 
they deliberately attempt to influence a centre’s perception of each other to their own 
ends (Frame 59). In Frame 48, we have looked at evidence for operating actors seeking 
to circumvent or resist mandates to which they are opposed. Finally, we have 
commented on the overall effectiveness of trading rules in fostering co-operation, and 
developing stable relationships between actors within a group (Frame 3).
Analysis of the relationships investigated in the field research has revealed evidence that 
that generally supports the elements of this part of the proposition. We have highlighted 
the use of lobbying by operating actors to change the conditions of rules and mandates. 
We have also seen that indirect influencing tactics can be employed that deliberately
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attempt to shape a centre’s perception of a group trading partner to achieve a similar 
means. We have presented evidence to show that actors can erect barriers that inhibit the 
imposition of rules where they do not perceive these to be in their best interests.
In general, our analysis questions the general effectiveness of relationships that are 
founded on external rules rather than being created through more ‘natural’ bonding 
processes associated with network interaction. Corporate centres wishing to co-ordinate 
the activities of their business units through the use of mandated forms of co-ordination 
policy must be aware of the commitment and effort required to ensure successful 
implementation, and recognise that the formulation of rules by a corporate centre is no 
guarantee of their success.
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Chapter 7 
External influences in intragroup relationships
Introduction
Analysis of intragroup relationships up to this point has focused on the behaviour of 
individual actors that form the basic intragroup triad. The focus of this chapter is to view 
these relationships from a wider perspective and examine the influence of other actors 
that are either external to the triad but internal to the group, or external to the group itself. 
The chapter builds on the theme of external influences identified in the third proposition 
(P3) which again is presented in two parts.
3A - Interaction between operating companies in an intragroup relationship is 
conditioned by:
• Indirect links with other group companies outside of the basic triad.
• Direct and indirect links with alternative customers and suppliers outside of the 
group.
3B - Internal and external customers of the supplier may be competitors of each 
other in downstream markets. Similarly, internal and external suppliers to the 
buyer may also be competitors. Therefore:
• Relationships between operating actors conditions potential interaction with 
alternative buyers and sellers.
• Relationships between alternative buyers and sellers may also affect relationships 
between the operating actors.
In section 7.1, we introduce the concepts of direct and indirect influences in buyer seller 
relationships and identify a number of important influences outside of the main triad that 
potentially condition the behaviour of internal actors.
In section 7.2, we identify how relationships between other actors in the group can affect 
relationships between actors in the triad. (Part 3A of the proposition). We note that links 
between group buyers can make the task of managing internal relationships more 
complicated for internal suppliers.
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Sections 7.3 and 7.4 focus on part 3B of the proposition. In section 7.3, we recognise 
that a relationship between a group actor and buyers and sellers outside of the group can 
be sensitive to an internal trading partner who may be in competition with these buyers 
and sellers in upstream or downstream markets. We note that sensitivity is heightened 
when an external customer is perceived to be given a favoured status which 
disadvantages the competitive position of an internal customer. The latter is likely be 
particularly sensitive of the flow of information between an internal trading partner and 
its competitors outside of the group.
In section 7.4, we identify how relationships between internal actors can influence their 
relationships with external trading partners. The latter may perceive that the risk of 
developing relationships with associate companies of their competitors is so great that 
they may abruptly terminate future interaction or slowly withdraw commitment over a 
period of time. External actors may be particularly sensitive to the risk that internal 
companies are under pressure to pass commercially valuable information to other actors 
within their group.
Our analysis will reinforce the notion that intragroup relationships must be viewed within 
a network context even inside the boundaries of the group organisation.
7.1 Direct and indirect influences in relationships
No business is an island. (Hakansson & Snehota 1989). Business organisations operate 
in an environment where their behaviour is directly conditioned by a limited number of 
counterparts each of which is unique and goal oriented. Relationships are formed through 
exchange processes in a series of interactions that link the activities of actors together. 
Since other parties to the interaction also operate under similar conditions, an 
organisation's performance is influenced by the totality of the network including 
interdependencies of third parties. What is transacted and produced in a relationship can 
affect and is affected by other relationships involving other actors.
Business organisations operate in networks where they will have a series of direct and 
indirect relationships. An indirect relationship is described as 'the relationship between 
two firms which are not directly related but which is mediated by a third firm with which
they both have relationships' (Easton 1992). Examples of indirect relationships include 
that of a firm and its customer's customer, or a firm and its competitors linked through a 
mutual customer. Mattsson (1986) notes that indirect relationships provide the context 
for direct relationships and are capable of strongly influencing them. It is likely that a 
firm will have more indirect than direct relationships which adds to the complexity of 
relationship management. To fully comprehend the nature of a relationship, we must 
view that relationship in the context of other network relationships. (Johanson & 
Mattsson 1987).
Actors in intragroup relationships are therefore likely to have a series of direct and 
indirect relationships. Taking the basic intragroup triad as a unit of analysis (Fig 7.1), 




However the relationship between SI and B1 will also be conditioned by a number of 
other influences. These fall into two categories.
• Other group actors external to the triad (Indirect internal influences).
• Other actors external to the group (Indirect external influences).
7 .1.1 Indirect internal influences
An example of internal indirect influence on a focal intragroup relationship is given in 
Fig 7.2
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In this case, an internal supplier S1 may have direct relationships with group buying 
companies B 1 and B2 as a supplier of raw materials or other goods and services. Buyers 
B 1 and B2 may be connected, for example, by being in the same division, ultimately 
reporting to the same divisional CEO. They may exchange information on common 
suppliers including those within the group. Therefore the relationship between B1 and 
B2 can indirectly influence the focal relationship between S 1 and B 1 within the 
intragroup triad. An external supplier S2 may also be influenced in the same way. It can 
be seen from Fig 7.2 that ultimately all internal relationships are connected via the centre.
A  similar situation is presented in Fig 7.3 Actors SI and S2 could be suppliers of 
complementary raw materials to an internal buyer B l. The focal relationship SI and B1 
will be conditioned partly by any relationship between S1 and S2 who may exchange 
imformation on common customers. External buyer B2 will be similarly affected.
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The first of these situations was investigated in the field research to ascertain if there is 
evidence that buyers exchange information on common suppliers inside or outside of the 
group. The results are featured in Part 2 of this chapter.
".1.2 Indirect external influences




In Fig 7.4, buyer Bl has supply relationships with an internal supplier SI and an external 
supplier S2. SI and S2 are related as competitors, therefore supplier SI may be 
particularly sensitive to the relationship between B 1 and S2 claiming it assists 
competitors to the group as a whole. A similar situation arises where an internal supplier 
has relationships with buyers internal and external to the group. Relationships with 
alternative buyers and sellers may therefore condition relationships between operating 
actors. This situation is examined in Section 3. The analysis sets out to determine 
whether internal companies are especially sensitive of other relationships of their 
customers or suppliers outside of the group.
The relationship between S1 and B 1 will also influence the relationship between B 1 and 
S2. External supplier S2 may perceive that SI has an advantageous position from being 
in the same group as B l. It may also be suspicious of Bl passing information to SI 
which reduces trust between the parties. Similarly, an external customer may have less 
trust of a supplier that is in the same group as one of its competitors. Relationships 
between operating actors are therefore likely to condition their interaction with other
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buyers and sellers. This aspect of intragroup relationships is examined in Section 4, 
which seeks to ascertain whether external buyers and sellers have a lower level of trust of 
Irading partners who were linked to their competitors through common ownership.
We now examine the concept of indirect internal influences in more detail by analysing 
Ihe relationships between buying companies within a group and their impact on a focal 
buyer seller relationship within a triad.
7.2. Relationships between group buyers
Liaison and collaboration between group buyers may occur when common raw materials 
are sourced from suppliers both inside and outside of the group. Information may be 
exchanged between internal buyers on a number of trading parameters including price 
levels, price changes and supplier performance (product and service quality, flexibility 
and adaptation to individual needs). Such information may be used by group buyers to 
improve their position in negotiation with suppliers by providing benchmarks and targets 
and reducing the level of uncertainty. In some cases, they may seek to combine their 
purchases and negotiate on behalf of the group as a whole to exploit economies of scale. 
Lead buying strategies may be adopted in various parts of the group where one operating 
company develops a specific area of expertise to purchases on behalf of the group as a 
whole. Such liaisons are not exclusive to group companies. External customers may 
develop alliances in the form of buying groups to increase their power in negotiations 
against large suppliers.
7.2.1 Collaboration around pricing
Respondent views of whether group buyers collaborate, or collude, to reduce prices from 
their internal suppliers was analysed in Scenario 20. Respondents were presented a 
situation where ‘You have the suspicion that a number of sister companies who you 
supply are colluding in order to force you to reduce your prices’. Responses were 
analysed in Frame 37 (Internal price collaboration. Mentions 61. Responses 29/8).
Results from the statistical analysis are inconclusive for both sets of respondents (Mean 
scores 0.2 Agrifood and 0.0 Other respondents). The one sample t-test showed no
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significant difference from zero, whilst the Mann-Whitney test indicated no difference 
between groups. This suggests that whilst collusion between group buying companies 
can occur, it is not universally common to all situations.
7  must admit I  have heard o f this. (Material X) is a particularly sensitive subject and the London Business 
School is a very good opportunity for buyers of(X) to have what they consider a constructive debate on 
what is a sensible price". (Respondent 3).
7  have to say a group o f us have just done it to a Euro Industrie’s supplier at another Euro Industries 
company who's price structure was too high, and indeed I've heard elements o f this encouraged by a Euro 
Industries main board director in one instance". Respondent 34.
7  don't know I've seen it in this company  We’ve had individual approaches to get us to reduce our
prices but I don't think I have seen collusion to do that". (Respondent 10).
Analysis of the data suggests that collaboration amongst buyers, where it exists, can take 
two forms. In the first instance, it may be officially sanctioned by the centre, in the form 
a group buying committee which is given a mandate to represent the group as a whole. 
Respondent 39 from Branded Foods described a European purchasing committee that 
regularly met in Brussels to review group procurement. Individual operating companies 
may come together to exchange and pool information on suppliers including in house 
companies. In some cases, in house suppliers may have representation on a group 
purchasing committee with internal customers. This can give rise to sensitivities around 
information exchange especially in instances where prices are compared amongst 
suppliers.
Informal collaboration between buyers can develop through internal networks and 
personal contacts. Respondents recognised that informal collaboration was more likely to 
occur in the situation where an internal company seeks to exploit its group status by 
charging prices above that of the market generally and where there is therefore a low 
level of trust of the internal supplier.
i f  you are getting feedback from the market place that prices are lower than what you are paying then 
you would do all in your power, and if it meant getting together with other companies to get your price 
reduced internally then you would do it". (Respondent 13).
"I think if  you can stand by the price you're charging your sister company, you're OK. But if  you are more 
expensive than other people in the market and you've got sister companies colluding to try and get you 
down to the rest o f the market, then I think you deserve what you get". (Respondent 40).
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A. number of respondents recognised that collaboration between buyers around internal 
prices was less likely to occur where group transfer pricing rules were well defined.
’I f  there is an effective policy in force then it wouldn’t happen. I f  there is not a group trading policy and 
here's a free market and your selling price is according to normal negotiation rules, maybe it could 
happen". (Respondent 4).
The existence of internal collaboration between buyers, or the increased potential for it to 
occur within the group environment, has implications for the pricing policies of internal 
suppliers. The issue relates to the transparency of information within a multi-business 
organisation (discussed in Chapter 8). Group suppliers may need to be more sensitive to 
the consistency of pricing in instances where a number of group companies source 
common materials or services from an internal supplier. This may be difficult to achieve 
where price is an outcome of separate negotiations with each group user. There are 
higher risks for internal sellers to be opportunistic in negotiations with internal customers 
where the latter have access to shared information. Agreements between a buyer and 
seller in one part of the group may indirectly influence relationships in other areas. Third 
party suppliers would be subject to similar requirements of consistency.
"We're in a fairly fortunate position that we do supply our ingredients to a number o f sister companies and 
I suppose like any group situation, if  they all sat down one day as buyers and compared notes on prices, 
they might uncover some discrepancies in pricing, shall I say, and therefore that could be a cause for some 
concern". (Respondent 24).
7.2.2 Collaboration around performance
The theme of internal collaboration was further developed in Scenario 21 where 
respondents were asked to: ‘Imagine that a group buyer is unhappy with your service, 
and starts to tell other companies within the group’. Frame 38 examined evidence of 
internal buyers sharing information on the performance of in house suppliers. (Frame 38 - 
Internal performance collaboration. Mentions 63. Responses 28/10).
Respondent feedback was more conclusive for this frame. Statistical analysis gives an 
average mean score of 1.3 for each group of respondents, with the one sample t-test 
significantly different from zero. This indicates that there is strong evidence that supplier 
performance information is commonly shared amongst group buyers (considerably more
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so than pricing information measured in Frame 37). No significant difference was 
recorded between the groups.
7  think that's quite normal. I mean it happens both intergroup and externally". (Respondent 26).
"I'm sure (Operating Division A) have told other companies that they weren’t happy with Tastetec". 
(Respondent 29).
"Well that happens sometimes because our service levels to our sister companies are not as good as they 
should be in some places and that word can get around". (Respondent 34).
'That's probably happened more in the area o f support services". (Respondent 36).
"Yes, we would sit around the table and we would discuss performance criteria and so on and then we'll go 
and hit them as a unit". (Respondent 37).
Some respondents recognised that such action was more likely to be undertaken where 
unsuccessful representations had been made to an internal supplier to improve its levels 
of performance.
"The initial approach is usually fairly direct. I f  nothing happens then messages start to go around a bit. 
People start to spread rumours or whatever, or spread the word". (Respondent 32).
A number of respondents expressed major concerns over poor performance becoming 
public knowledge across the group and were particularly sensitive to the damage of 
internal image. It was recognised that once an internal company gained such a reputation 
it was difficult to reverse. This was particularly true where strong informal networks 
existed amongst group buyers.
"It needs killing fairly quickly. It can soon do a lot o f damage and it's very difficult to stop. We've had this 
happen to us and unless you come down heavy from above onto that individual it's very difficult to stop". 
(Respondent 1).
One reason for the heightened sensitivity is that poor performance can quickly become 
public knowledge inside the group and be communicated to the centre. A number of 
respondents commented that poor relationships with internal companies, caused by 
service or quality failures, can represent a signal to the centre that external relationships 
may also be problematic. Supply relationships with internal companies represent a 
potential mechanism for the centre to evaluate the competency of individual business 
units, in their overall market activities. From the centre's perspective, internal
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relationships represent a benchmark to evaluate an operating company's total relationship 
portfolio. For this reason, a number of respondents commented on the desirability of 
increasing the profile of poor performance of group suppliers.
"I don't see why a sister company should be protectedfrom bad service around the group any more than 
an outside company. I think the thing to do is to help to bring added pressure on that particular company 
to improve its levels o f  service, so I'm sure it happens and I'm sure it should happen and I don't see any 
disadvantage". (Respondent 19).
7.2.3 Summary
Where internal suppliers develop relationships with a number of companies within a 
group, each relationship will be conditioned by the supplier's activities across all other 
relationships. The strength of this influence directly relates to the level of information 
exchange and co-operation between the various buying companies. Evidence from 
respondents in this study indicates that group buyers will seek to increase influence over 
internal (and external) suppliers by sharing information (either formally or informally), 
and using this information to change the behaviour of these suppliers. For supplying 
companies therefore, relationship management may be more complex in the group 
situation where more attention may be needed to consistency of approach across all 
intragroup relationships.
7.3. Internal trading sensitivities in intragroup relationships
Dyadic interaction between companies within the same group will be conditioned by their 
interaction with actors outside of the group. Except in circumstances where the centre 
mandates that group companies must exclusively interact with each other in their 
buyer/seller relationships, group actors generally have choices of interacting with 
potential partners internal or external to the group. Thus a group buying company may 
choose to source goods and services from a number of suppliers from either inside or 
outside of the group. These alternative suppliers are direct competitors to each other that 
are indirectly linked through the focal internal buyer. However external suppliers may 
also be regarded as competitors to the group as a whole. Internal supplying companies 
may therefore be sensitive of a relationship between an internal buyer and one of its 
competitors. Similarly, an internal buying company may be especially sensitive of an
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internal supplier's relationships with other customers, which also represent its 
competitors.
The issue of competitor sensitivity was identified in Scenarios 24 and 25. In the former 
case, respondents were presented with a situation that: ‘An intercompany customer 
seems very sensitive about your relationships with other customers in the market 
and claims that you are assisting one of its competitors’. Scenario 25 presented a 
similar situation from a supplier’s perspective. Frame 42 was set up to record and 
measure responses that indicated a heightened sensitivity of group suppliers to 
competitive relationships of their internal customers. (Frame 42 - Internal supplier 
sensitivity. Mentions 73. Response 24/9). Frame 43 measured competitor sensitivity 
from group customers’ perspectives. (Frame 43 - Internal customer sensitivity. Mentions 
78. Response 25/7).
Results from the t-test in both frames were significantly different from zero. The analysis 
suggests that whilst a heightened sensitivity seems evident in both situations, it is 
particularly prominent amongst internal customers who seem especially sensitive of their 
suppliers’ relationships with other customers outside of the group. Mean scores for 
Agrifood and other respondents for Frame 43 were identical at 1.4. The Mann-Whitney 
test shows no significant difference between groups for both frames.
"I do think there is an underlying paranoia by intergroup customers that we might assist a competitor, 
particularly in the environment in which they may not be trading well but their competitors are". 
(Respondent 2).
"They were concerned that this material o f ours was extremely valuable and giving advantage to their 
biggest competitor". (Respondent 14).
"We would treat sister companies exactly the same as external companies in terms o f confidentiality, but it 
does worry them. It worries them a lot more than external customers". (Respondent 15).
"I fail to understand the weighting that's put on these sort o f things when perhaps 90% of the material that 
you actually consume in the group is actually sourced intercompany. The small additional extra volume in 
my opinion is not really what the whole issue is about. But people get very sensitive and out o f  
proportion ". (Respondent 3 0).
"We do have an example where we're the customer and we're concerned about another business assisting 
one o f our competitors and we've tackled that pretty directly with them ". (Respondent 32).
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The focus of this sensitivity was highlighted in two areas.
• Technology transfer outside of the group.
• Information exchange with external trading partners.
7.3.1 Sensitivity around technology exchange with external partners
Sensitivity arises in intragroup trading where a group selling company develops a unique 
technology which offers significant advantage to buyers across the market. An internal 
buyer may perceive it should have priority access to such technology, especially where it 
has been developed using group-based R&D facilities. Internal selling companies on the 
other hand may perceive it in their interests to offer the technology to external customers 
where they have a larger share of potential demand and provide greater volume or margin 
opportunities. However in doing so, they place the internal company at a competitive 
disadvantage. The situation was identified by a number of respondents.
"This scenario I think has happened in the past and will probably happen in the future...... where we have
been accused o f transferring technology to their competitors and we have been asked not to supply and 
service those customers with certain products and services". (Respondent 8).
"You should be prepared to allow an intercompany supplier to deal with some o f your competitors, but you 
probably don't want them to give the best technology away. They (external customers) are always going to 
have second call on that technology (Respondent 17).
One response from an internal company that has been disadvantaged in this way is to 
exert pressure on an internal supplier to cease supplying its competitors. Leverage may 
be applied either directly or via the centre. A number of respondents reported they had 
experienced such pressures at times in the past.
"The reaction that this created was that they tried to create an exclusive relationship with us to prevent us 
from dealing with their competitors. They tried to restrict us from supplying competitors and what we did 
was to resist it intensely, saying that what in effect they were doing was restricting our profit stream ". 
(Respondent 2).
"We have been told quite clearly that we would be heavily discouraged to trade with sister company's 
competitors and pass over that technology and they would certainly try to influence the parent company to 
ensure that we actually met with their expectations". (Respondent 8).
It was recognised that these circumstances justified the involvement of the centre as a 
neutral arbiter to assess the implications of the technology exploitation on the group as a
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whole. A number of respondents also recognised the potential need to compensate an 
internal company that had been restricted in its market activities because of the positions 
adopted by other group companies
"Ifyou always come back to the fact o f we're going to be judged on PBIT, if the other company feels that 
they are being disadvantaged, then are they willing to give you a certain slug of profit that you would have 
gainedfrom dealing with that competitor to prevent you doing so? If they believe that strongly then that 
should be the case, otherwise it's very difficult to say 'don’t supply the competitor’". (Respondent 18).
The potential imposition of restrictions on the activities of supplying companies may 
motivate them in certain circumstances to adopt measures to conceal interaction with 
buyers and sellers outside of the group. One respondent mentioned how reference to 
external customers was kept out of monthly reports and board minutes for fear it should 
be picked up by companies in other divisions.
7.3.2 Sensitivity around information exchange with external partners
Competitive sensitivity can intensify when one group actor perceives that another is 
passing information to companies outside of the group. In some cases this may happen 
innocently, or out of ignorance. It was recognised that it is difficult for people to fully 
appreciate the implications of dealing with external customers or suppliers in large 
multi-divisional groups with many operating companies and business units.
'"The problem o f being part o f a big organisation is that not anybody at any stage is aware o f  what 
potential there is within the organisation. I've been a group buyer for Brit Chemicals and I  wasn’t always
aware o f the potential customers within my organisation who I could buy on behalf o f ........People aren’t
aware o f the consequences o f their actions because nobody’s told them and they couldn’t possibly foresee 
it". (Respondent 32).
The need to demonstrate and maintain confidentiality in external and internal 
relationships was commented on by a number of respondents, who frequently mentioned 
tlhe requirement to operate 'chinese walls' between group companies. This may be 
difficult to achieve in an environment where the culture of the group is to encourage the 
exchange of information between group actors through the development of 'open 
relationships' as described later in Chapter 8. Group actors may therefore face 
contradictory pressures in terms of information exchange. The need to continually 
reassure internal partners about the confidentiality of information added to the necessity
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of building trust with internal actors was regarded as particularly important in the 
development of stable intragroup relationships.
"You just have to assure them that they are getting sensitive about nothing and that they will always get the 
benefit o f  what we develop with these other people and then again it's down to the relationship as to 
whether they believe you or not". (Respondent 1)
"It would be virtually impossible to avoid potential conflicts like that and the only way through it is to 
maintain absolute confidentiality in all trading relationships". (Respondent 24).
7.3.3 Summary
Sensitivities can arise in intragroup relationships when internal companies interact with 
actors outside of the group that are competitors to companies within the group. These 
sensitivities are heightened where an internal company perceives that an external party is 
given favoured status in terms of being offered superior products or services that may 
disadvantage that internal company in its market place. Internal actors are also sensitive 
to information passing to external actors by group companies that may occur deliberately 
or innocently. This is likely to be more prevalent where internal companies have stronger 
relationships with external trading partners. These factors again add to the complexity of 
managing relationships between companies within a group and heighten the potential for 
conflict and disagreement between them.
7.4 External competitor sensitivity of intragroup relationships
Whilst the relationship between a group company and an external supplier or customer 
may be particularly sensitive to an internal trading partner, the situation may be equally 
sensitive in reverse. An external seller may be especially sensitive of a relationship 
between an internal buyer and an in-house supplier in which it may be in competition. 
The external supplier may have a lower level of tmst in the in house customer because it 
is under common ownership with one its competitors. Similarly, an external customer 
may have less tmst of an in house supplier of one of its competitors. Johanson & 
Mattsson (1987) recognised a similar set of circumstances. They identified that if 
company A first buys from B, but then merges with B, not only is the relationship 
between A and B changed but also A’s relation to B’s other customers, suppliers,
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competitors etc.. They point out that what might be gained in the A-B relationship might 
well be lost through the changes in the other relationships that B had before the merger.
The issue of tmst of external buyers and sellers in their interaction with group companies 
was examined in Scenarios 22 and 23. Respondents were presented with a situation 
where their group had just acquired one of their customers (Scenario 22) or suppliers 
(Scenario 23) and were asked to comment how other customers and suppliers in the 
market might react. Responses were measured in Frames 40 and 41. Frame 40 measured 
mist from an external customer's perspective (Frame 40 - External customer mistrust. 
Mentions 123. Response 29/10). Frame 41 measured tmst from an external supplier's 
position (Frame 41 - External supplier mistmst. Mentions 74. Response 27/7).
Results for the t-test in both frames were again significantly different from zero.
Analysis of responses from Agrifood and other respondents indicates that there is 
evidence of mistmst of suppliers or customers that are in the same group as one of their 
competitors. The evidence is stronger in the case of external customers. (Mean scores for 
Frame 40: 1.3 and 0.9, Frame 41: 0.8 and 0.7. The Mann-Whitney test confirms no 
significant difference between both groups of respondents).
A number of respondents reported direct experience of external customers and suppliers 
being acquired into their group and recognised the difficulty this created in their 
relationships with other customer and suppliers. In some cases, relationships with 
external trading partners were immediately terminated.
"I remember it just happened overnight. And the next day 'Goodbye'. Not because we had done a badjob, 
just policy". (Respondent 11).
"There was no discussion, he got ten minutes and told 'No more business'. So certainly that is where a 
customer delisted us". (Respondent 12).
In other circumstances, business may be lost as a result of a gradual withdrawal of 
commitment from an external customer or supplier. This is likely to occur in 
circumstances where products or services provided by an internal company are user- 
specific or semi-unique, and the external company needs time to search for alternative 
sources.
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'(Company X) took the decision immediately after, although it took some months to actually move to a 
position where they could move the business away". (Respondent 7).
*Sometimes you find that the customer will make a sort of gradual withdrawal". (Respondent 36).
A relationship may gradually terminate over time where the internal supplier continues to 
provide existing products or services but is denied the opportunity to participate in new 
product development or other commercially sensitive projects.
"Some will be very quiet about it and up front say 'OK we accept it won't make any difference'. But.... over 
a period o f two or three years you find you 're not getting any new business. They don't actually take away 
your existing business, but they think twice about giving you new". (Respondent 1).
In certain cases, it was recognised that a corporate group may define official policies 
covering trade with suppliers in the same group as a competitor.
"I think (Company X) would probably have a policy not to buy from Tastetec anyway because they are 
part o f the same group as Petco. Certainly I think a lot o f companies do have that policy". (Respondent 
29).
Respondents also reported similar examples where their companies were suppliers to a 
particular customer which was acquired by a competitor. The response in one reported 
case was to withdraw technical resource and commitment almost immediately.
"That created a great deal o f conflict within the business, and I know it did because even now that conflict 
exists with that customer. People are not prepared to talk to them, supply them or give them technical 
support". (Respondent 6).
Whilst external suppliers and customers may be concerned about other relationships of 
their trading partners, we must recognise that termination of these relationships is not the 
inevitable outcome in all circumstances. A number of respondents reported instances 
where they were able to continue to develop business with external customers and 
suppliers even after their group had vertically integrated through the acquisition of one of 
the existing market players. Past demonstrations of trust and commitment, built up over 
the history of the relationship, were important factors in maintaining bonds between the 
actors in the changed circumstances Other respondents recognised that relationships can 
continue where an internal supplier or customer has a strong market position or where the 
level of rivalry in the industry is less intense. However even in these cases, relationships
between actors undergo subtle changes particularly in the level of trust between them.
¥
129
7.4.1 Concerns of external partners.
The issue of trust was frequently mentioned by respondents in this context. The reasons 
for external actors distrusting suppliers in the same group as their competitors fell into 
three areas.
Firstly, respondents recognised the risk that sensitive information can be passed back to 
an internal customer by a group supplier resulting in a rapid transfer of information to the 
group company. The relationship between group actors was perceived as one of 'insider 
trading'. External customers were concerned that their business potentially becomes 
'more transparent' and 'visible' to one of their competitors. They recognise the risk that 
the group customer could have access to special or unique products or services which 
may have been exclusive to themselves. Even where there is no evidence to support the 
transfer of information to another group company, people may be concerned about the 
potential risk of it occurring at sometime in the future. In these circumstances they may 
perceive the commercial risk of dealing with the group supplier to be too great to justify 
future development of the relationship.
"It will always provide a cloud over the relationship you've got with customers who compete with what 
becomes a sister company". (Respondent 28).
Similar factors influence buyer seller relationships where internal users source products 
or services from internal and external suppliers. The latter may be suspicious that the 
group buyer passes information to the internal supplier particularly if this involves unique 
or unprotected technology.
"It would be a worry particularly if  there's a big technical input coming in from the suppliers, so I think it 
would be a concern". (Respondent 18).
The concern of external actors that an internal buyer or seller can pass information to 
another group company has some justification in that a number of respondents claimed to 
do just that. One respondent admitted passing market pricing information to an internal 
supplier. Other respondents commented on the desirability of communicating 
information to assist sister companies within the group.
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"They do trust you less and they'll naturally assume of course that you're giving market information back 
to your sister company, which you probably would". (Respondent 16).
The second issue of trust relates to the perception by external customers that an internal 
customer will automatically receive a favoured status from a group supplier. In this case, 
the internal customer is assumed to receive priority treatment in terms of, for example, 
being offered special prices or improved delivery terms. The internal supplier is assumed 
to satisfy the requirement of the internal customer as priority over those other customers. 
Again, even where there is no evidence of this happening, people are concerned about its 
potential to occur, casting doubt over the value of future interaction with the internal 
supplier.
"I think human nature would suggest that they would expect the Brit Chemicals subsidiary that is now a 
competitor o f theirs would get a better deal". (Respondent 32).
"I think there might be an element where, yes o f course, your other suppliers would trust you less. I f  your 
business had a record of, at the expense o f everything, dealing within its own business, I think that would 
be". (Respondent 6).
Whilst the perception of external partners may be that internal companies receive priority 
status in satisfying their needs, evidence presented in Chapter 9 suggests that, in practice, 
the opposite is true. Internal companies are more likely to exploit the advantage of their 
group links by taking internal business for granted and therefore putting the needs of 
external trading partners above those of the internal. We explore this theme later in the 
thesis.
The third area of concern centres on the sensitivity of indirectly assisting a competitor by 
trading with another unit within that competitor's group. Interaction with an internal 
supplier may be viewed as increasing the economic value of the group as a whole which 
indirectly benefits other companies within the organisation. In this way, an external 
company may perceive that it is indirectly contributing to the prosperity of one of its 
competitors.
7.4.2 Implications of external partner mistrust
Because of the problem of inherent mistrust in these relationships it was recognised that 
an internal supplier may have to perform to a higher standard than other suppliers when
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servicing an external customer in terms of increased commitment. Consequently, a 
marginal level of performance is more likely to result in the delisting of a supplier. 
Similarly, a group supplier is particularly vulnerable where external buyers pursue 
supplier rationalisation programmes.
Internal sellers need to continually emphasise and reinforce confidentiality in their 
relationships with external customers, demonstrating the effectiveness of 'chinese walls' 
with other parts of their organisation. In the case of one internal supplier this entailed 
entering into legally binding confidentiality agreements.
"... we actually have quite complex confidentiality agreements so that the technical people in Bakery 
Supplies don't talk to Millpropeople about what they've learnt about (Company X and Company Y)". 
(Respondent 17).
"... we have an elaborate system of codings, pools and keeping reports very confidential because if  any 
information got out that could blow our whole contract out of the water". (Respondent 24).
"... it's important that integrity will be tested to the full in this sort o f  situation". (Respondent 28).
In the absence of a history of previous interaction that demonstrate integrity and 
responsibility, the formation of new trading relationships with external partners is likely 
to be difficult. On the other hand, where there is a continuing relationship, internal 
companies are more likely to be targeted by their competitors in situations where they 
interact with internal and external partners. Competitor tactics typically focus on 
undermining external relationships by casting doubt and uncertainty over the integrity 
and trust worthiness of the internal supplier.
"I've actually used that with external businesses very successfully and I've said to people like Company 
X.... 'You don't give them (a competitor company) any business and they'll stop calling, because what 
they're doing, they are bound to pick up information about your business, passing it back and their 
(factories) will respond accordingly to it'". (Respondent 22).
"Of course competitors will exploit that. That's really the gist. The competition will really go at you 
because they will see a chink in your armour". (Respondent 28).
Companies are likely to be most vulnerable at the time when a customer or supplier is 
acquired into the group and the intragroup linkage is formed. Respondents with 
experience of these events recognised that significant attention needs to be given to all 
relationships at the point of take-over. This necessitates the need to communicate the
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rationale for the action and provide reassurance about confidentiality and continuity 
(assuming the internal party desires to continue relationships with external trading 
partners). The situation is regarded as particularly destabilising, requiring sensitive 
management by the internal company if it wishes to continue relationships into the future 
and avoid a 'knee jerk' reaction by existing trading partners.
"Ifyou think about it, it's the change o f ownership o f companies that probably causes more stress than any 
market situation. The knock on effect at all levels, customers and suppliers, can be very dramatic". 
(Respondent 24).
7.4.3 Summary
Relationships between internal actors will indirectly condition their relationships with 
other actors external to the group. The latter may consider the commercial risk of 
interacting with an associate company of one of their competitors as unacceptable and 
seek to exit the relationship either immediately or over a period of time. In circumstances 
where relationships continue to develop, the issue of trust becomes more significant. 
Internal companies may need to demonstrate increased commitment to an external 
partner, to compensate for declining levels of trust, and go to greater lengths to prove 
confidentiality and integrity. Competitors are likely to pick up on these issues and seek 
to undermine the position of an internal actor who is most vulnerable at the time the 
intragroup linkage is formed. We can see therefore that one of the features of these 
relationships is their potential vulnerability to changing circumstances and events.
The consequences of this are that group actors may feel disadvantaged by belonging to 
the same corporate group as potential suppliers or customers. Group sellers may perceive 
that having an internal customer in their group distances them from other customers and 
represents a potential barrier to their market place, effectively inhibiting their 
development. This can be exacerbated if the group customer has a relatively small share 
of the market, or is in a weak position vis a vis its competitors. The situation may lead to 
resentment, especially if the history of interaction between the group companies has been 
adversarial and characterised by conflict.
Group buyers may feel similar concerns about the commitment of external suppliers, and 
may perceive themselves isolated from superior technology of these suppliers. Again,
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resentment can arise when the internal supplier is inferior to other suppliers in the market 
place, or seems to favour companies external to the group.
Corporate strategists considering upstream or downstream integration must be aware of 
the effects this can have on the portfolio of relationships of existing and potential group 
companies. The benefits of acquisition usually focus on the synergies generated by the 
merger of two focal actors within a group. This study highlights the need to balance this 
against the potential destruction of other relationships, and the financial losses that can 
result.
"We have seriously considered not making acquisitions because o f the impact it would make on other 
trading relationships, so it's definitely an important issue". (Respondent 17)
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with the influence of actors outside the basic intragroup 
triad that are either internal or external to the group. Analysis has centred on assessing 
the validity of the main elements contained in proposition P3.
We have investigated the various parts of the proposition through analysis of six of the 
content frames. We have seen from evidence presented by the groups featured in this 
study that where an actor develops relationships with a number of internal group 
companies, each relationship will be conditioned to some extent by the interaction 
between these companies. We have seen that whilst there is inconclusive evidence that 
group buyers formally or informally exchange information on the pricing strategies of 
their suppliers (Frame 37), there is stronger evidence to suggest that buyers discuss the 
performance standards of their suppliers and may use that information to influence their 
behaviour (Frame 38). Similarly group suppliers may exchange information on internal 
or external customers.
We have also demonstrated how relationships between operating actors can be influenced
by their interaction with alternative buyers and sellers. (Frames 42 and 43). Sensitivities
can arise in intragroup relationships where internal companies interact with actors outside
of the group that are competitors to companies inside. This may heighten mistrust and
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conflict between internal actors, particularly where group companies are perceived to 
have stronger relationships, or give favoured status to external trading partners.
Finally, we have seen that relationships between internal actors will indirectly condition 
their relationships with other actors external to the group. We have examined in Frames 
40 and 41 evidence that external customers and suppliers are less likely to trust trading 
partners in the same group as one of their competitors. They may regard the group actor 
as an associate of a direct competitor and be reticent to develop close relationships, 
recognising the potential for information leakage. In extreme cases, this may motivate an 
external partner to suddenly or gradually terminate a relationship.
These factors individually, or in combination, add additional dimensions of complexity 
and uncertainty in managing relationships with internal and external partners. They 
increase the number of factors that must be considered in strategic and day-to-day 
decision making. They heighten the potential for mistrust to develop between the parties 
increasing the fragility and vulnerability of these relationships. They may also be the 
cause of stresses and conflicts between actors that need to be continuously managed 
within the context of their relationships.
Our analysis reinforces the notion that hierarchical factors associated with ownership 
cannot be considered in isolation of network influences and visa versa. Interaction 
between the two systems shape the perceptions of risk and trust that actors have about 
each other. Hierarchical factors can constrain freedom and choice associated with 
networks, even where interaction between group companies is minimal. A corporate 
centre that grants its operating companies complete ‘network freedom’ must recognise 
that in practice, who these companies are associated with influences the perceptions of 
other trading partners that limit opportunities in networks. The network options of a 
group company maybe limited simply because of its direct or indirect association with 
other companies within the group.
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Chapter 8 
Information flow between actors in intragroup 
relationships
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw that a group company maybe especially concerned 
about the transfer of information to one of its competitors via an internal trading partner. 
We also highlighted that an external company may also be concerned about the flow of 
information in the opposite direction. This chapter explores information exchange 
between operating actors within the intragroup triad itself. By taking the group in its 
totality as our unit of analysis, the chapter seeks to identify factors in the group 
environment which are responsible for enhancing or reducing the level of information 
exchange between operating actors. It explores the validity of the fourth proposition 
(P4) which introduces the notion of distance between group actors and proposes that:
The group context is likely to increase the level of information that each party has 
about the other and the breadth of interaction between them. This is likely to 
affect the perception of each other's position.
In section 8.1, we introduce the concept of distance in business relationships and 
highlight that social and cultural dimensions of distance are important in influencing the 
amount of information passed between group actors.
In section 8.2, we examine the influence of the group's culture and recognise that whilst 
information is continuously circulating around the group, the level of the flow is not 
fixed and will be affected by the attitudes and values of operating actors. We will see 
that the amount of information flow will depend on the expectations of the centre which 
will influenced by its attitudes towards intragroup trading. Operating actors may face 
dilemmas of how much information to pass to other actors and how much to conceal 
from other organisational members.
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In section 8.3, we explore how the environment of the group affects the social distance 
between actors and highlight how factors such as group forums, networks and 
grapevines can influence the flow of information between them.
In section 8.4, we measure the effects of the information flow to see if it translates into 
actors having greater knowledge and awareness of each other and whether they are able 
to use this in their relationships.
The overall aim of this chapter is to highlight how group environmental factors can have 
a bearing on the relationships between actors. We are particularly interested to examine 
how people think about information within the group and how their attitudes influence 
the flow of information between them.
8.1. Distance between actors in business relationships
Information transfer lies at the heart of all exchange processes in business relationships. 
Collection of information is one of the primary uncertainty reduction activities that 
firms adopt in their interaction with others. (Easton 1992). In this respect, information 
is a ‘common currency’ of inter-firm relations which other exchange processes operate 
through. Information exchange is therefore a prerequisite for co-operation.
Distance between buyers and sellers represents the sum of factors that prevent the flow 
of information between them (Ford & Rossen 1982). The concept of distance was used 
by Ford (1980) to explain the process of how companies develop relationships over a 
period of time, identifying various stages of relationship development. These stages 
accompany a sequential reduction in distance as actors gradually form more stable 
bonds and closer relationships. Ford notes that the distance perceived to exist between 
buyer and seller has several aspects:
Social distance: the extent to which both the individuals and organisations in the 
relationship are unfamiliar with each others' way of working.
Cultural distance: the degree to which the norms, values or working methods between 
two companies differ because of their separate national characteristics.
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Technological distance: the differences between the two companies' product and 
process technologies.
Time distance: the time which must elapse between establishing contact or placing an 
order, and the actual transfer of the product or service involved.
Geographical distance: the physical distance between the two companies' locations.
Ford's analysis focuses on dyadic interaction between buyers and sellers in a network 
context and would apply to intragroup buyers and sellers in terms of their horizontal 
relationships, taken from a network perspective. In the intragroup situation however, 
additional factors affect the distance between intragroup actors which are independent of 
network influences but are important in mediating their behaviour. These additional 
factors are closely related to those identified by Ford, and primarily concern two aspects 
associated with group membership:
Social distance: the extent to which both the individuals and organisations in 
relationships are familiar with each other through membership of the group and having a 
common parent.
Cultural distance: the degree to which the norms and values or working methods 
between the actors are influenced by the existence of a group culture.
We now explore the concept of cultural distance between group actors, and identify how 
it affects the development of their relationships and particularly the flow of information 
between them.
8.2. Cultural distance between actors
8.2.1 Culture and shared values
Culture in its widest sense typically refers to the pattern of development reflected in a 
organisation’s system of knowledge, ideology, values, laws and day-to-day rituals. 
(Morgan 1986). The notion of'corporate culture' increasingly recognises that
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organisations are 'mini societies' that have their own distinct pattern of values and 
norms, built up and fashioned over time. Thus an organisation may aspire to be, or have 
developed into, a close-knit team that believes in co-operation and working together. 
Another may be highly fragmented, divided into groups and shaped by an ethic of 
competitive individualism. The characteristics of culture gradually come evident from 
observations of patterns of interaction between individuals, the language used and the 
values espoused in daily routines and conversation. Behind these factors, there are 
usually historical explanations why things are done.
All group actors work within an environment. Part of this environment encompasses 
that of the total organisation or group. This imposes certain conditions or constraints on 
the way actors operate. Every organisation has norms about ways of working, style of 
meeting, methods of reporting and co-ordinating (Handy 1985). It is not always 
possible for a group or set of actors to avoid conforming to these norms whether or not 
they are the most appropriate in their circumstances.
Ford (1992) recognises that one of the aspects of information exchange is that of its 
formality. The degree of formality may depend on an organisation’s characteristics (its 
culture) which can affect the nature of its interaction processes with other actors. The 
development of shared norms and values are important in guiding the behaviour of 
actors in dyadic relationships. Hakansson & Snehota (1989) note that in certain 
circumstances, reactive behaviour can only be guided by norms and values based on 
past experience, in the form of organisational routines. Similarly at the network level 
there may exist some shared beliefs about activities and resources (Hakansson & 
Snehota 1994).
8.2.2 Group values and information exchange
The exchange of information between actors in intragroup relationships will depend on 
the extent to which they share a common ideology about the benefits of information 
exchange to themselves and the group as a whole.
We identified in Chapter 6 that one of the prerequisites for the development of effective 
rules governing group relationships is for the actors involved to accept and adhere to
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certain norms and values that underlie these rules. We saw that co-operation may be 
considered as something that actors perceive as a value (something desirable), as well as 
a constituent part of the process of interaction. The welfare of the group as a totality 
was also recognised as an underlying ideology accompanying exchange processes 
within corporate groups.
In a similar way, the level of information exchange in intragroup relationships will be 
influenced by a centre’s perception of the value of that exchange to the group as a 
whole. A group headquarters/centre may operate a deliberate and systematic policy to 
shape the values of its operating companies to enhance the flow of information between 
them. Its rationale for doing this is that it may see information transfer as a way for 
operating companies, through their relationships, to learn from each other and spread 
best practices across the group. A corporate centre may regard information exchange 
between actors as a means of achieving synergies that strengthen the group as a whole.
In Scenario 15, respondents were asked to comment on a situation that: ‘As part of a 
policy to encourage internal co-operation, the centre has formed a number of 
working parties to identify areas of best practice within the group, share ideas and 
compare buying prices’. Frame 26 was set up to explore whether respondents 
perceived that the policies of their groups promoted the sharing of information between 
actors and whether corporate centres took an active role in facilitating the process of 
information transfer. (Frame 26. Information sharing encouragement. Mentions 63. 
Response 28/9). Analysis of responses from Agrifood and other respondents strongly 
suggest that corporate centres take a high profile role in encouraging information 
exchange between all parts of their groups. Results from the one sample t-test were 
significantly different from zero. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 1.7, other 
respondent 1.8). No significant difference was recorded between groups.
A number of respondents mentioned that their organisations were actively involved in 
promoting bench marking exercises between group actors to identify and spread best 
practices between them.
"... look for synergies, look for opportunities to share best practice and bench marking is one o f the 
themes o f the day". Respondent 31.
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In the case of Agrifood, corporate philosophy was expressed in a policy that favoured 
and encouraged interaction between its operating units. To support this, a number of 
Value statements' were developed and publicised by the corporate centre. These value 
statements were widely communicated to managers across the organisation using media 
such as management bulletins (entitled 'Agrifood Values'), video and management 
briefings & workshops. The 'cross fertilisation of skills across the group' was one of 
Agrifood’s stated 'core values'. Information exchange between operating actors was 
regarded in Agrifood as an important mechanism for transferring knowledge across the 
group, to the benefit of the organisation as a whole.
8.2.3 Information exchange and openness
Whilst the exchange of information between internal actors may be regarded as a 
desired attribute of their relationships, the rate of exchange of information will depend 
on how open they are with each other. Respondents regularly referred to 'openness' in 
their relationships with other members of the group. Openness was described by 
respondents in terms of a number of attributes.
Some equated openness with honesty in that internal companies should be truthful in 
their day to day interactions with each other.
"...the buyer's in a slight difficulty, because he would not be expected internally to tell out right lies. He 
shouldn't do ". Respondent 22.
Honesty was also defined in terms of refraining from knowingly concealing information 
from another group company, or withholding information that was recognised to be in a 
sister company's interest.
Openness was equated with the visibility and transparency of information. Some 
respondents used the analogy of an 'open book' to describe their relationships with other 
parties suggesting actors should have an unrestricted access to information across the 
group, including that of their trading partners.
"To me, the whole benefit o f intergroup trading is to make sure that everybody has full cost visibility". 
Respondent 29
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Finally, openness was described in terms an attitude or mind set of the actors. A number 
of respondents equated openness as part of the culture of their organisation.
"I think we are trying hard to promote a culture o f openness". Respondent 18.
The issue of openness was further developed in Frame 68 which was set up to measure 
respondent's attitudes towards the desirability of openness in intragroup relationships. 
(Openness - desired. Mentions 69. Response 20/6). The t-test indicates that whilst 65% 
of interviewees recorded responses in this frame, there was strong support for the view 
that sister companies should develop open relationships with intragroup partners, and 
that openness was perceived to enhance the relationship between group actors. Overall 
scores were significantly different from zero, whilst similar responses were recorded for 
Agrifood and other respondents (Mean scores: 1.4 and 1.8 respectively. No significant 
differences recorded between groups).
"... we have to create within the group an atmosphere o f honesty and openness. I know it is easy to say 
that but in fact it is very important to the success o f the business". Respondent 4.
"There just has to be as much of an openness about the relationship as possible". Respondent 20.
"... it would do our relationship a great deal ofgood if we were more open about it". Respondent 29.
The level of support demonstrated for desired openness in intragroup relationships by 
respondents along with strong evidence that corporate groups surveyed in this study, 
value information exchange between their operating companies, indicates a propensity 
for the group environment to enhance the information flow between operating actors in 
intragroup relationships and increase the level of information exchange between them. 
However when actors discussed the openness of their relationships in reality, a different 
picture is portrayed. (Frame 27 Openness - Actual. Mentions 158. Response 29/10).
Whilst the overall scores in the one sample t-test were significantly different from zero, 
the Mann-Whitney test indicated a significant difference between the responses of 
Agrifood interviewees and those from the other organisations. (Mean scores for 
Agrifood -0.6, other respondents 0.9). Non Agrifood respondents generally regarded
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their organisations as open as defined by the attributes of openness listed earlier. 
Examples of positive statements included:
"There isn't much hiding that I think's going on now". Respondent 34.
"We operate very much within European guidelines and the sharing o f information". Respondent 38.
"You're talking about information in Branded Foods. In fact all information is totally transparent..... It 
follows the culture that we all have learned to live with and comply with, so I think that no information is 
hidden. I don’t believe that to be the case at all". Respondent 39
Agrifood respondents, in contrast, were generally negative towards openness 
highlighting a reticence across the group to develop 'open and frank' dialogues between 
sister companies
".. each company is still trying to maintain a degree o f autonomy and secrecy from their sister". 
Respondent 1.
"... at times..... we might well be part o f a different group". Respondent 2.
" there does seem to be a big reluctance in opening up internally". Respondent 13.
"My experience is that in the Agrifood culture there isn't a great deal o f openness between companies. 
Sister companies within the Agrifood Group and even within (X Division) ". Respondent 17.
Analysis of Agrifood responses indicates a significant reluctance amongst group actors 
to be open with sister companies simply because they did not perceive that openness to 
be in their interest. For some respondents, the desire for openness was regarded as 
jeopardising a negotiating position with another group actor.
Some respondents mentioned a reticence to be open in terms of diminishing the value of 
information power. They perceived that unique knowledge gave them power in the 
group environment and disclosure of that knowledge to an intragroup trading partner, or 
to the centre would weaken their position within the group even to the extent of 
threatening their status as an independent unit. Actors were particularly sensitive to 
disclosing information that could facilitate the integration of activities between group 
companies.
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"I can well understand that this is an issue that people are reticent about disclosing knowledge to others 
and it's one o f the major problems I think we have as a group is to try and get people to share knowledge 
and information, whereas everybody recognises that knowledge is a power base in a way and supports 
them and gives them their uniqueness to the group which they will try and protect or to make sure they 
keep their job, so there is a problem here. We (the centre) on the other hand would endeavour all the 
time to try and break that reticence down on the grounds that if  there's knowledge in the group, the wider 
it can be shared the better". Respondent 19.
This last quote demonstrates the dilemma that can confront operating companies in 
managing information exchange with other group actors. On the one hand they may 
experience pressure from the centre to be open in the context of the group environment 
to enhance the information flow and transfer knowledge that is perceived to be to the 
value of the group overall. At the same time, they may perceive that the disclosure of 
such knowledge is not be in their interest and may therefore seek to retain its 
confidentiality by concealing its existence from other actors, an observation 
acknowledged by a number of Agrifood respondents.
"...everybody gives the impression that they have something to hide". Respondent 11.
Our analysis indicates that openness is not a universal trait in all intragroup 
relationships, indicating that in some circumstances the information flow between sister 
companies may not be heightened by the group environment. We have seen that this 
can occur even in circumstances where a centre values the transfer of information 
between its business units and where people involved in the relationship believe it to be 
a desirable attribute. It was evident from further analysis of Agrifood responses that 
previous group philosophies and mandates relating to intragroup trading were 
continuing to have a profound impact on the behaviour of actors despite a change in 
strategy some years ago.
8.2.5 The impact of previous policies and values
The traditional philosophy of Agrifood for much of its history contrasted significantly 
with its current internal trading strategy. Co-operation and openness between businesses 
was never actively encouraged by the corporate centre and at times had been 
intentionally discouraged. Organisational culture was characterised as results-oriented 
and individually focused. In some relationships this led to rivalry and competition 
between companies and individuals (discussed more fully in Chapter 9) and a reticence
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by some to form closer relationships with other members of the group. Operating actors 
tended to develop intragroup relationships only if they perceived them to be in their 
wider interests. The group environment was described by a number of respondents as 
'working in silos' depicting the notion of being very compartmentalised and isolated. 
Communication between divisions was rare. Individual operating companies developed 
their own value systems and ways of working, expressed by one respondent as 'cultures 
within cultures'. The only unifying philosophy was 'the bottom line'. Hence in the 
Agrifood environment, many managers that had developed a set of expectations 
associated with a certain trading philosophy and set of values were being asked to adapt 
to another. This process that was proving slow, and for some, frustratingly difficult to 
implement.
The Agrifood case illustrates that under certain conditions intragroup trading strategies 
may support a neutral or negative stance towards openness in intragroup relationships.
It would also suggest that over a period of time, group policies and philosophies 
gradually translate themselves into a set of values which become inculcated into the 
value systems of individual actors. These value systems provide an important 
component of the atmosphere in which intragroup relationships develop. They may be 
responsible for reducing the cultural distance between group companies by instilling, for 
example, the attributes of openness within internal relationships that enhances 
co-operation between actors.. They may equally be responsible for increasing cultural 
distance between actors by fixing alternative systems that support other priorities. 
Therefore, if group policies and mandates are to be effective they must translate 
themselves into the value sets of internal buyers and sellers and become institutionalised 
in the relationships in the day-to-day routines of interaction. Openness may not be a 
'natural state' or something that develops because the centre desires or orders it to 
happen. However, once these value sets become embedded in the personalities of the 
actors they act as a 'normative glue' (Morgan 1986) which gives additional bonding to 
intragroup relationships, making subsequent change difficult to enact in terms of new 
policies and corporate philosophies. Organisations seeking to radically change their 
intragroup trading strategies should be aware of the challenge this poses.
To explore this area further respondents were presented with a change situation in 
Scenario 2 which described a predicament similar to the one facing Agrifood. ‘Suppose
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your group has a history of favouring independence of its operating companies and 
has refrained from setting rules and policies on intercompany trading. However 
there is now a change in direction and strategy, and the group is placing more 
emphasis on co-operation between sister companies. You wonder how people will 
react to the new situation9. Frame 9 was developed to ascertain respondents' views of 
the difficulty of implementing new philosophies and changing the attitudes and 
expectations of actors in intragroup relationships.
Scores from the one sample t-test were significantly different from zero, demonstrating 
strong agreement between both groups of respondents that such changes are difficult 
and slow to implement, as the following examples illustrate:
"To suddenly take a group o f managers who for the last ten or fifteen years have been operating in a 
completely isolated environment, they weren't encouraged to talk to others within the group, indeed if  
anything they were discouraged to talk to other people within the group. To suddenly say 'Right guys 
let's all get together and meet once a quarter' which is what we do 'and we're going to turn the world on 
its head' it doesn't work like that and we have found as a group that we've been struggling really - we all 
buy into it, we think it's a great idea - but we've been struggling to really find the key that will unlock the 
holy grail we've actually called it". Respondent 5
"I think it's incredibly difficult for people to change over night. In fact I don't think they can. I think if 
you've come through a business culture that says we will act independently wherever we can, to then be 
told or to be suggested that you work more closely with other people I think is again a desire that is 
unlikely to work in the short term. And by the short term I mean I  can't see it working in less than a five 
year change period. It is very difficult to change that culture". Respondent 11.
The need for strong leadership and commitment from the centre was an undercurrent 
theme expressed strongly by a number of respondents suggesting an organisation 
embarking on such a change needs significant resolve and dedication.
"...until they see real leadership, that the group is serious about it, until then nothing will happen. It will 
just go on as it is ". Respondent 3.
For some, the only way of achieving lasting change in this situation was to bring in new 
people, with mind sets that aligned more closely to the new values, to manage 
relationships between group operating companies.
"....maybe the only way o f doing this is bringing in certain personnel and the only way you will overcome 
the fiefdoms o f a previous culture and if  you want to change that culture, you have to change the people, 
particularly when they are not playing the game". Respondent 9.
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These observations of change have significant implications for the management of 
intragroup relationships, including the development of openness between actors. The 
relationships between buying and selling firms are dynamic and are affected by the 
individual episodes which take place between them (Ford 1982). The present is 
conditioned by the past. Stability derives from the length of the relationship, its 
routinisation and expectations which become held by both parties. New policies and 
values on intragroup trading put forward by the centre will require changes in the 
expectations and routines of actors that will have incrementally developed over 
numerous years. Evidence from respondents suggest that actors are likely to experience 
difficulty in breaking free from these routines and aligning to the expectations 
associated with a new internal trading philosophy. Strong leaderships, patience and 
commitment will be required by the centre to achieve such a change. Where attitudes 
and values are strongly embedded, changing and replacing people with more 
sympathetic mind sets to the new philosophies may be the only change mechanism 
available to achieve this.
8.2.6 Summary
The level of information flow in intragroup relationships is influenced by the value 
systems of each actor in the intragroup triad. The centre’s attitude to information 
exchange between actors will be conditioned by its policies on intragroup trading. It is 
likely to adopt a positive stance towards an enhanced information flow between actors 
where its principle objective is achieving synergy between its business units. It may 
therefore seek to shape the values of individual operating actors accordingly. When the 
centre values autonomy and accountability it may adopt a neutral or negative stance 
which may decrease or retard the flow of information between actors.
Operating actors may face difficult dilemmas in terms of managing information 
exchange in intragroup relationships. On the one hand they will be influenced by the 
values of the centre which may favour the exchange of information between the parties 
in the wider interests of the group. But operating actors will also value information in 
terms of advancing their own positions and may be reticent to impart information to 
other group companies where they do not regard it in their individual interests, even if 
they perceive the information to be to the benefit of the group as a whole.
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Operating actors may therefore seek to hide or conceal information from each other. The 
problems they have in doing this relate to the factors in the group environment that tend 
to increase the visibility of the actors to each other by reducing the social distance 
between them. The level of information exchange in intragroup relationships must also 
be considered in terms of the social distance between the actors involved.
8.3. Social distance
Social distance was defined earlier as 'the extent to which both the individuals and 
organisations in relationships are familiar with each other through membership of the 
group and having a common parent'.
Social distance in dyadic relationships is reduced through the process of interaction. 
Overtime, contact patterns develop between actors to achieve an effective matching and 
adaptation of the systems and procedures of both supplier and customer (Ford 1980). 
This may involve several functional areas and be accompanied by the formation of 
strong personal relationships between individuals in the two companies.
Social distance in intragroup relationships will also be affected by factors that arise from 
group membership which increase the intensity and frequency of interaction between 
actors and therefore increases the knowledge operating actors have about each other.
The factors responsible for increasing the level of interaction inside a group include:
• Group forums and gatherings.
• The mobility of managers within the group.
• Informal information networks and grapevines.
8.3.1 Group forums and gatherings
Social distance between group actors is influenced by the opportunity they have to meet 
socially within the group. In order to enhance the information flow between actors, the 
centre may set up gatherings or formal meetings that physically and socially bring actors 
together. In this way, physical proximity increases interaction amongst actors whilst
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shared facilities does much to enhance group identity. In Agrifood, the centre actively 
facilitated and encouraged operating actors to regularly meet to exchange information 
and share knowledge and experience, through the formation of group committees 
focused on common activities and functions across operating companies. Examples 
included meetings of a group purchasing committee, a group manufacturing forum and a 
group distribution forum, where personnel from individual operating companies were 
brought together in 'common interest groups' and encouraged to identify and share best 
practice and exploit potential group economies of scale. Examples of similar committees 
and forums were evident in other groups. For Agrifood, these committees had a 
symbolic relevance signalling the importance the centre attached to internal 
co-operation and information exchange to the benefit of the group as a whole.
"We've got the operations forum, we've got the research forum  We've got the purchasing
committee. I'm going to do the distribution forum which is pretty well developed. Comparing buying 
prices is mainly down to one forum, but best practice and sharing of ideas, targeting areas o f core 
competence and improvement certainly is in the brief for all the others. That's fine. I think it's a very 
strong signal to the participants in the group that this is an important area". Respondent 20.
The centre may also stimulate the information flow between managers in the group by 
bringing them together in settings such as management training and development 
programmes. Respondents recognised such programmes as common events in their 
organisations. In these settings, managers may be encouraged to exchange information 
about their businesses as part of education programmes using case studies and internal 
group examples. In certain circumstances, this may require managers imparting 
information they regard as sensitive to their business, again highlighting the 
predicament managers confront in managing information flows with other group 
members.
"I'm on the London Business School course. We do make presentations and we do relate it to our 
current experience o f our own businesses and therefore we do talk about strengths and weaknesses o f our 
businesses. My experience to date is that we have been very open about it. All o f us". Respondent 6.
Some respondents highlighted the difficulty of reconciling the need to be open with the 
need to protect what they perceived to be the interests of individual businesses. 
Respondents were particularly sensitive to the image and reputation of their business 
units within the group and highlighted a reticence to disclose information that they 
perceived as disadvantaging their business in front of other group actors.
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"I have been in analogous situations on the technical side, when we used to hold group technical 
meetings, and it is difficult to know how much o f your own business you should put forward in front o f the 
rest o f the companies Respondent 15.
This highlights an important relationship between social and cultural distance in 
intragroup relationships. A reduction in social distance can increase the level of 
information exchange between actors where cultural distance between them is 
simultaneously reduced. Thus putting in close proximity group actors that desire 
openness in their day-to-day interaction, is likely to enhance that openness and raise the 
level of information exchange between them. But where there is a diversity in values 
between actors or where there is reticence to develop open relationships, a reduction in 
social distance is unlikely to be effective in increasing the information flow between 
them. A reduction in social distance does not automatically translate in an increase in 
the level of information exchanged between actors.
8.3.2 Mobility of managers
The level of information exchange between group actors is influenced by the frequency 
that personnel transfer between different divisions and operating companies. The centre 
may again take an active role in facilitating this process in the form of group personnel 
and HR policies. Historically, the transfer of managers between companies and 
divisions in Agrifood was limited. More recently however, the policy of the centre has 
been to encourage the movement of managers as a vehicle for transferring knowledge 
and skills and enhancing openness between business units. The mobility of people is 
therefore another factor that can reduce social distance between actors.
"I am very much in favour ofpeople moving within different parts o f the group because that is the most 
effective way o f transferring know how and technology within a group like Agrifood, people moving from 
England to France to Italy what ever, and actually across the group from different divisions. It is a very 
effective way o f moving skills and knowledge through out the group Respondent 4.
In Scenario 17, respondents were asked to comment on a situation that: ‘A senior 
manager in your company is promoted to a position in a sister company with 
which you have a trading relationship. You are considering whether this is a good 
or bad thing’. Frame 30 measured respondent views whether it was desirable for 
people to move between operating companies in terms of enhancing relationships 
between them. (Frame 30. People transfer - desired. Mentions 37. Response 19/7).
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Of the respondents expressing an opinion, there was almost universal agreement around 
the desirability of managers moving between operating actors as a means of facilitating 
and strengthening relationships through the development of personal bonds and 
friendships. (Mean scores for Agrifood 1.8, other respondents 1.9. One sample t-test 
significantly different from zero). These managers were seen as being able to exploit 
their knowledge of both operating units to bring them closer together by, for example, 
facilitating introductions between people and helping them to understand each others' 
positions. The description of'ambassador' was used to describe the position of the 
transferee by one respondent.
"From my personal point o f view, I  clearly saw it was a good move and I am very keen that suppliers and 
customers understand each others' businesses, and so for me as a customer to move into Tastetec as a 
supplier to Petco, I saw that as a very positive thing". Respondent 5.
Whilst the mobility of people was generally perceived as positive in the group context, 
some respondents highlighted experiences where the movement of a particular 
individual between companies was generally detrimental to the relationship between 
them. This was particularly evident where that individual divulged sensitive 
information to the disadvantage of the previous employer. Examples of sensitive 
information quoted by respondents in this context included the exposure of: weaknesses 
in operating procedures, failures to follow group mandates or policies (for example by 
favouring an external rather than an internal partner) and information on cost levels and 
profitability. The personality of individual managers along with their relationships with 
previous group employers were regarded as important influences as the way individuals 
responded to the situation.
"Going back to one o f the early scenarios you said about people hiding things. Inevitably things are 
hidden and therefore you're a poacher turned gamekeeper, or a gamekeeper turned poacher and I've seen 
the results of that on both sides and sometimes the company can be turned against the sister company 
through a one sided comment being made by the person who is actually transferring". Respondent 11.
The analysis highlights the issue that in some areas, operating actors may have little 
control over the information flow with their sister companies despite their desires to 
withhold certain information. The factor that is also significant in the influence of group 
grapevines and networks.
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8.3.3 Informal networks and grapevines
Information and knowledge are transferred within an organisation through informal 
networks and grapevines which may prove powerful communication channels. A 
number of respondents commented that informal networks were formed amongst people 
from different operating companies during group development programmes which 
continued to function after these had officially terminated. Again the formation of 
personal bonds and friendships was cited as an important outcome of such events.
"The feedback I get was one o f the best advantages o f these LBS (London Business School) schemes is 
that the relationships you set up with other people within the group and you are never quite sure where 
they're going to come in useful But people who've been on these courses tell me that one o f the best 
things they remember getting out o f it is knowing other people around the group and knowing where to 
go when you want to find something out and being able to pick up the phone and speak to someone 
personally". Respondent 19.
Respondent 17 commenting about Euro Industry’s graduate development programme 
noted that the Group consciously moved new graduates in the early stages of their 
careers that would entail three of four transfers in the first few years.
"By the time you've got to your early thirties you've been through enough Euro Industry courses and 
you've worked in enough companies that you know somebody almost everywhere". Respondent 17.
The existence of group grapevines was acknowledged by most interviewees. In 
Scenario 45, respondents were told that ‘Being in the same group, you are always 
picking up information on the grapevine about sister companies’. Analysis of 
Frame 28, (Informal information networks. Mentions 72. Response 27/10), indicates 
that although informal information systems are more predominant and influential in 
Agrifood than in other organisations, both groups acknowledge them as significant 
information sources within the general environment of the group. Scores from the one 
sample t-test were significantly different from zero for Frame 28.
Grapevine information was variously described as 'gossip', 'tittle tattle', 'idle chit chat', 
'rumour' and 'speculation’ and was regarded as an inevitable consequence of large 
organisations.
"It is true that you are always picking up information on the grapevine about sister companies". 
Respondent 4.
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"You pick up a lot more information about your sister company than you do about external companies". 
Respondent 40.
Many respondents recognised the potential power of the grapevine for disseminating 
information across the organisation and regarded it as supplementary to other forms of 
communication. Some admitted using the grapevine to transmit specific messages to 
other parts of the group. It was also recognised that the grapevine had the potential to 
become the dominant mode of intragroup communication if other forms were 
ineffective; for example where there is a low level of openness between sister 
companies.
"It's a wonderful way o f getting news, a way o f disseminating information as well. And I think on 
balance if  you are gaining more information than you give you feel you've made a profit on the deal. It's 
no different if  you are in a comfortable family set up that you hear about other members o f the family. It 
can be good and bad news and I think there is no faster method o f getting information ". Respondent 11.
It was also recognised by many that the grapevine was particularly effective in 
transmitting negative rather than positive news, confirming the adage that 'bad news 
travels quickly', and highlighting the 'immediacy' of informal communication. A 
number of respondents quoted examples where an individual operating company had 
particular trading difficulties, which quickly became well known through out the group.
"All the time, every day, every hour. It's usually the bad stuff that flies". Respondent 37.
8.3.4 Social distance in groups and networks
A number of group-related factors have been identified in previous sections that 
influence the social distance between actors. Similar factors are also influential in 
reducing distance between actors at an industry level. For example, external buyers and 
sellers may meet socially in industry forums such as trade conferences and trade 
associations. Managers may move between buyers and sellers outside of a group and be 
regarded as valuable information sources. Markets with grapevines and other informal 
communication networks are well developed in many industries. A number of 
respondents recognised this and made comparisons between their internal and external 
relationships in this respect.
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"There are grapevines in all industries and they'll talk about sister companies as well as external 
companies". Respondent 19.
However, when describing their relationships with other companies within the group, it 
was generally acknowledged that these factors were more pronounced and more 
influential in the group context. In comparison to the general industry environment in 
which companies develop external buyer seller relationships, respondents generally 
regarded the internal environment of the group as being 'more transparent', 'easier to spy 
in' and 'harder to hide in' whilst having 'greater visibility' suggesting that the information 
flow between companies in the same group is generally heightened when compared to 
the information flow that develops in relationships enacted with companies external to 
the group.
"The problem is that within a group, because you are within a family, it’s a bit like saying 'Why don't you 
get on with Fred and I’m telling the rest o f the family straight away'. News travels much faster. It gets 
amplified much more which means that once these relationships start to get ropy they slide very quickly. 
That also happens in the real world outside of the group. But the communication flows much slower. 
Much less gossiping'. Respondent 26.
8.4. Social and cultural distance and the group environment
We have identified that the dual concepts of social and cultural distance provide useful 
analytical tools to describe various characteristics of a group environment and its affect 
on the information flow between actors. Both cultural and social distance can be 
measured in terms of how ‘close’ actors are to each other. Thus actors can be 
considered ‘culturally close’ when they share similar values and ideologies that promote 
trading in the group environment. Similarly, actors are considered ‘distant’ when they 
identify with diverse values and philosophies. These concepts are combined in Fig 8.1, 
and provide us with a description of four possible group environments in terms of the 
enhancement or otherwise of information flow between actors.
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Fig 8.1
Cultural d is ta n c e
S o c ia l
d is ta n c e
In organisations described by cell 1, cultural and social distance between actors is close. 
Therefore the environment of the group is likely to enhance the flow of information 
between the parties leading to closer co-operation between them.
In cell 3, cultural distance between the parties is close however social interaction within 
the group is at a relatively low level. If a corporate centre wishes to increase the flow of 
information between the parties it should seek to reduce physical distance between 
actors and seek to enhance contacts between individuals as described in the previous 
section.
In cell 2, there is a high level of social interaction between actors, however their cultural 
distance is high due to differing values and expectations. In order to enhance 
information flow within the group, a corporate centre needs to change the perception 
and beliefs of individual actors around the benefits of information sharing and openness.
Finally, in cell 4, social and cultural distance between actors is relatively wide. In these 
circumstances, the group environment is unlikely to be conducive to the flow of 
information between actors, effectively discouraging and inhibiting co-operation 
between them. A corporate centre wishing to enhance information transfer between 
internal companies is likely to encounter major obstacles and exchange barriers. It will 
need to demonstrate significant commitment and resolve in bringing actors socially and 
culturally together for the benefit of the group as a whole. Experience in Agrifood 
indicates that this can be a slow and often time consuming process.
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8.5. Information flow and knowledge
Analysis presented in the previous sections has demonstrated that the nature of the 
group environment may, under certain circumstances, increase the intensity and 
frequency of interaction amongst intragroup actors either formally (in group forums) or 
informally (through interpersonal networks and grapevines). The outcome is likely to 
lead to an increased information flow between actors, although the level of this flow will 
be limited by the cultural and social distance between them.
The potential consequence of an increased information flow will be that intragroup 
companies should be more knowledgeable about each others' businesses. To evaluate 
this further, interviews were analysed and coded for statements where respondents 
believed they had more information and knowledge about a sister company, in 
comparison with relationships with companies external to the group. (Frame 77. 
Knowledge actual. Mentions 83. Response 25/9). Whilst the overall scores of the 
t-test were significantly different from zero, analysis of Frame 77 indicates a significant 
difference in the perceptions of Agrifood and other respondents, measured by the 
Mann-Whitney test. Whilst mean scores for both groups were high (Agrifood 1.4, Other 
1.9), respondents from other organisations seemed particularly knowledgeable about 
other actors in their group. This is consistent with results recorded in Frame 27 
(featured earlier in this chapter) where non Agrifood respondents indicated a higher 
level of openness in their organisations in comparison to Agrifood. However the overall 
analysis, does suggest that group companies are generally more knowledgeable about 
sister companies than they are about other trading partners outside of the group.
"You know more about a supplier who's an intercompany supplier than you do with an external
supplier.  Wouldn't it be awful if  you were an external supplier to somebody and that customer of
yours knew as much as they did as if  you were an internal supplier". Respondent 6.
.. .sister companies having a more intimate knowledge o f each other". Respondent 21.
"We have access to a massive amount o f information about each other". Respondent 34.
Respondents seemed particularly aware of each others' trading positions and financial 
performances.
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"In general you know who is doing well and who is doing badly". Respondent 4.
"If you take someone like Coverco, we are in the same group together, so I know how they are performing 
so if  they were supplying me in reverse they would know how I would be performing". Respondent 10.
Whilst much of the additional information flow represents 'noise' in the group 
environment and not directly relevant to operating actors in terms of its usefulness or 
exploitative potential, a number of respondents mentioned instances where such 
information was either used by them, or against them, to further their position in a 
relationship with an internal partner. One respondent talked about a situation where his 
business unit was performing significantly ahead of budget. This information was 
communicated to his internal customers (the majority of his business) by a divisional 
chief executive at a group conference.
"The chief executive stood up at one o f the conferences and said how far Agrivite was ahead o f budget 
and immediately all those business unit people (internal customers) thought 'Ah he's ahead o f budget and 
riding on my back'". Respondent 27
A greater awareness and knowledge about an internal partner can have a number of 
consequences. On the one hand it can bring companies closer together by increasing 
their understanding each has about the other's position, in terms of goals, attitudes, 
values and ways of working. On the other hand it can be used by one partner to enhance 
his position over another in terms of pursuing personal objectives that would be 
perceived to be detrimental by that trading partner. (For example by increasing prices 
above market levels). The propensity to follow each route will depend on how actors 
see their intragroup relationships from their perspective and the value they attach to 
them in furthering their individual interests, a theme which is explored in the next 
Chapter.
8.6. Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the flow of information between companies in a 
group. We have set out to identify factors in the group environment which are 
responsible for influencing the distance between actors by impeding or enhancing the 
information flow between them. In so doing, we have sought evidence for our fourth 
proposition (P4), which suggests that the group context is likely to increase the level of
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information that each party has about the other and the breadth of interaction between 
them. As a consequence, this is likely to affect the perception of each others’ position.
We have examined elements of proposition P4 through the application of various 
content frames. In Frame 26, we investigated whether corporate centres are responsible 
for increasing the level of information exchanged between operating actors; whilst in 
Frames 27 and 68, we evaluated the impact of openness in intra-group relationships and 
its effect on internal communications. In Frame 28, we saw how an information flow 
can be enhanced through informal mechanisms such as group grapevines and personal 
networks. In Frame 30 we examined the impact of individuals transferring between 
companies within the group. Finally, in Frame 77, we attempted to measure whether 
companies are more knowledgeable about the activities and performance of their 
internal trading partners as a consequence of belonging to the same corporate group.
We have shown that a corporate centre may seek to reduce the cultural distance between 
actors by encouraging openness in their relationships. It may specifically value the 
exchange and sharing of information across the group as a means of transferring best 
practices. It may also regard the transfer of information as a mechanism for deriving 
synergies between its various operating companies. Overtime, it may inculcate these 
attributes into the value systems of its operating actors.
We have also seen that the group environment can reduce the social distance between 
operating actors by increasing the breadth of interaction between them. The centre may 
deliberately bring actors and individuals together in forums that are outside the normal 
boundaries of their relationships. It may encourage the exchange of personnel between 
actors as a means of transferring knowledge and building personal bonds. Informal 
information systems, in the form of group grapevines and personal networks, can also be 
important information sources for group companies that can shape their perceptions of 
other actors.
We have also identified that in other circumstances, the level of information flow may 
be less extensive. The centre may not value the transfer of information between its 
actors preferring their individual autonomy and accountability. In this case, it may take 
a neutral or even negative stance to the transfer of information across the group.
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Individual operating actors may not perceive it to be in their interest to be open with 
each other despite official encouragement from the centre. This occurs where actors 
perceive that information can be used against them to weaken their positions.
We must conclude that the group context is likely to increase the level of information 
each party has about the other, and the breadth of interaction between them, where the 
social and cultural distance between actors within a group is low. Where social and 
cultural distance between actors is high, the group environment is likely to inhibit the 
level of information exchange between actors thereby diminishing their knowledge of 
each other. Social and cultural distance have major implications for the success, or 
otherwise, of group policies for internal trading.
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Chapter 9 
Trust between actors in intragroup relationships
Introduction
This chapter investigates the factors that influence the level of trust between actors in a 
group. In marketing and purchasing literature, trust is recognised as a significant factor 
influencing the formation, maintenance and development of relationships between actors 
in business networks. Co-operation between actors requires a minimum amount of trust 
for exchange process to operate. Trust creates attitudes which in turn lead to more 
efficient and effective relationships.
Trust may be considered as a 'state of mind, an expectation held by one trading partner 
about another, that the other behaves or responds in a predictable and mutually acceptable 
manner'. (Sako 1992). Young (1996) identifies that trust has been considered in past 
literature in a number of ways. One view considers trust in terms of conditions 
responsible for generating trust, either in an entity to be trusted, or in a particular setting 
or situation. In this context, opportunism is linked to trust in that when participants in 
business relationships trust, they are less likely to undertake opportunistic activity, 
exploiting transaction partners as a means of gaining short term advantage (Young 1996). 
The risk of opportunism must be there for trust to operate. (Bradach & Eccles 1989). 
Opportunism is cited as one of the reasons that makes actors reluctant to engage in long 
term partnering (Biong, Parvatiyar & Wathne 1996), and is characterised by self interest 
manifest in behaviour such as:
• Suppliers charging monopoly prices.
• Actors taking unilateral advantage of their relationships.
• Actors taking exchange partners for granted.
The prediction of transaction cost economists is that 'locked in' partners will become 
victims of opportunism. (Williamson 1985). A lock-in can result from asset specificity 
where assets are dedicated to business relationships that are non recoverable. This limits
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the flexibility of an owner and increases dependence on a business partner. People stay 
in relationships because they want to, or, because they have to.
A lock-in situation occurs when a corporate centre mandates trading between internal 
companies. Under these conditions, both parties to a relationship are 'locked in' by an 
external authority. A weaker form of this lock-in is likely to occur when a corporate 
centre encourages interaction between its business units. In the case of an 'external lock' 
we might surmise that opportunism can be pursued by both parties to a relationship rather 
than being one sided. Opportunistic behaviour may therefore be a consequence of group 
policies of intragroup trading. This situation is highlighted in proposition P5, which 
proposes that:
In a situation where the centre mandates interaction between the operating actors in 
an intragroup relationship, the mandate may affect the nature of the relationship. 
Actors may regard the terms of a mandate as an opportunity to behave differently 
towards a partner.
• An intragroup seller may give proportionately less commitment to an intragroup 
buyer in terms of service, quality and other exchange variables.
• An intragroup buyer may demand a proportionately higher level of commitment 
from an internal seller.
The potential to opportunistically exploit the terms of a trading mandate will 
therefore influence the level of trust between actors in intragroup relationships.
In Section 9.1, we investigate evidence for internal sellers taking advantage of their 
relationships with group buyers. We note that the expectation for opportunistic 
behaviour to occur is well recognised by actors, which may condition their trust of a 
internal partner, and attitude to group trading.
In 9.2, we examine opportunism in the other direction in terms of group buyers exploiting 
the existence of a mandate to demand higher commitment from an internal supplier. We 
note that continuous episodes of opportunism lead to high levels of conflict and conclude 
that trust may be more difficult to build in intragroup relationships specifically because of 
the heightened potential for opportunism to occur on both sides of the relationship.
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An alternative perspective of trust is to view it in terms of those things which result from 
trust (e.g. co-operation) or lack of trust (e.g. suspicion). Internal actors may be 
suspicious of each other for a number of reasons. They may perceive themselves to be 
rivals for resources within the group that reward them as individuals. They may also 
believe that their general competence and effectiveness can be revealed to the centre 
through their involvement with other group actors within intragroup relationships. Trust 
in this context can be viewed as a ‘risk reducer’ or something needed as a result of risk 
being perceived. (Young 1996). We therefore propose in Proposition P6 that:
Trust between parties within intragroup relationships may be affected by the 
influence of the centre. For example:
• Operating actors may regard themselves in competition with each other for 
group resources and rewards.
• Operating actors may perceive that their competence and performance is being 
evaluated through their involvement in the relationship.
Therefore, individual actors perceive the relationship as involving higher personal 
risks.
In Section 9.3 we see how competition and rivalry may arise within intragroup 
relationships and note that a centre may deliberately promote rivalry between actors to 
achieve certain objectives. We go on to explore how rivalry manifests itself in internal 
relationships and note the conditions where rivalry can shift from being 'constructive' to 
'destructive'. Finally, we investigate the link between rivalry, risk and trust and conclude 
that individuals may perceive themselves to be more exposed, and feel more at risk, 
through their involvement with other group actors.
The aim of this chapter is to see how being in a group affects the level of trust between 
operating companies and the relationships formed between them. We start by 
investigating whether opportunistic behaviour is a feature of intragroup relationships.
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9.1 Opportunism - Group sellers over buyers
The aim of this section is to identify the linkage between mandate, lock-in and 
opportunism and investigate whether there is evidence that group sellers exploit the 
existence of a mandate and act opportunistically in their relationships with group buyers.
A range of scenarios was developed to obtain feedback from respondents, identifying 
whether they perceived that opportunistic behaviour was a feature of their relationships 
with other group companies, and highlighting the form it manifested itself. The results of 
Frames 49, 50, 53 and 74 were combined in Frame 78 to provide an overview of whether 
group sellers tended to act opportunistically. (Frame 78. Opportunism group sellers 
over buyers. Mentions 243. Response 30/10). Statistical analysis of Frame 78 indicates 
that supplier opportunism seems to feature particularly strongly within Agrifood, 
although no significant difference was found between the responses of both group. It’s 
existence - or potential existence - was recognised by most respondents. (Mean scores: 
Agrifood respondents 1.2, other respondents 0.7. One sample t-test significantly different 
from zero).
9.1.1. Supplier opportunism and service quality
Opportunism related to service quality was investigated in Scenario 30, and analysed in 
Frame 49. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 0.8, other respondents 0.5. One sample 
t-test significantly different from zero. No significant difference recorded between 
groups). The theme that internal companies provide poor service to group buyers was 
highlighted by a number of respondents. The belief that a mandate provides a degree of 
protection to internal suppliers was identified as a significant contributory factor. The 
situation is likely to be exacerbated in circumstances where internal transfer pricing rules 
result in low margins for the supplier.
"... there is a natural inclination to say 'well it doesn't matter they are only internal'. And this is even 
more so if  the margin that you make on that business is lowered because o f transfer pricing policy." 
(Respondent 5).
"After Agrifood had acquired us, at the beginning, the first six months we noticed that the service level 
dropped off considerably with Millpro. No visits from the sales and technical people, that all faded  
away........I think we moved from being an absolutely key customer that needed a high service level because
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o f a fast moving business ...to one ’well in our part in the group you are going to have to buy from us"'. 
(Respondent 7).
"My experience is that intercompany suppliers are generally thought to be the worst suppliers because they 
know they can get away with it". (Respondent 17).
"What can occur is the supply division often doesn't have a sufficiently strong customer ethic to sister 
companies." (Respondent 28).
A number of respondents noted that a higher probability of service opportunism was 
universally recognised by group buyers as being endemic to intragroup trading, almost 
representing an inevitable outcome of all internal relationships.
"I think to some degree, group companies tend to say 'Well it is a sister company so we won't get as good 
service as people outside would get.'" (Respondent 10).
9.1.2 Supplier opportunism and product quality
Scenario 31 was constructed to investigate respondent perception of supplier opportunism 
around product quality. Frame 50 analysed responses that indicated that group sellers 
tend to exploit the existence of a mandate by compromising product quality. (Mean 
scores Agrifood respondents 1.0, other respondents 0.7. One sample t-test significantly 
different from zero. No significant difference between groups). Many respondents 
recognised the potential for group suppliers to compromise quality standards particularly 
in the case of marginal decisions and borderline rejections. The fact that a user was an 
internal customer was perceived to influence a decision to pass or reject marginal 
product. Respondents indicated that group suppliers were more likely to take chances 
with internal customers on borderline decisions, more readily than they would with 
external customers. Again, the lock in effect of the mandate was identified as the primary 
cause. As one respondent described it "You're a captive audience".
"I think there is a temptation to say that because it's an internal supply situation, that you can get away 
with things that you wouldn't do with an external customer and maybe you would slip some things through. 
I  can see that happening and have known that to happen". (Respondent 1).
"I think this can happen and definitely you would tend to take a chance if it was on the borderline o f  
specification they would be definitely intercompanies who would take that chance". (Respondent 13).
The notion of heightened buyer awareness of the potential for sellers to act 
opportunistically around product quality was again highlighted.
164
"It's an issue that will go through every buyers' mind I'm quite sure. Having said that I also think it 
happens in practice". (Respondent 19).
9.1.3 Supplier opportunism and pricing
The issue of opportunism through price exploitation elicited fewer responses from 
interviewees, suggesting it was perceived as less important. Frame 74 measured 
responses that indicated that group companies exploit the existence of a mandate by 
charging higher prices. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 0.9, other respondents 1.3. 
One sample t-test significantly different from zero. No significant difference recorded 
between groups). Those who mentioned price did so in terms of prices rising more 
frequently from internal suppliers. Some respondents expressed the belief that their 
companies where being charged prices higher than market levels by internal suppliers as 
a consequence of the group situation. Lack of credible benchmarks in external markets 
was identified as one of the factors that encouraged price opportunism by group 
suppliers.
"When it comes to price, the usual feeling is that the sister company is paying a much higher price than the 
open market customers, inevitably". (Respondent 24).
"It could often be the case that once they're in the group, you find that their prices start to rise because 
they are an internal sister supplier and you haven't got other companies now calling on you, giving you 
prices, giving you competitive prices because they feel you may never buy off o f them because o f your sister 
relationship". (Respondent 16).
9.1.4 General themes of supplier opportunism
General themes of opportunism based on internal companies exploiting and taking 
advantage of the group situation provided some very strong responses from interviewees. 
Scenario 34, generated a significant number of mentions which tended to be critical of 
internal supply companies. Frame 53 measured responses that indicated that internal 
suppliers have a tendency to take internal customers for granted. (Mean scores: Agrifood 
respondents 1.5, other respondents 0.8. One sample t-test significantly different from 
zero. No significant difference recorded between groups).
Adjectives used to describe group suppliers included: 'arrogant1, 'blase', 'complacent', 
'uncommitted' and 'casual'. Internal companies were accused of 'relaxing their effort',
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'sitting back' and 'not working hard in forming the relationship'. The situation was 
summed up by one respondent as 'The classic complaint of in house businesses'.
"I think it is very easy for supplying companies to become complacent". (Respondent 4).
"One o f the biggest gripes is that people take the intercompany trade for granted and you don't treat your 
internal customers as proper customers". (Respondent 24).
The criticisms of internal supply companies was not just identified by group buyers. A 
number of respondents working in group supply companies highlighted the dangers of 
opportunism developing in their relationships as a consequences of their attitudes towards 
internal trading.
"We were guilty o f ignoring some of our own customers, our intercompany customers, taking them for 
granted". (Respondent 14).
"A lot o f companies do take internal trade for granted and I think if  I'm honest, there's an element o f that 
within our company". (Respondent 24).
A major criticism echoed by many respondents was that internal companies were not 
afforded sufficient status by group suppliers in comparison to that given to external 
customers. One respondent highlighted the fact that an internal supplier did not assign 
specific sales responsibility to group customers. Another observed that his company 
failed to include an internal user in its 'top 10 list of customers' even though it represented 
their third or forth largest account. A number of respondents identified that they were less 
likely to 'wine and dine' internal customers in terms of social entertaining.
"We've been guilty in the past o f just saying 'Well they don't really count'. So we've not rolled out the red 
carpet". (Respondent 14).
"The one company doesn't treat the other one as a proper customer. I think that is the core o f a lot o f it". 
(Respondent 24).
Frequent reference was made to internal suppliers favouring external customers and 
assigning them priority status over internal users. For one respondent this was an 'an 
inevitable consequence of intragroup trading'.
'If I go and make a presentation to an external customer I give it a lot more thought, I suspect and I make 
sure my shirt's ironed a bit better if  I'm doing it to X (an external customer) than if  I do it to Y (an internal 
customer)'. (Respondent 6).
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7 know for a fact that ifZ  (an external customer) had a problem and Bakery Supplies had a problem then it 
would be Z who got servedfirst'. (Respondent 9)
The issue of the lock in effect of the mandate was again highlighted by respondents as a 
contributory cause of opportunism. In the view of some respondents, this was 
compounded by a criticism directed at some internal suppliers that they perceived that 
group business was 'theirs by right' and should therefore be afforded some form of 
favoured status derived from group membership.
"Tastetec assumed that all the business that was outside o f the business that (Internal Company X) gave to 
other people should come into Tastetec, and really it didn't have to do anything to get it, to win it, it was 
there’s by right and I suppose in retrospect that’s the classic way to upset a sister company”. (Respondent 
1).
"If they haven't got to go and chase the business, they know they have got the business, then I don't think 
the incentive is there for them to respond in the same way". (Respondent 9).
9.1.5 Expectation of opportunism
Evidence from respondents indicates that supplier opportunism is perceived to occur, or 
have occurred, in many of the relationships reviewed in the field research. Group buyers 
seem to have a high level of awareness of the potential for internal suppliers to behave 
opportunistically, which is likely to influence their expectations of internal relationships. 
Group buyers may expect a lower level of commitment from internal suppliers even prior 
to the formation of trading relationships, for example where a seller is acquired into the 
group. An important implication of this heightened awareness is that buyers may enter 
into relationships with suppliers inside the group with a lower level of trust and a higher 
level of suspicion. They may perceive the requirement to closely monitor the 
performance of internal supplies, particularly in the early stages of relationships 
development. This has two important implications for intragroup actors:
• Group buyers are likely to be reticent to allocate all their business with an internal 
supplier despite mandates or encouragement from the centre to source products and 
services from group companies.
• Group sellers may need to demonstrate high levels of commitment to internal 
customers to convince them of their credibility and trustworthiness as a supplier.
167
9.1.6 External benchmarks
The first of these issues was investigated in Frame 55 which was set up to record 
respondent opinions on the need for external benchmarks, and to identify evidence of 
buyer reluctance to allocate all business with internal suppliers. (Frame 55. External 
benchmarks. Mentions 41. Response 19/5). Statistical analysis indicates strong support 
for the view that internal buyers are reluctant to source exclusively from internal 
suppliers, because of the need for external benchmarks in their relationships. (Mean 
scores: Agrifood respondents 1.2, Other respondents 2.0. One sample t-test significantly 
different from zero). The Mann-Whitney test showed a significant difference between 
groups in that non Agrifood respondents expressed particularly strong views (although 
the number of respondents expressing views was relatively low, N = 5).
Respondents highlighted the danger of 'being insular' and the problems associated with 
'taking away the disciplines of the external market' through exclusive internal sourcing 
arrangements. The potential existed for the relationships to become 'too comfortable' and 
introverted. Whilst it was generally acknowledged that internal buyers needed to monitor 
external markets for technical and commercial developments, respondents mentioned the 
need for 'insurance and safeguards' against internal suppliers taking them for granted and 
acting opportunistically. Even where an internal company supplied a large percentage of 
their business, group buyers were reluctant to adopt an exclusive internal supplier.
"The one thing you can't afford to do is just to come in house and suddenly go away from what is 
happening outside". (Respondent 13).
The need maintain contact with the external market actors involves internal buyers 
incurring additional monitoring and search costs, which may partially negate and offset 
benefits of interaction between internal companies to the group as a whole. Efficiencies 
and economies in transaction costs which potentially derive from common ownership 
may be lost due to the expectation that group suppliers will act opportunistically, 
offsetting benefits that may derive from efficiency and synergy. Results from this study 
would suggest that the perceived need to guard against opportunism may be an inevitable 
cost of intragroup interaction particularly in the early stages of relationship development.
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A further problem confronting group buyers is that although they may recognise the need 
to use external companies to benchmark performance of internal suppliers, the former 
may utilise the situation to act opportunistically and attempt to destabilise the relationship 
between internal companies. In the expectation that a group buyer is likely to favour an 
internal actor, an external supplier may be reluctant to quote prices to a group company, 
or may provide 'misinformation' that undermines the position of the internal supplier, 
casting doubt on its trustworthiness. An external supplier may indulge in quoting 'silly 
prices' in the expectation that these would not be taken up by the group buyer. Group 
memberships may therefore represent a partial barrier to optimum efficiency based on 
free market reference and feedback. Robust benchmarks may not be available to monitor 
the 'true' effectiveness of internal suppliers.
9.1.7 Internal supplier commitment
The requirement for internal suppliers to demonstrate increased levels of commitment to 
group buyers was measured in Frame 56. Commitment in this context may be seen as a 
willingness to do more than is formally expected (Sako 1992). The frame measured 
respondent perceptions of whether they needed to put a higher than normal level of effort 
into their relationships with group buyers. (Frame 56 Internal seller commitment. 
Mentions 22. Response 10/3). Statistical analysis indicates that whilst the frame 
recorded a low level of response, those interviewees expressing an opinion, all strongly 
endorsed the need to raise the level of commitment when dealing with group companies. 
(Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 2.0, other respondent 2.0).
Respondents identified the need to 'work harder', 'to go that extra mile internally'. A 
number of respondents made comparisons between internal and external relationships and 
highlighted the higher standards required to service internal companies.
"I think the standard ofperformance in sister company trade will usually be higher than if  you are
dealing with a third party. I think particularly in the early stages o f the relationship you have got to 
perform better on all the key criteria than a third party. If you drop away from that, the sceptics (and 
there's probably more sceptics than supporters) will tend to exploit that. So the standards o f performance 
are usually much higher for intercompany trading." (Respondent 28).
This again calls into question the efficiency of intragroup relationships in terms of 
reducing or economising transaction costs of intragroup exchanges. We have seen in the
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previous section that the expectation of opportunism is likely to motivate group buyers to 
seek benchmarks and measures amongst external actors to reference 'acceptable 
performance standards'. At the other end of the scale, internal actors may need to incur 
additional costs in proving their trustworthiness as credible suppliers, and over come 
potential prejudices associated with intragroup trading. This, again, is likely to offset 
benefits of group membership in terms of reducing transaction costs between internal 
actors resulting from common ownership. These findings would support the widely held 
perception among business unit managers that the costs associated with internal 
transactions exceed those of external transactions in mult-divisional companies. (Eccles 
& White 1988).
We have seen that the need for internal suppliers to demonstrate higher levels of 
commitment to group partners arises because of the requirement to overcome the 
suspicion that they will act opportunistically in their relationships with other group 
companies. However, this is not the only reason it arises. The need to demonstrate higher 
levels of commitment is also associated with the fact that internal buyers may themselves 
expect higher commitment from internal suppliers. This expectation is again related to 
the lock-in properties of a mandate and represents a reverse form of opportunism to that 
discussed so far. Whilst group sellers may exploit the existence of a mandate by, say, 
providing a lower level of product quality or technical service, group buyers may exploit 
a mandate to demand the opposite.
9.2 Opportunism - Group buyers over sellers
This section investigates the incidence of opportunistic behaviour on the part of group 
buyers in intragroup relationships. A range of scenarios was again formulated to elicit 
feedback from respondents identifying whether they perceived that opportunistic 
behaviour featured in their relationships with other group buying companies and identify 
the form it manifested itself. Results of Frames 51, 52 and 70 were cumulated into 
Frame 79 to provide an overview of whether group buyers tended to act opportunistically, 
directly because of the group context. (Frame 79. Opportunism group buyers over 
sellers. Mentions 98. Response 29/9). Overall results from the one sample t-test are 
significantly different from zero. (Mean scores Agrifood respondents 0.9, other 
respondents 0.7). Analysis of the frame again indicates that buyer opportunism seems
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more prevalent in Agrifood than other organisations although no significant difference 
was recorded between groups. In comparison to the previous section, whilst other 
respondents recorded identical mean scores in Frames 78 and 79 (measuring 0.7), 
Agrifood respondents indicated that seller opportunism was more predominant than buyer 
opportunism in their organisation. (Mean scores: Frame 78: 1.2, Frame 79: 0.9).
9.2.1 Buyer opportunism and price expectation
The issue of price exploitation was featured in Scenario 33. Frame 51 measured 
responses that indicated that group buyers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
demanding lower prices. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 1.0, other respondents 
-0.7). Results in this frame were inconclusive in that the one sample t-test was not 
significantly different from zero. Some respondents identified that in the absence of 
defined transfer pricing rules, group buyers may perceive the opportunity to negotiate 
more strongly for price concessions from internal suppliers in the expectation that they 
should be afforded a favoured status (aptly described by one respondent as 'staff 
discount'). This expectation my may motivate group buyers to be more demanding in 
their negotiations with group suppliers. The expectation of buyers achieving 
advantageous prices from group companies was reported by a number of respondents.
"Their immediate reaction is to come in for a 10% price reduction as they are now in the company 
(group)". (Respondent 1).
"Quite correctly, they (an internal supplier) anticipate a reduction in prices they can charge".
(Respondent 3).
9.2.2 Buyer opportunism and service expectation
Similar themes to the ones expressed in the previous section relate to service expectation. 
Frame 52 measured respondent perceptions of whether buyers exploit the existence of a 
mandate by demanding higher levels of service. (Mean scores Agrifood respondents 0.3, 
other respondents 0.6). Again the t-test did not show a significant difference from zero. 
Some respondents reported that their group customers were generally more demanding 
on them as internal suppliers in terms of order lead times and service response levels 
generally. Because they were part of the same group, internal customers may expect to be
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given priority status by their internal suppliers in terms of satisfaction of their 
requirements ahead of other users.
"They actually do demand higher service levels o f some of our sister companies than they would do in the 
normal market place. We tend to get pretty cross with people who do that to be honest." (Respondent 37).
9.2.3 General themes of buyer opportunism
General themes of buyer opportunism were reflected in statements that group buyers 
tended to be more critical of internal suppliers, more likely to air grievances and 
complaints, were generally perceived to be less tolerant and patient and more likely to 
impose 'unrealistic demands'. These responses were recorded and measured under Frame 
70. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 1.5, other respondents 1.0. No significant 
difference recorded between groups). In this case, the one sample t-test was significantly 
different from zero. Respondents expressed these views in relative terms and highlighted 
dual standards in the treatment of internal and external suppliers. There was a belief 
amongst some respondents that group buyers make demands on internal suppliers that 
would not be asked of other suppliers external to the group.
The lock in effect of a mandate was again recognised as a major contributory factor in 
shaping buyer behaviour where it was perceived that group sellers were 'locked into' 
internal supply. Restrictions imposed by a mandate were seen as something that could be 
exploited by internal buying companies by making 'excessive demands', with little 
concern about group buyers withdrawing from their relationships. It was also recognised 
that such behaviour could manifest a deliberate tactic employed by group buyers, to 
de-motivate and discourage internal suppliers by continuously demanding increased 
levels of resource and commitment. This was likely to occur when an internal buyer 
objected to the terms of a mandate to source products or services from internal companies 
and where superior trading partners were perceived to exist external to the group.
Whilst it is difficult to assess the reality behind these statements of 'excessive demand' in 
practice, the inclination and motivation for group buyers to behave opportunistically was 
certainly recognised as a potential outcome of the imposition of a mandate that locks 
companies together. Initial perceptions are important in shaping eventual outcomes. The 
imposition of a mandate may immediately heighten awareness and suspicion of
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opportunistic behaviour to occur and will shape from an early stage the way group 
companies think about their relationships with each other and their behaviour in terms of 
day to day interaction. In a group situation, this would seem to apply to both parties in a 
relationship.
Continuing incidences of opportunistic behaviour by one or both parties can be a 
significant cause of dispute and disagreement between actors in intragroup interaction. It 
is one of the factors that appears to generate high levels of conflict that seen to be 
inherent in these relationships. Sellers may come to resent the 'excessive' demands of 
group buyers. The latter may feel resentful of being taken for granted by group sellers, 
and of being afforded a lower status compared to other external companies (who may be 
their competitors). Over time, actors may come to feel dissatisfied and disappointed with 
their internal relationships. However, at the same time may also feel powerless to 
withdraw from internal interaction because of a real, or perceived, lock in effect of a 
mandate. The danger in this situation is that group relationships may deteriorate into 
acrimony and bitterness between actors. The issue of conflict in intragroup relationships 
is featured in the next chapter. At this stage we can note that the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour to occur within the group context, is significantly heightened in 
intragroup relationships and is likely to be accompanied by an increasing incidence of 
dispute and conflict between actors and can become a characterising feature of intragroup 
interaction.
9.3. Rivalry risk and trust in intragroup relationships
We have seen that heightened awareness and potential for opportunistic behaviour to 
occur in intragroup relationships increases the level of mistrust between the parties and 
can lead to a higher incidence of disputes and conflict. So far we have considered trust at 
an actor level of business unit or operating company where opportunistic behaviour is 
pursued by firms within the group environment.
Opportunistic behaviour can also occur between managers within group suppliers and 
customers. The pursuit of opportunistic advantage may increase the level of mistrust 
between individuals within buyer seller relationships. Managers may regard relationships 
with other group companies as a mechanism through which to take unilateral advantage
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to improve a position over other individuals. The motivation to improve personal 
position stems from the fact that individuals may perceive they are rivals within the wider 
context of the group. (E.g.. for personnel advancement). Intragroup relationships may 
therefore be viewed as vehicles for actors to improve a position over potential rivals. 
Competitive rivalry may be regarded as an important source of mistrust between actors in 
intragroup relationships. Operating actors are less likely to trust partners who they 
perceive as rivals.
9.3.1. Competitive rivalry between actors in intragroup relationships
Competition occurs when two actors have objectives which are in conflict whilst the 
locus of their objective is under the control of a third party. (Easton & Araujo 1992). 
Under these circumstances, competition can be regarded as 'parallel striving' by actors in 
pursuance of similar goals. In the context of wider network relationships competition 
occurs between suppliers to a common customer. Similarly buyers may compete for 
products and services of a monopoly supplier.
In intragroup relationships, individuals may perceive themselves to be in competition 
with each other for limited resources within the group. For example, business unit 
managers A and B may perceive themselves to be in competition for advancement inside 
the group, which is likely to be under the control of the corporate centre. Personal 
relationships between A and B may therefore begin to express themselves at the 
operating actor level. Competition between individuals can be a significant factor in 
shaping interaction between group companies. Easton & Araujo note that a crucial aspect 
of competitive relationships is that they rely on the assumption of'dual sourcing' in that 
there must be a common customer, or in this case, a common centre. Thus, if the centre 
discounts the advancement of individual A, this may change A's attitude to B which may 
also effect the tone of the general relationship between their operating companies.
Competitive rivalry was examined in Scenario 35 where respondents were presented with 
the statement that ’People at times feel they have something to prove and seem to be 
in competition with each other in intercompany relationships’. Frame 57 was set up
to measure respondent perception of the incidence of competition between individuals in 
their relationships with other group companies (Frame 57. Rivalry between actors.
174
Mentions 127. Response 30/10). Statistical analysis of responses provided a significant 
difference between Agrifood and other organisations. Whilst Frame 57 recorded positive 
mean scores for both groups, competitive rivalry seemed to feature particularly strongly 
in Agrifood. (Mean scores Agrifood respondents 1.5, other respondents 0.8. One sample 
t-test significantly different from zero). In discussing their reactions to the scenario in 
terms of personal experiences, a number of respondents expressed strong views about the 
nature of competition in their organisations.
"This is one o f the biggest problems, biggest single problems, in intercompany relationships". (Respondent
5).
"Ohyes. Endlessly. Endlessly". (Respondent 11).
"I think we can all think o f examples in the past where we've ended up in competition". (Respondent 15). 
"I'm sure this is a significant issue, more so than people will recognise". (Respondent 19).
"Yes very much. Absolutely recognise it". (Respondent 29).
"Oh without doubt. I think certainly between business managers that could be true". (Respondent 33).
A significant contributory factor generating competition between individuals and 
operating actors in intragroup relationships is the nature and extent of reward and 
measurement systems that are laid down by the centre. In multi-divisional companies, 
these are extensively used to evaluate the effectiveness of managers and the success or 
otherwise of individual operating units.
Measurement and reward systems are closely related, in that the achievement of 
prescribed measures (in the form of financial targets) is usually the basis for the 
allocation of future rewards. For individuals, these rewards are likely be of a financial 
nature but they may also satisfy less tangible needs such as status and advancement 
within the wider organisation. Similar considerations apply to operating companies where 
financial rewards may come in the form of future investment funds. Status as a leading 
company within the group may also be seen as important. Past track record of an 
individual or operating company is a critical indicator of the allocation of future rewards.
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The availability of rewards is necessarily limited. Opportunities for advancement 
diminish at higher levels within hierarchies. Investment funds are constrained by capital 
markets inside and outside the group. Individuals and operating companies may perceive 
they are in competition with each other for resources that are constrained within the 
corporate environment. In a wider network context, the circumstances are similar to 
suppliers competing for limited resources of customers.
9.3.2 Encouraged rivalry in intragroup relationships
In certain circumstances a corporate centre may specifically encourage the competitive 
nature of its business units. One way it can do this is to make direct and public 
comparisons between operating actors (indirectly, comparing the individuals who manage 
them). These comparisons are employed to incentivise actors to higher levels of 
performance. They may also act as a warning to operating actors who are performing 
below required standards.
The use of comparisons to influence and motivate the effectiveness of individual 
operating actors was reviewed in Scenario 14. Respondents where presented with a 
statement that: ‘Your performance as a operating company is continuously being 
compared to other group companies by people at the centre’. Frame 22 measured 
responses that suggested corporate centres regularly compare performances between 
operating units. (Frame 22. Comparisons - actual. Mentions 44. Response 25/8). 
Statistical analysis shows strong evidence of comparisons being used across respondent 
organisations. (One sample t-test significantly different from zero). Identical mean scores 
of 1.8 were recorded by Agrifood and other respondents.
For many respondents, comparisons with other operating actors was an inevitable 
consequence of group membership that had positive and negative outcomes.
"I think that this is inevitable. It's bound to happen within a group like Agrifood that’s got a number of 
business units and to a certain extent, most of the time it's done in a positive way andfor benefit". 
(Respondent 5).
"We find ourselves compared with Tastetec and Coverco on a regular basis. It doesn’t help relationships 
especially as we don't seem to come out as well as we believe we should". (Respondent 15).
176
"Performances are compared, their profitability and other parameters are used to encourage people to 
some extent to compete I suppose". (Respondent 32).
"I think that's absolutely right, very much so. I mean there is keen competition here....... there is very
strong competition to make sure one's doing better than the others". (Respondent 33).
The consequences of comparisons heightening rivalry between individuals and business 
units was highlighted by a number of respondents, particularly in Agrifood. Where a 
corporate centre makes deliberate and overt comparisons between its operating actors, 
this may change the attitude and perception of operating actors towards each other and 
the way they view each other. When comparisons are made between businesses, this can 
generate a negative attitude towards an internal trading partner or, in extreme cases, out 
right hostility as the following quotations illustrate.
"If two managers were being compared with each other and they also had to trade with each other, they 
would tear into each other like cat and dog and do everything possible to get the better end o f the deal and 
that sort o f comparison made intercompany trading desperately difficult". (Respondent 14).
"Now if you are going to have intercompany trading, you're separate profit centres, obviously if  one 
group's doing particularly better than another and you're being told that they're always doing better than 
you, you're going to negotiate that much harder on transfer prices or refuse to play ball with them on 
transfer prices and you become more and more awkward. So that guy running that division, if he's being 
told he's doing a lot better than this guy, this guy is going to be very hard and not want to deal with him 
any longer". (Respondent 40)
9.3.3 Manifestations of rivalry in intragroup relationships
When actors perceive they are rivals inside a group, this can thus have a significant 
influence on the way they behave towards each other. The above quotations illustrate the 
potential for internal actors to be more outwardly hostile to a group partner or be less 
accommodating and co-operative. They may be reluctant to enter into relationships with 
other group companies where they perceive this will further the interests of a rival. By 
entering into exchange relationships actors may feel that they are assisting a rival to 
improve a position, giving access to future rewards which are valued across the group.
Competition and rivalry may express themselves in other ways. Using the comparison of 
market networks, where two actors are in competition with each other to secure the 
business of a common customer, a continuous activity for both suppliers is to 
demonstrate the superiority of their skills and capabilities over those of competitive
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suppliers. The objective of these activities is to generate a favourable image and 
perception in the psyche of the customer thereby improving their position to receive 
future rewards in terms of increased revenues. The perceived fear that a competitor is 
following similar routines will drive the continuous reinforcement of these image 
enhancing activities.
Internal actors may see their relationships as a way of demonstrating their competence to 
the centre in terms of their managerial efficiency and effectiveness. They may also view 
these relationships as a means of establishing their superiority over other actors in the 
group. In this aspect, respondents recognised a positive and constructive element of 
competition that drives internal actors to heightened levels of performance. There is also 
a perceived 'fear factor' for under-performing actors, in revealing weaknesses and 
inefficiencies.
"People do feel they have something to prove because if you want to be the most successful within, say the 
(X Division) for instance, you want to be seen as the most successful. You don't want to be seen as the one 
that's at the bottom o f the pile and there is a great deal o f competition". (Respondent 6).
However respondents also recognised that there was a fine line between what was 
considered constructive and destructive competition. The latter occurs when actors 
deliberately seek to question and undermine the capabilities of their rivals. The tactic of 
undermining the reputation of an internal partner was recognised as an activity that can 
characterise intragroup behaviour where actors pursue extreme forms of rivalry. A 
number of respondents in Agrifood described this behaviour in terms of'macho 
posturing,' specifically using the machismo analogy to describe an atmosphere 
characterised by criticism and one-upmanship. Whilst this represents an extreme form of 
rivalry between actors in intragroup relationships it was something that seemed to 
characterise a number of relationships in Agrifood, and something that most respondents 
recognised had the potential to occur.
"It's about machismo at a senior level". (Respondent 2).
"The trouble is though, a lot o f the time is not spent trying to develop cordial relationships, it's spent on the 
bloody politics o f trying to score points off each other and without a doubt, that does go on". (Respondent
5).
"There's a lot o f competition. So as soon as criticisms start to be o f each other's businesses, start to come 
to the forefront, then it comes extremely competitive because we have all been criticised (as all companies
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in the group are criticised on a number o f fronts) and usually we will answer that criticism with a worse 
and harder criticism and copying in a few more people (E.g. via memos or e mails)". (Respondent 6).
"You do see the macho behaviour sometimes but I don't let it bother me and I am sure most people realise 
that it is playing to the gallery". (Respondent 10).
"It's the same as in a small family that you find that the brothers and sisters are competing for the affection 
of their parents. In my experience, you find there's probably even greater competition within companies of 
the same holding company than there should be outside". (Respondent 18).
The competitive nature of group actors can therefore have a significant influence on the 
development and maintenance of trust between parties in intragroup relationships. Trust 
in this sense can be viewed as an emotional response in reaction to a perceived risk. 
Young (1996) recognises that trust may be described in terms of combinations of 
emotions felt towards others (such as admiration, respect and faith) and also emotions 
directed towards oneself (for example confidence). Trust can manifest itself in terms of 
suspicion and uncertainty. Young notes that suspicion is often seen as an alternative to 
trust. Actors in intragroup relationships may perceive high levels of risk attached to their 
relationships with other group companies because of the competitive activities of their 
trading partners directed against themselves.
9.3.5 Risk and exposure
Actors may also feel that higher levels of risk are associated with intragroup relationships 
because of the exposure and visibility these give within the group environment. The 
issues of risk and exposure were investigated in Scenario 37, where interviewees were 
asked to respond to the statement that: ’A manager in your business tells you that he 
thinks his actions are more closely scrutinised when dealing with a sister company 
and he feels more at risk’. Frame 58 measured perceptions of whether respondents felt 
exposed and vulnerable in their internal relationships. (Frame 58. Exposure & 
vulnerability. Mentions 100. Response 30/10). Statistical analysis indicates no 
significant differences between the views of Agrifood and other respondents. Mean 
scores of 1.0 (Agrifood) and 0.5 (other respondents) indicate that internal actors do 
perceive some element of risk when interacting with other trading partners within the 
group. (One sample t-test significantly different from zero).
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Respondents used a number of themes to describe the visibility of the group environment. 
They talked about being 'more closely scrutinised' in their interaction with other group 
companies, in comparison with dealings with external partners. Views were expressed 
that the environment was 'more public', 'more under the microscope' and more of an 
'exposed position'. People perceived they were more closely 'watched' where mistakes 
can be drawn to the attention of corporate management very rapidly. One respondent 
described an account of an audit of a laboratory facility by an internal customer where 
certain practices were severely criticised. The report of the audit was quickly drawn to 
the attention of centre who castigated local management in the supplying company. 
Whilst a number of respondents recognised that the watchful eye of'big brother' at the 
centre was more in the minds of people rather than proven in reality, it was generally 
agreed that a perceived increased exposure associated with the group environment was 
responsible for making actors more cautious and aware of their activities with other 
group companies.
Respondents associated increased risk with being 'more conscious' of their actions and 
more concerned about the consequence of their decisions. It was recognised that 'doing a 
bad job' was more likely to lead to a 'risky position' for internal actors whilst interaction 
with companies outside of the group was less likely to come to the attention of the centre 
where mistakes and misjudgements had been made.
"... people recognise it is more exposed and more visible and therefore sometimes you're better off not 
taking the risk at all". (Respondent 20).
An area in which risk may be particularly sensitive is where group actors negotiate with 
each other, for example, in implementing price rises. Visibility of an agreement may be 
increased when both actors report to a common centre. The outcome of individual 
decision making and the effectiveness of the overall settlement has a greater chance of 
being visible to, and evaluated by, a higher authority. In this situation, actors may be 
particularly aware of personal reputations and may be more reticent to make concessions 
to an internal partner, fearing this may be interpreted as a general sign of weakness. The 
issue of internal interaction shaping the reputation and image of individuals within the 
group was noted by a number of respondents.
"I understand why the guy would feel at risk because his performance in that relationship could have a 
major impact on his long term career in the group". (Respondent 5).
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"... people are worried about their own reputations around the group  I think they are worried that if
they don't get it right they'll be in trouble for whatever reason. I think that is what worries people. So they 
spend more time trying to make sure they're not the one responsible for it being wrong as opposed to just 
getting it right". (Respondent 15).
Increased risk and uncertainty also arises from the fact that there is a higher probability 
within the group that individuals who are colleagues or group trading partners in the 
current trading environment may become 'bosses' and superiors in the future. As one 
respondent candidly pointed out:
"I think there is an element o f human nature here that says its common sense to make the most o f dealing 
together.... because there is an element o f fear that comes into it. You never know whose going to be 
running you in the future". (Respondent 1).
These findings provide some explanation of why managers prefer the less ambiguous 
circumstances of external trading and would seem to have a bias against using internal 
suppliers, or a bias against preferentially favouring internal customers. Eccles & White 
(1988) have noted this bias and argue that it emanates from risks associated with 
transacting with someone in the same hierarchy of authority. In a transaction between 
two profit centres, if a delivery is late or quality is poor (using Eccles & White’s 
analogies), what had been a market relation can, and managers fear will, move through 
hierarchical channels to a higher authority. The group environment provides the context 
for this to occur.
9.4 Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted a number of reasons why trust may be difficult to achieve 
between actors in intragroup relationships. We have used the content frames to examine 
various aspects of trust featured in propositions P5 and P6. Frames 78 and 79 looked for 
general evidence that operating actors take opportunistic advantage of trading partners 
because of their positions within the group, whilst Frames 55 and 56 have examined the 
consequences of a lower level of trust between group actors. Frame 57 examined trust in 
terms of rivalry that can be generated between actors, and Frame 58 investigated the issue 
of risk and exposure felt by actors within the group environment.
We have seen that one of the implications of imposing or encouraging a trading mandate 
between group companies is to introduce a double lock in effect, which provides actors
181
on both sides of the relationship with an opportunity to exploit the conditions of that 
mandate to their advantage. Group sellers may feel they can avoid giving high levels of 
support to internal buyers. The latter on the other hand may see the mandate as 
justification to demand increased commitment from an internal supplier. Actors seem 
well aware of the potential for an opportunistic advantage to be exploited by trading 
partners, which shapes their expectations and trust of other group companies.
We have also seen that the suspicion of opportunistic behaviour (founded on past 
episodes or perceived fear) increases transaction costs between actors in intragroup 
relationships, partially negating cost advantages that may accrue from common 
ownership. Group buyers may feel they have to develop alternative relationships with 
external suppliers to benchmark performance and provide a counter measure to the threat 
of opportunism. (Although in practice, true benchmarks may be difficult to develop 
because of the group situation). Internal suppliers may have to incur additional costs in 
proving their credibility to internal partners. These factors support the claim of many 
business unit managers that the costs associated with internal transactions exceed those of 
corresponding external exchanges.
We have identified that trust between group actors is also influenced by rivalry that may 
develop between them because of the group situation. We have seen that the group 
environment can shape competitive pressures between actors where they perceive they 
are in competition for resources which are controlled and apportioned by the centre. 
Excessive levels of rivalry may lead players to pursue 'one-upmanship' strategies to 
further their positions at the expense of other group actors. This can increase the level of 
exposure of operating actors to the corporate centre. Internal actors may therefore 
attribute a higher level of risk to their relationships with other group companies which 
further influences the level of trust between them. The potential for the group 
environment to enhance competitive pressures between group actors provides some 
explanation of why internal companies favour external rather than internal trading 
partners.
We can conclude that in intragroup relationships, trust is an outcome of hierarchical and 
network influences. Factors inherent in one governance system (e.g. authority and rivalry
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in hierarchies) interact with elements of another (e.g. competition and co-operation 




Conflict and conflict resolution
Introduction
In previous chapters, we have highlighted factors that can generate conflict between 
actors in a group. We have seen that where operating companies behave 
opportunistically towards each other this can result in intense argument and dispute. We 
have recognised that conflicts can arise through varying interpretation of trading and 
transfer mandates by parties in an internal relationship. We have also identified that the 
very existence of a mandate may cause an adverse response among actors who perceive 
they are disadvantaged by its imposition.
In this chapter, we bring together these themes and investigate conflict in the context of 
intragroup relationships. Our particular interest is to understand how conflict arises and 
how it is managed and resolved. Our objective is to identify those factors that make 
conflicts between actors in a group different from those associated with buyer/seller 
interaction of unrelated actors. Our position on this in presented in Proposition P7 which 
contends that:
The resolution of conflicts between actors in a group may be affected by a mandate 
because:
* Termination of their relationship may not be allowable under the terms of the 
mandate.
* Intragroup actors may regard acts of deselection as involving personal risks to 
themselves.
* The centre may take some role in resolving conflicts between operating actors. 
Therefore exchange may take place between operating actors even within an 
atmosphere characterised by high levels of conflict and disagreement.
In section 10.1, we investigate whether intragroup relationships are identified with higher 
levels of conflict in comparison to that associated with interaction between buyers and
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sellers outside of a group. We go on to highlight factors unique to the group environment 
that are responsible for causing disputes and arguments amongst internal actors.
In section 10.2, we analyse how conflict is regulated and resolved in intragroup 
relationships. We see that actors may not have the option of withdrawing from their 
relationships under the terms of a mandate. They may also be reluctant to terminate 
interaction because of possible sanctions from the centre. We see that corporate centres 
are likely to be reticent to arbitrate in disputes between sister companies and highlight the 
responsibility of business managers in regulating disputes between their respective units. 
We conclude that disagreements may be more difficult to resolve within a group.
10.1 Conflict in intragroup relationships
10.1.1 Sources and functions of conflict
Actors in business relationships have both shared and contradictory interests. If they do 
not learn how to deal with the contradictory ones the resultant outcome is conflict. 
(Hakansson & Gadde 1992). Conflicts between buyers and sellers cannot be resolved 
once and for all, they are inherent in all business relationships and have to be regulated 
and tolerated permanently. Conflict requires a minimum level of mutuality between 
trading partners. (Ford, Hakansson & Johanson 1986). In any relationship, therefore, 
there is an inherent tension between conflict and co-operation because actors will be 
continuously sensitive as to whether they are receiving an adequate or equitable share of 
the benefits that accrue from their relationships.
Conflict represents a situation governed by opponent centred strategies (Easton & Araujo 
1992) where actors objectives are mutually exclusive. A member of an organisation is 
said to engage in conflictual behaviour if he consciously, but not necessarily deliberately, 
blocks another member’s goal achievement (Pondy 1967). Each contact point in a 
network can therefore be a source of conflict as well as harmony (Powell 1990).
The term ‘conflict’ can be variously used to describe certain states, conditions or 
behaviours. Some writers have viewed conflict in terms of its antecedent conditions 
relating its causes to problems of resource scarcity or policy differences. Conflict can be
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analysed in terms of its cognitive states in terms of an actor’s perception or awareness of 
a conflict situation. Conflict can be used to describe certain types of behaviour ranging 
from passive resistance to overt aggression. Finally, conflict can seen in terms of 
affective states it induces in actors such as stress, tension, hostility and anxiety.
Conflict between organisations is an inevitable outcome of functional independence and 
scarcity of resources (Assail 1969). Pondy identifies three models or types of conflict 
among sub-units of formal organisations. The first he terms the ‘Bargaining Model’ 
describing conflict between interest groups in competition for scarce resources. This 
model typically describes conflicts that arise in classical labour/management disputes. 
The ‘Bureaucratic Model’ analyses conflict along a vertical direction in terms of 
superior-subordinate relationships. It typically describes conflict in terms of institutional 
attempts to control behaviour and an organisation’s reaction to such control. Conflict 
occurs when one party seeks to exercise control over some activity that another party
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regards his own province and seeks to insulate itself from such control. The drive for 
autonomy of sub-units within an organisation can be analysed under this category. The 
third model is termed the ‘Systems Model’ which is directed at lateral conflict or 
conflicts among the parties to a functional relationship. Conflict arises through a 
divergence of sub-unit goals and is associated with problems of co-ordination. Disputes 
may arise when two parties who must co-operate on some joint activity are unable to 
reach a consensus on concerted activity.
Pondy recognises that these conflict sources may be present simultaneously within the 
context of the same organisation or conflict situation. He also notes that conflicts may be 
perceived by actors in a relationship when no conditions exist. In this case, conflict can 
result from the misunderstanding of each others’ true positions and can be resolved by 
improving communication between the parties. This model has been the basis of a wide 
variety of management techniques aimed at improving interpersonal relations between 
actors in a relationship.
Conflict is intimately tied up with the stability of the organisation and is frequently 
negatively valued by organisation members. However conflict can be regarded as 
functional as well as dysfunctional for the individual or organisation. Hakansson and 
Gadde (1992) point to the mistaken belief that the elimination of all conflict is a
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prerequisite for developing improved supplier relationships. Conflict can represent a 
catalyst that enables a better climate for innovation and development where lack of 
conflict results in the parties placing too few demands on one another. The desirable 
type of relationship is one where conflict is handled constructively. Constructive conflict 
can result in improved communications between organisations, allowing for legitimate 
differences of interests and beliefs to emerge (Assal 1969).
Other positive aspects of conflict can arise where arguments and disputes are deliberately 
created to produce dissent and competition among organisational sub-units. Eccles & 
White (1988) identified that within the context of intragroup relationships, conflict 
between actors makes information available to top management that otherwise may not 
be known, or would be difficult or expensive to obtain. This allows a corporate centre to 
be brought into a relationship as an arbiter at critical times.
Finally, it must be recognised that some participants to a relationship may enjoy the 
challenge of argument and debate inherent in the rivalry between competing sub-units. 
(Pondy 1967).
The previous analysis has highlighted that conflict is an inherent component of business 
relationships. In this section, we examine conflict in the context of relationships between 
group companies, and investigate:
• To what extent intragroup relationships are characterised by conflict between actors, 
particularly within the context of the intragroup triad.
• Where the main sources of conflict arise.
We then go on to look at mechanisms and administrative procedures used to control 
conflict within intragroup relationships.
10.1.2 Conflict in intragroup relationships
To investigate further the intensity of conflict between group actors, respondents were 
presented in Scenario 42 with a statement that “One of your colleagues observes that 
you always seem to be arguing with a sister company and nothing ever seems to
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change”. Frame 62 was set up to highlight statements where respondents perceived that 
their internal relationships were characterised by high levels of dispute and argument. 
(Frame 62. Dispute intensity. Response 27/10. Mentions 65). The one sample t-test for 
the frame was significantly different from zero. Analysis of the data indicates that both 
groups of respondents believe that the intensity of argument and dispute tends to be high 
within their internal relationships. (Mean scores: Agrifood respondents 1.3, other 
respondents 0.'8. Mann-Whitney test indicates no significant difference in responses).
Some respondents gave the impression that disputes and arguments were almost endemic 
to relationships with sister companies highlighting internal conflicts as a ‘fact of long 
term life’. In some cases, there was almost an expectation that sister companies should 
argue. Part of this can be attributed to the rivalry that can exist between group actors 
which was highlighted in Chapter 9. This can cause business units to take more extreme 
positions in arguments with other group companies and be more reticent to concede 
ground in disputes with perceived rivals. The danger here is that relatively minor 
disagreements may escalate and widen into more serious conflicts, where an initial 
dispute precipitates more general and more personal conflict that was previously 
suppressed. A retaliative mentality may begin to characterise interaction between the 
parties. Such an escalation of conflict was identified by Eccles & White (1988) where 
business managers seek to involve a corporate centre in business unit disputes. Under 
these conditions, there are strong incentives for actors to defend criticisms with counter 
arguments even though the result is conflict.
Respondents highlighted the lack of robust conflict resolution mechanisms within their 
organisation which meant that disputes are more likely to become protracted and drawn 
out. We examine the impact of this in the next section. It was suggested that increased 
conflict was related to the fact that there was ‘more scope for argument in intercompany 
relationships’ indicating there are additional factors present in the group environment 
which give rise to dispute between actors.
“It’s almost an expectation that you should argue with sister companies and I would expect a colleague to 
see that”. (Respondent 2).
“I ’m absolutely sure that relationships are allowed to get bad because o f this invisible glue that’s suppose 
to be holding it together which makes it even worse (Respondent 6).
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" you actually get to the point where all you do is argue. You don't try to solve problems. I think that’s
very valid. That does happen I t’s an attitude o f mind”. (Respondent 10).
"... what happens is that situations get blown up out of all proportion and the ongoing relationship is 
further damaged. And I  guess there must have been a lot o f that in Tastetec and Millpro over the years”. 
(Respondent 24).
"7 must admit, to some extent, on intercompany relationships, a fact o f long term life is that there will 
always be arguments going on with sister companies ”. (Respondent 34).
10.1.3 Source of conflict in intragroup relationships
In terms of identifying these additional factors, respondents made reference to them 
through out their interviews. Many have been highlighted in previous chapters, but it is 
useful to reiterate them in the context of Pondy’s three categories of conflict sources.
We have seen that Pondy’s ‘bargaining model’ describes conflict between interest groups 
who are in competition for scare resources. Conflicts arise where buyers and sellers seek 
to secure what they perceive to be an equitable share of the benefits of their relationships. 
In this respect, there is little difference between internal and external relationships, 
particularly where interaction is governed by voluntary exchange mechanisms, where 
actors have the freedom to select (or reject) potential trading partners, and negotiate the 
terms of their exchanges. We have seen in an earlier chapter that in certain circumstances 
group actors may find it difficult to reach agreement on what constitutes an equitable 
share of the benefits of an internal relationship because of the added dimension of related 
ownership and potential rivalry. Therefore in order to avoid what the centre perceives as 
wasteful or dysfunctional conflict it adopts transfer pricing rules that externally define the 
value each party receives from its involvement in a relationship. We have demonstrated 
however that rules may be open to multiple interpretation and may be circumvented or 
manipulated to the benefit of one party and the detriment of another. Transfer pricing 
rules designed to reduce conflict may therefore become significant sources of argument 
and dispute between actors.
A number of respondents in field research openly admitted that they would have little 
hesitation in manipulating or misrepresenting product costs or selling prices in order to 
improve their share of the benefits of interaction with sister companies. However when 
such behaviour is suspected and identified by trading partners, argument and dispute can 
come to dominate the value of transfers between internal business units. These will
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become particularly predominant where actors perceive the allocation processes to be 
unfair and inequitable. Conflicts associated with various transfer pricing systems have 
been well documented by Eccles & White (1988) and are beyond the scope of this 
project. Bradach & Eccles (1989) identified similar disagreements over transfer pricing 
stating these to be a cause of disagreement and acrimony between division managers.
“lean  tell you even in Tastetec we had a discussion how you actually falsify the input value in order to 
create a profit higher than S Base (The management information system) shows. So already what you 
have is people seeing that profit allocation is inequitable and therefore finding a way o f giving themselves 
an advantage to correct something they see as unjust (Respondent 2).
“Oh you wouldn’t believe the blood that was spilt over that  We’re talking about transfer pricing, the
problem certainly in the time that I was with the company was not resolved. It was an open issue at the 
time that I left. The reason was that you had two different companies using two completely separate cost 
basis and they just could not agree ". (Respondent 31).
Resource-based conflict in intragroup relationships arises as a result of opportunistic 
behaviour of one or both of the parties. We saw in Chapter 9 that an internal seller may 
use the lock in protection of a full or partial mandate to reduce resources allocated to 
internal relationships in favour of external partners. On the other hand, internal buyers 
may demand proportionately more of the resources of an internal supplier than is 
expected from other suppliers. Disagreements over what each party expects the other to 
invest in a relationship may cause long standing conflict and dispute. It is worth 
reiterating that opportunistic behaviour of internal buyers and sellers was identified as a 
significant cause of conflict amongst group actors by respondents.
Pondy’s ‘bureaucratic model’ is particularly relevant when a corporate centre becomes 
involved in the relationships between group actors through the application of rules and 
mandates. We have seen that in certain circumstances internal business units may resent 
this intrusion especially where they perceive it to be to their detriment. Being made to 
trade with an inferior group supplier falls into this category. Conflicts may therefore arise 
along a vertical rather than horizontal direction. It is worth noting that no respondent 
made reference to a direct and manifested conflict between a business unit and a 
corporate centre. This is not surprising given the potential risk confronting a business 
manager who directly challenges the authority of the centre. Under these conditions, 
conflicts that arise vertically, may express themselves horizontally between related 
business units rather than between a business unit and a higher authority. Disputes and
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arguments may be engineered and propagated to avoid or minimise the impact of adverse 
policies.
"If you manage to keep arguing, nothing ever will change because you ’11 be so busy arguing, nothing else 
will get done; and that would be a scenario that I would recognise (Respondent 3).
Evidence of a planned and deliberate exploitation of conflict by a corporate centre was 
not evident from field interviews, suggesting that this did not feature in the relationships 
examined within this project. (Or perhaps that respondents were not conscious of its use 
as an influencing tactic). Eccles & White (1988) identified that conflict may be fostered 
by corporate executives to make information available to top management. As a 
consequence of conflict, product managers may monitor the performance of each other 
and of the functions that supply them with resources. In doing so, they may make 
valuable information available to higher level management. When corporate managers 
are freely supplied with information by lower levels of management, this helps obviate 
the loss of control associated with hierarchies without interfering with the autonomy of 
business unit managers. Whilst respondents recognised that conflict was inherently 
present in the cultures of their organisations, and that certain individuals seemed to thrive 
on the challenge of argument and debate with sister companies, its deliberate use as an 
information collection device by a corporate centre did not characterise their intragroup 
relationships.
The 'systems model’ defines conflicts that arise due to a divergence of sub-unit goals 
between actors who may not be able to reach agreement on a particular activity or course 
of action. These can arise in the group environment where actors fail to reach agreement 
over the interpretation of rules and edicts, particularly where they seek to interpret these 
in terms most favourable to themselves. Actors may therefore disagree over the 
fundamental basis on which they interact within intragroup relationships. We have seen 
in Chapter 6 that ambiguity inherent in loosely-worded edicts can result in significant 
disagreement over their interpretation and meaning.
We can see that the ways actors interpret and react to the imposition of trading and 
transfer mandates gives rise to these ‘additional’ sources of conflict associated with 
intragroup relationships. They represent additional variables that are absent in external
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relationships for actors to consider and reach agreement on (or potentially argue over), 
and can fundamentally influence relationships between actors in the group context.
10.2 Conflict resolution in intragroup relationship
10.2.1 Resolving conflicts in dyadic relationships
Having identified some of the sources of conflict associated with intragroup trading, we 
now go on to examine the mechanisms that may be used in their resolution. A 
relationship cannot bear continuous conflict amongst its participants unless conflict is 
consistently regulated and resolved. An organisation’s success hinges to a great extent on 
its ability to set up and operate appropriate mechanisms for dealing with a variety of 
conflicts (Pondy 1967). Johanson & Mattsson (1987) argue that disagreements have to 
be handled in the framework of relationships. ‘Voice’ maybe preferable to ‘exit’ which 
might not be easy or attractive. Actors therefore have to develop conflict resolution 
methods and problem solving routines. If commonly accepted procedures for conflict 
resolution can be developed, then a system can establish a degree of stability despite the 
competing self interests of its individual members (Assal 1969).
The perception of conflict by participants in a relationship may have the effect of 
motivating them to reduce conflict in a number of ways. Minor conflicts generate 
pressures towards resolution without altering the relationship. But major conflicts may 
generate pressures to alter the form of the relationship or dissolve it altogether. Actors 
may seek increased inducements to compensate for the conflict. The effectiveness and 
appropriateness of conflict resolution techniques depends on the nature of the conflict and 
an administrator’s philosophy of management. (Pondy 1967).
The objective of conflict resolution mechanisms is to prevent conflicts which have 
reached an awareness level from developing into non co-operative behaviour. Examples 
of resolution devices include the collective bargaining apparatus of labour/managment 
disputes or processes of appeal systems for resolving superior-subordinate conflicts. 
Pondy (1967) notes that transfer pricing systems constitute a form of mechanism for 
resolving lateral conflicts among partners within a functional relationship. However, the 
existence of resolution mechanisms and procedures may not be sufficient to prevent
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conflict from becoming manifest if the parties do not value the relationship or if conflict 
is strategic in pursuit of sub-unit goals.
In this section we will identify various resolution mechanisms used to regulate conflict 
between actors within a group. Our objective is to highlight those mechanisms that are 
particularly appropriate to the group situation that operate along side the ‘normal’ 
mechanism buyers and sellers employ to regulate and resolve conflicts in business 
networks. We will examine three specific issues:
• The extent to which actors have the option of terminating relationships with in-house 
partners.
• The circumstances under which a corporate centre becomes involved in disputes and 
disagreement between group buyers and sellers.
• Other options available to business unit managers to regulate conflict within the 
context of their internal relationships.
10.2.2. Termination of intragroup relationships
Termination of a relationship is an extreme form of conflict resolution, usually employed 
when other mechanisms have failed to resolve fundamental and intense conflict between 
actors. The decision to terminate may represent a joint agreement by the parties who are 
unable to reach a consensus on the way to resolve their differences. A more common 
event is when one of the parties takes unilateral action to withdraw because it is 
dissatisfied with the performance or commitment of its counterpart. Thus a buyer may 
deselect a supplier who it perceives is acting opportunistically and where it has failed to 
perform against key parameters (e.g. product and service quality). A supplier may decide 
to withdraw support from a particular customer because it believes its marketing 
resources are better employed in alternative relationships. Distinction must be made 
between partial and absolute termination. In the case of the latter, all contact between the 
parties, including personal interaction, is ceased. A partial termination occurs when 
products and services are no longer exchanged between the parties but personal contacts 
continue (although probably at a scaled down level).
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Termination is likely to be problematic in intragroup relationships where interaction 
between parties is governed by mandates locking them together. Internal actors may not 
be allowed the sanction of termination by a corporate centre where significant synergies 
for the group are created through their interaction. Even where actors are linked through 
weaker mandates (encouragement rather than edict), individual parties may still be 
reticent to partially or fully withdraw from a relationship with an internal counterpart.
The consequences of termination were explored in Scenarios 39 and 40. In Scenario 39, 
respondents were presented with a situation where ‘You have become so fed up with 
arguing with a sister company that you are tempted to cease supplying them’. A 
similar predicament was presented in Scenario 40 which proposed that ‘Your company 
is seriously considering delisting a sister company as one of your suppliers. What 
might your thoughts be?’ Frame 60 was set up to measure respondents’ reticence to 
withdraw from internal relationships. (Frame 60 Termination reticence. Response 30/10. 
Mentions 102). Statistical analysis of responses indicates that there is divergence of 
opinion amongst Agrifood respondents, and between other respondents, as to whether 
termination represents a viable option for internal actors. Whilst the t-test indicates that 
overall responses are not significantly different from zero, respondents expressed a 
variety of opinions around the likelihood of terminating relationships with group partners. 
(Mean scores: Agrifood 0.4, other respondents 0.2. No significant difference recorded in 
responses between groups).
People expressed reluctance to terminate relationships with internal partners in a number 
of ways. Some recognised termination as a point that ‘neither party dare get to’.
“I don’t think I  would ever be tempted to cease supplying them (Respondent 10).
“There is a reluctance in an honest man’s mind because you know it should be part o f proper group 
business ”. (Respondent 31).
“I think there would be a reticence to do that and you ’d  have to think about it in another dimension than if  
it were a totally external company, because you would have to think what are the internal ramifications o f
that.  You might be more challenged on the decision to do that by somebody else whereas if  it were an
external company, they can’t challenge you (Respondent 36).
A number of respondents admitted that they would have ideally delisted internal 
companies in the past, but recognised an internal pressure to continue to resolve 
differences. Whilst deselection could be applied as device to threaten a trading
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counterpart, it’s use was seen as ineffective because both parties recognised that its 
implementation was unlikely because of the signals it would send to other parts of the 
organisation. Some respondents believed it was a ‘duty’ to resolve internal conflicts 
without resorting to extreme measures such as termination. Failure to do so was regarded 
as a breakdown of management processes within the group.
“I ’ve been to that point (deselection) and you know that you ’re not going to not supply them, and they 
know that you ’re not going to not supply them as well because neither party dare get to that point’’. 
(Respondent 1).
"The pressure on them to keep us as a (internal) supplier was very significant”. (Respondent 2).
“We couldn 't not supply. It is more difficult. I wouldfeel it is incumbent on us to resolve those 
difficulties”. (Respondent 14).
“I  think what normally brings people back from the brink is the fact that’s rather high profile stuff. So I
think people step back from the brink and try and sort things out ”. (Respondent 19).
Not all respondents expressed a reservation to de-list internal trading partners. Repeated 
incidents of service and quality failures were quoted by a number of respondents as 
justification for pursuing such a course of action. However even in these circumstance 
most respondents had obvious reservation. People talked about ‘moving heaven and 
earth to sort the problem out’ first by giving a trading counterpart extensive warning. 
Respondents were concerned that they followed ‘proper procedures’ so they could be sure 
of their positions when answering to the centre.
“My thought would certainly be well really are we doing the right thing? To make that decision you would 
have to have tried everything. You ’d  have to be very very sure o f your position ”. (Respondent 6).
“For this situation to arise in practicalities there would need to be some very negative and very adverse 
trading relations between the two organisations for this decision to be considered strongly ". (Respondent
6).
“I think if  you give them enough chances to supply you properly and they haven’t responded to your 
requirements, providing they are not excessive, then I would seriously consider delisting them ’’. 
(Respondent 13).
When respondents discussed their reactions to the scenarios, two themes were 
particularly apparent. Firstly, termination of an intragroup relationship was perceived as 
evoking a strong adverse reaction from the corporate centre. Secondly, as a consequence 
of this, failure to resolve differences between group actors carried high personal risk to 
the individuals involved. Frame 61 identified statements where respondents believed that
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termination of their internal relationships would be met with strong disapproval by the 
centre. (Frame 61 Centre disapproval. Response 16/6. Mentions 34). The one sample 
t-test was significantly different from zero. Further analysis indicates that whilst just 
over half of respondents mentioned this theme in their interviews, when they did so, it 
was in terms of likely disapproval by the centre. (Identical mean scores of 1.6 were 
recorded for Agrifood and other respondents).
Respondents described the probable response of the centre to a breakdown in a 
relationship between internal actors in the following terms:
“The centre would go mad. You just couldn’t do it. They wouldn’t let you do it". (Respondent 16).
“If the companies know that it is important they’re going to have to explain it, because they know that I ’m 
going to come and descend on them and that will make them think about it”. (Respondent 26).
“If I was Chief Executive and one division's going to delist another, if  it got to that point, I would be 
seriously upset with both. I ’d  be knocking heads together". (Respondent 35).
Respondents were especially sensitive to being perceived as incompetent by top 
management for failing to resolve differences between themselves. Failure to reach 
agreement was regarded as a sign of immaturity of the managers involved, irrespective of 
the validity of the original argument. The expectation of business unit managers was that 
because of their position and status as head of their operating units, they should have the 
ability to solve their own problems within the framework of existing relationships and 
without compromising the prosperity of the group.
“I  keep using the wordfear, but there's a fear/threat that if  you are a good manager then you should be 
able to do this, and to actually admit that you can’t come to some consensus starts people above 
questioning whether you are the right person in that role ”. (Respondent 1).
In summary, termination of relationships between internal actors may be problematic 
within a group. A corporate centre may explicitly disallow its operating actors the option 
of withdrawing from relationships with sister companies where corporate profitability or 
‘value’ is compromised. Even where a centre lays down no official guidelines relating to 
termination, there are pressures for actors to maintain their internal relationships.
Business managers may have concerns about the consequences of their actions on the 
overall prosperity of the group and regard acts of deselection as an admission of failure 
on their part and therefore inappropriate. Actors may also view an act of deselection of
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an internal trading partner as involving personal risk because of the likely adverse 
response from the centre. They may therefore prefer to continue arguing rather than risk 
incurring the displeasure and sanction of senior management.
10.2.3 Arbitration of intragroup relationships
When actors have disputes which they are unable to resolve satisfactorily, they may 
request that a neutral third party is brought into the relationship to arbitrate a solution 
between them. At one level, the arbitrator may act as a conduit of communication 
between the parties in the dispute and help facilitate a negotiated settlement through 
discussion and compromise. On the other hand, an arbiter may seek an impassionate 
investigation of the grievances of each party and then pronounce judgement in favour of 
one or the other.
In disputes between companies within a group, an obvious source of arbitration would 
seem to be the corporate centre as the legitimate and ultimate authority over both 
operating actors. In theory, it has the positional power to impose judgements over actors 
to regulate or resolve their disputes. Evidence from the field research however reveals 
that corporate centres tend to distance themselves from internal arguments and are very 
reluctant to be drawn into disputes between operating actors.
In Scenario 41 respondents were presented with a situation where “You are in dispute 
with a sister company and have asked the centre to intervene, however you find that 
people at the centre are reluctant to become involved”. Frame 63 was set up to
measure responses that supported or rejected the assertion that corporate centres are 
reluctant to intervene in the relationships of their operating companies. (Frame 63 
Centre intervention - Actual. Response 25/9. Mentions 67). Again, the one sample t-test 
was significantly different from zero. Analysis of responses indicates that whilst both 
sets of respondents perceived a reluctance for corporate centres to become involved in 
business unit disputes, this was particularly relevant in Agrifood. (Mean scores: Agrifood 
respondents 1.3, other respondents 0.8. No statistical difference was recorded between 
groups).
" there is no forum in which you can bring two trading companies together in order to resolve that, at
which the centre is prepared to arbitrate (Respondent 2).
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“Yes I think so. They ’re reluctant to stick their head above the parapet. I mean that often happens. I 
mean people at the centre never do anything do they? I mean that's normal comment that you often get. 
They talk bu t they run away from conflict ”. (Respondent 26).
“That’s exactly the situation. At the centre o f Biotec they will not. You sort your own problem out. They 
will not try and arbitrate between divisions. ” (Respondent 36).
“Yes, we would be pretty reluctant to get involved. You just have to sometimes. It depends on the gravity 
of the situation ”. (Respondent 37).
In discussing their reactions to the scenario above, respondents highlighted a number of 
reasons why a corporate centre prefers to occupy a neutral position in disputes between 
operating companies. Firstly, corporate management may hold the view that it is not its 
function or prerogative to resolve disputes between internal customers and suppliers. A 
centre may perceive that its intervention is likely to compromise the accountability and 
autonomy of its businesses. By involving itself in disputes, the centre may implicitly 
assume partial ownership of the problems and disagreements that are at the root cause of 
the conflict. Where a centre’s mode of co-ordination is through voluntary mechanisms it 
is more likely to distance itself from conflicts between actors.
“That would be something that I would recognise where the basic challenge would be ‘Look you ’re the 
profit making units. You must work this out between yourselves. We can’t intervene you ’ve got to sort it 
out. But we do expect you to sort it out”. (Respondent 3).
“One o f the excuses given is ‘Well o f course you ’re grown up. You trade with each other. I t‘s your 
relationships to manage not ours ’ ”. (Respondent 6).
“I think i t ’s quite natural in that if  the centre start to get involved in the operational activities o f divisions 
then one questions where the ownership lies o f the output”. (Respondent 28).
A number of respondents pointed out that corporate centres are particularly reluctant to 
intervene in disputes where the outcome is perceived as a zero sum game to the group as 
a whole. Thus arguments that involve the allocation of benefits between sister companies 
were seen as particularly wasteful from the centre’s point of view because little advantage 
accrues to the group from the involvement of the centre. Disputes about payment and 
credit terms between sister companies fall within this category where a creditor in the 
balance sheet of one business unit is a debtor in another.
“The perspective o f the people at the centre is actually this is a complete waste o f time and i t ’s a complete 
zero sum game because I ’m skulking about moving profit out o f one pocket to the other ’’. (Respondent 
17).
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The desire by corporate management to be seen to be neutral and impartial in its 
relationships with its operating companies was also highlighted as a reason for non 
intervention. A centre may be sensitive to criticisms of supporting one party against 
another and therefore refrain from placing itself in a potentially compromising situation. 
Pronouncements in favour of one party automatically influences the centre’s relationship 
with another. The danger to the centre is that an adverse ruling against one of its 
operating actors may engender feelings of alienation and of being let down, that shapes 
the atmosphere of future interaction.
“They 're reluctant because they probably deal with both the two chief executives or two sales directors or 
whatever it is directly, by themselves anyway. They know them very well and don’t want to take sides.
What you will genuinely find is that the two guys will be good in their own areas. Then why crap on either 
one o f them? It would tend to put them off and you have a bigger problem ”. (Respondent 10).
Finally, a corporate centre may be reticent to be involved in a dispute due to the 
complexity inherent in many conflict situations. If a disagreement between group actors 
has reached the level of intensity that necessitates the need of involving the centre, it is 
likely that more obvious and easily derived solutions are unlikely to be applicable. 
Conflict may not be based on a single episode but a culmination of many episodes that 
have arisen in intensity over time. Pondy (1967) notes that once conflicts breakout on 
some specific issue, then that conflict frequently widens and the initial specific conflict 
episode precipitates more general and more personal conflicts which has been suppressed 
in the interest of preserving the stability of the relationship up to that point. Conflict may 
therefore be characterised by claim and counterclaim between the parties. Eccles and 
White (1988) identified that profit centre managers have strong incentives for counter 
argument in disputes with sister companies even though the result is conflict. Under such 
conditions a corporate centre may have great difficulty in adjudicating between the 
claims of the various parties.
“They are also reluctant to come involved sometimes because they don 7 know what i t ’s all about and don 7 
understand it”. (Respondent 1).
“Everybody’s all for intercompany trade, but when you shout that you ’ve got a problem, they want you to 
sort out the problem because probably they know the complexities that are involved in it and they are 
reluctant to give you their help ”. (Respondent 29).
Having established that corporate centres are reluctant to arbitrate disputes between 
operating actors we should comment on the validity of a centre adopting this stance in 
disputes between sister companies. This theme was highlighted in Frame 64 that
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recorded respondent views on the desirability of involving the centre in disputes. (Frame 
64. Centre intervention - desired. Response 23/5. Mentions 75). Statistical results are 
similar to frame 60 in that whilst the t-test shows no significant difference from zero for 
overall responses, respondents had divergent opinions on the desirability of involving the 
centre in their disputes. (Mean scores: Agrifood 0.4, other respondents 0.6. No 
significant difference recorded between groups).
Those who refuted the desirability of involving the centre perceived the need for 
arbitration as a ‘sign of weakness’ or an ‘admission of failure’ on behalf of operating 
actors; something to be avoided at all costs. However other respondents highlighted the 
need for an ultimate authority to oversee disagreements between actors that were 
regarded as important and significant to the group, especially where both parties had 
requested the intervention of the centre to assist to facilitate a solution. Under these 
conditions it was seen as incumbent on the centre to accede to this request. It was also 
highlighted by a number of respondents that the requirement for the centre to arbitrate 
between sister companies was reinforced by the fact that actors in internal relationships 
did not have access to what might be regarded as the ultimate resolution mechanism, 
appeal to the courts of law. One respondent accounted a dispute with a sister company 
that would have resulted in some form of legal action had not the parties been connected 
through common ownership
" at the end o f the da y .... you don't actually have the sanction to sue your sister company. You know 
i t’s not going to get to court..... Therefore what is the mechanism to resolve that dispute? ” (Respondent 
17).
10.2.4 Other resolution mechanisms in intragroup relationships
We have seen that the break-up of a relationship between internal actors is unlikely to be 
practical either because it is specifically disallowed by the centre, or because business 
managers may be reluctant to withdraw for reasons of personal risk or group loyalty. We 
have also seen that arbitration may be more difficult to achieve because the centre is 
likely to be reticent to involve itself in the disputes of operating actors, and that the latter 
are unlikely to have recourse to legal mechanisms.
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This presents something of a dilemma for business managers because whilst there are 
more factors to argue over in group relationships, resolution may be more difficult to 
achieve. At the same time, failure to resolve disputes carries higher personal risks to the 
individuals managing those relationships. We can therefore conclude that actors have to 
work harder to regulate and resolve their differences in the group situation.
Under these conditions, actors are likely to operate in an atmosphere of uneasy 
coexistence, where potential conflicts reside just below the surface of their relationships. 
Pondy (1967) notes that if conflict is genuinely resolved to the satisfaction of both 
parties, the basis of more co-operative relationships may be laid. But if conflict is merely 
suppressed and not resolved, conditions of conflict may be aggravated and develop into 
more serious forms until they are rectified or until the relationship dissolves.
Given these factors many respondents highlighted the responsibility and increased onus 
on the heads of business units to take a leading role in regulating and resolving 
differences with internal trading partners. Business unit managers were seen as 
particularly important in setting the tone and shaping the atmosphere of relationships with 
sister companies; more so than in their relationships with external customers or suppliers. 
In certain instances, relationships between business unit heads were seen as a critical 
factor in the success of the overall intragroup relationship.
“I  see the roles o f CEO’s (business unit heads) being critical. I f  they can sit and agree there is a way 
forward then the inertia can often be overcome. But i t ’s very unlikely to be overcome by someone like me 
or, even worse, further people down the line ”. (Respondent 2).
"I think it is the attitude o f the Chief Executives o f those companies which is key to get the relationship 
going and sorting out problems as they arise ”. (Respondent 19).
“At the end o f the day the CEO (business unit head) is responsible for everything I suppose that’s probably 
true. They ’re very influential and I believe the managers often do believe that to be the case. If you look at 
Tastetec and Coverco. Why is that relationship bad? Well it does start at the top at the end o f the day”. 
(Respondent 26).
“I think the highest level o f management has a major role to play in ensuring that intercompany trade 
works correctly. I think it's interesting the further you go down in seniority, the more difficult it is for  
junior people to make it work and they need a lot o f support and they need a lot o f networking if  you like at 
the top level to make sure it works properly, which you wouldn’t do with an external supplier”.
(Respondent 30).
“Their influence can be huge". (Respondent 37).
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10.3 Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the way conflicts arise, and are managed within a 
group. Our initial starting point was summarised in proposition P7, presented at the 
beginning of the chapter which we have examined within four of the content frames. 
Frame 60 was set up to investigate whether actors are reticent to terminate relationships 
with group partners whilst Frame 61 evaluated whether actors perceive the act of 
termination would elicit disapproval from the centre and therefore represent personal risk 
to themselves. Frame 63 explored the likelihood of corporate centres becoming involved 
in disagreements between operating actors; and finally, Frame 62 examined whether 
group relationships are characterised by high levels of argument and dispute.
Our analysis has supported the view that the termination of relationships may be more 
difficult to achieve inside a group. We have seen that whilst a corporate centre may 
explicitly disallow its operating actors from withdrawing from an internal relationship, 
the perceived threat of sanctions may be enough to bind actors, even in circumstances of 
high manifest conflict.
We must however reject the notion that corporate centres adopt a significant role in 
resolving conflicts between operating actors. Our analysis indicates that corporate 
management are reluctant to intervene in disputes between business units and tend to 
refrain from acting as arbiters when disagreements arise in their relationships.
Finally, our analysis suggests that relationships within a group tend to be characterised by 
higher levels of conflict compared to equivalent intercompany relationships between 
unrelated actors. There are a number of factors inherent in the group situation that can 
give rise to arguments and disputes between actors that relate to the influence of a 
mandate regulating intragroup trading and transfers. This is reinforced by the fact that 
actors cannot withdraw from their internal relationships, and that the use of traditional 






This final chapter has four aims:
• Firstly, to summarise the research that has been presented in this thesis.
• Secondly, to bring together the findings of the research into its ‘core conclusions’.
• Thirdly, to point to the implications of the research for corporate managers and 
practitioners involved in the management of intragroup relationships.
• Finally, to suggest possible directions for further research in the area,
11.2 Summary of research
11.2.1 Research aims and propositions
The aim of this research has been to develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of intragroup relationships. We have been particularly interested in identifying and 
describing those factors that are associated with the environment of the group that make 
these relationships distinct and unique. Our objective has been to produce a 
comprehensive and in-depth analysis by bringing these factors together in the context of a 
single study.
We have developed a series of propositions that help describe and account for the 
behaviour of actors involved in relationships within a group. These propositions have 
drawn on a number of concepts identified in industrial marketing literature as well as 
theory developed in the areas of economics, organisational behaviour and corporate 
strategy. These propositions have also been derived from the author’s intuitive ideas, as 
well as the views of practitioners involved in co-ordinating and managing these 
relationships. Each proposition provides a frame work for the analysis of data covering 
various themes of intragroup interaction.
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These themes concern the following aspects of intragroup relationships:
• The influence of the centre.
• The effectiveness of mandates.
• The influence of other actors inside and outside of the group.
• Information exchange between actors.
• Opportunistic behaviour of actors.
• Rivalry between actors.
• Conflict and conflict resolution.
11.2.2 The relation of the research to previous studies
One of the aims of this research has been to fill a gap in the literature on business 
relationships by highlighting the importance of interaction between companies in a group. 
We have seen that whilst academics have recognised the existence of intragroup 
relationships in the general body of marketing literature, there have been few studies that 
have taken these relationships as their central theme.
In describing the relationships that form between group companies we have been able to 
reference a number of concepts and analytical tools in the general literature that help 
explain and characterise dyadic interaction between internal actors.
The propositions that form the basis of this study were partly developed by applying 
these concepts to the group situation. The literature review highlighted the importance of 
thinking about intragroup relationships in the context of industrial networks. It also 
identified a set of factors (or contingencies) that motivate actors to form and develop 
commercial relationships which have general applicability to the group context.
11.2.3 Methodology
The propositions indicated the different factors which require investigation in order to 
understand the nature of intragroup relationships. The study of a wide variety of these 
factors was accommodated within the methodological design which had to reconcile 
certain other prerequisites, specifically:
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• The requirement to concentrate the research towards one focal organisation to achieve 
the depth of analysis inherent in a focused case study.
• The need to take into account potential sensitivities of respondents involved in 
intragroup relationships, and overcome problems of access and misinformation.
• The need to take into account the status of the researcher as a member of the focal 
organisation under investigation.
• The requirement to orientate the field research to allow respondents to freely express 
perceptions and beliefs about their involvement in intragroup relationships.
• The need to allow exploration of a wide range of factors associated with intragroup 
interaction, thereby negating the use of traditional research instruments such as 
conventional questionnaires.
• The need to investigate responses to specific issues and situations, rather than 
generalised expectations.
These prerequisites led to the development of a methodology which had two key
properties:
• Firstly, data was gathered in the form of tape-recorded responses to a number of 
hypothetical situations (scenarios). This was found to encourage a full expression of 
respondents’ reactions to issues and situations that they could identify with from 
current and previous experiences.
• Secondly, the raw data was analysed in the form of content analysis. This allowed the 
coding and quantification of respondents’ statements into a large number of 
categories. The method allowed the comparison between respondents in the focal 
organisation with those in other organisations referenced in this research. It also 
allowed a particular score to be traced back to the precise statement and context 
which produced the response. This provided a fuller and more accurate interpretation 
of scores.
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11.3 Summary of results and conclusions
11.3.1 Introduction
In this section, the results of the research are summarised according to the layout adopted 
in the thesis presentation. An attempt is then made to synthesise these results into overall 
conclusions.
11.3.2 Influence of the centre
Corporate centres have a profound influence on the relationships between operating 
companies within a group. A key task for multi-divisional corporations is to co-ordinate 
activities between the various business units that comprise the group. The challenge for 
corporate management is to define how an organisation can create a whole that is greater 
than the sum of its parts. In achieving this, a centre provides a rationale for existence of 
the group as a viable economic entity. Co-ordination therefore requires bringing into a 
relationship many disparate activities of organisational actors.
Co-ordination is achieved within a group by regulating two major elements of the 
interaction process:
• Intragroup trading policies prescribe the degree of freedom internal business units are 
given in selecting and developing relationships with partners internal and external to 
the group.
• Intragroup transfer policies define the mechanisms by which transactions are carried 
out within the group, particularly relating to the pricing of goods and services 
transferred between actors.
The research indicates that the process of co-ordination can be achieved in a number of 
ways.
• Mandated policies explicitly define that certain activities or events will occur. These 
are operationalised in the form of rules or edicts that enforce co-operation between
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actors and lock them together. Mandated policies reflect a hierarchical form of 
co-ordination.
• Voluntary policies are consciously designed not to influence the trading and transfer 
activities of individual actors who are left to formulate these for themselves. 
Voluntary policies express the network form of co-ordination where individual actors 
engage in reciprocal and mutually supportive actions to further their individual and 
joint interests.
• Encouraged policies seek to combine both network and hierarchical mechanisms to 
co-ordinate internal relationships. In these cases, corporate centres signal to internal 
operating actors that certain activities or events are appropriate but refrain from 
mandating that these will occur, leaving this to be decided by individual business 
units.
The mechanisms a corporate centre adopts to achieve co-ordination within a group 
depends on its perception of organisational benefits deriving from:
• Synergies that arise from the interaction between various business units, (e.g. joint 
research, exclusive supply, transaction cost reduction).
• Enhanced performance gained by promoting the freedom, independence and 
autonomy of those business units.
In circumstances where a group values the autonomy of its business units above that of 
the potential synergy created by their interaction, then voluntary mechanisms are likely to 
predominate within intragroup trading and transfer strategies. When synergies created by 
the interaction between business units are perceived to be significant, then mandated 
mechanisms are likely to be dominant.
The field research has indicated that whilst the encouraged form of trading policy is 
predominant in the groups researched in this study, different forms of co-ordination 
strategy may operate within a single corporation. Whilst a particular form may represent 
the basis of a group’s trading and transfer strategy, certain relationships may be
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co-ordinated by alternative mechanisms, depending on individual circumstances. This is 
likely to occur because groups may have a number of ‘centres’ that are involved in 
co-ordinating relationships between individual business units apart from the main 
corporate centre or head office.
We can conclude that the presence and influence of a corporate centre is one of the 
fundamental factors that distinguishes intragroup relationships from other forms of 
dyadic interaction. It has a profound influence in shaping the expectations of actors and 
therefore their perceptions of other actors within the group. A corporate centre sets the 
scene and context within which intragroup interaction takes place. Its policies directly 
and indirectly influence the atmosphere of individual relationships in terms of the levels 
of co-operation, conflict and competition contained within them.
Our first proposition (PI), has therefore been supported by this study in that 
interaction between buyers and sellers in a group is influenced by a central actor in 
terms of the nature and extent to which it mandates interaction between them.
11.3.3. Rule effectiveness in intragroup relationships
We have demonstrated that a corporate centre may be directly involved in relationships 
between operating actors by mandating or encouraging internal interaction. Mandates are 
enacted through formal rules that enforce co-operation and lock actors together.
Evidence from this research indicates that the imposition of rules over operating actors is 
not straight forward, particularly where group trading partners are reluctant to develop 
close relationships. Under these circumstances, certain preconditions must be met for 
these rules to be effective.
Firstly, operating actors must recognise and accept the authority of the centre to 
formulate and impose rules within the group environment. The research indicates that 
whilst the authority of the centre is acknowledged by operating actors, its freedom to 
impose trading and transfer policies is bounded by certain norms and expectations that 
limit its ability to arbitrarily impose mandates, without at least seeking some agreement
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from its operating actors. Where actors dispute the validity of trading and transfer 
mandates, they are more likely to engage in activities to minimise their impact.
A second prerequisite relates to the acceptance and approval of rules by operating actors. 
The essence of rule compliance rests on the belief that there are specific imperatives or 
principles which should be obeyed by all. If there is doubt about what the imperative is, 
or ambiguity around its interpretation, then the legitimacy basis of compliance is 
undermined. Actors cease to follow rules simply because they do not adhere to the 
fundamental principles that underlie them.
A third condition relates to the clarity of rule substance. The research indicates that 
ambiguity in rule definition can give rise to multiple interpretation of meaning that actors 
may exploit to further their individual interests. Differences in interpretation can be used 
by actors to impede the process of interaction and reduce the level of co-operation. Rule 
clarity may also be undermined by other rule sets that simultaneously exert influences on 
the behaviour of actors. Competing rule systems may give rise to ambiguities when 
interpreted together. Execution may require compromises and trade offs which 
undermine rule effectiveness.
Finally, the research has demonstrated that to maintain acceptance of legitimate authority, 
there has to be some form of reinforcement in the form of penalties for violation of the 
rules. Where there is no enforcement by authorities and no sanctions for violation, trading 
and transfer rules may become nullified and ineffective. The research suggest that whilst 
sanctions may not be presented as codified frameworks or formalised punishments, the 
threat of their imposition may shape the expectations of actors in the way they relate 
towards each other.
Our analysis has also highlighted that whilst a corporate centre may mandate interaction 
between operating actors for the benefit of the group, operating actors may see these as 
compromising their individual positions and may therefore pursue actions to minimise or 
neutralise their impact. One way to achieve this is to use direct and indirect lobbying 
tactics that seek to change the conditions of rules and mandates. We have presented 
evidence that shows how actors can erect barriers that inhibit the imposition of rules 
where they do not perceive these to be in their interests.
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The research challenges the notion of a corporate group as a harmonious set of actors 
intent on advancing the position of the overall enterprise above all other considerations. 
Operating actors may face difficult dilemmas in reconciling their interests with those of 
the group as a whole. Interaction with other group companies may mean that actors have 
to make sacrifices and forego potential benefits that would be available from developing 
relationships with external partners. When operating actors are reluctant to make these 
sacrifices then mandated relationships are likely to become problematic for all parties. 
Effective co-ordination under these circumstances requires the development of effective 
rule systems that integrate the qualities of authority, clarity and reinforcement highlighted 
above.
Our analysis has supported the view that certain preconditions, as outlined in part 
A of Proposition P2, need to be in operation for rules to be exercised effectively over 
operating actors. We predict that intragroup relationships are likely to be 
problematic if these conditions are not met. Part B of Proposition P2 predicts that 
actors will challenge the existence of rules they perceive not to be in their interests. 
Our research has demonstrated how actors can erect barriers that inhibit the 
imposition of these rules over their activities.
11.3.4 External influences in intragroup relationships
Whilst intragroup relationships can be viewed at a basic level in terms of a triadic 
structure, in reality they form part of a much wider network of relationships, both within, 
and outside of the boundaries of the corporate organisation. Group actors therefore 
operate in networks where they have a series of direct and indirect relationships with 
other parties. Our research has shown that hierarchical factors associated with ownership 
cannot be considered in isolation of network influences and visa versa. A corporate 
centre that grants its operating companies ‘network freedom’ implied in voluntary forms 
of co-ordination must recognise that direct and indirect associations with other group 
actors, resulting from common ownership, may limit opportunities for a focal actor.
The research has demonstrated that relationships between group actors are conditioned by 
their interaction with alternative buyers and sellers outside of the group. Internal actors
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are particularly sensitive in a situation where an internal trading partner develops 
relationships with other partners that are competitors to companies inside the group. The 
level of mistrust between internal actors is likely to be high where internal group 
companies are perceived to have stronger relationships, or give a favoured status to 
external trading partners.
We have also demonstrated that relationships between internal actors will indirectly 
condition their relationships with other actors external to the group. Trust is more 
difficult to develop in these circumstances. Therefore internal companies need to 
demonstrate increased commitment to an external partner or go to greater lengths to 
prove confidentiality and integrity. Competitive actors are likely to exploit this 
uncertainty and seek to undermine the position of the internal actor. In these 
circumstances, group actors may feel disadvantaged by belonging to the same corporate 
group, and system of ownership as their suppliers or customers. Group suppliers may 
perceive this as a barrier to their marketplace, effectively inhibiting their development 
with more attractive partners. Group buyers may perceive that they are isolated from 
superior technology of their suppliers. Both sets of actors may perceive their positions 
are disadvantaged through circumstances beyond their control, and through no fault of 
their own, resulting in resentment and antagonism towards sister companies.
We conclude that these factors, either individually or in combination, add significant 
elements of complexity and uncertainty to managing relationships simultaneously with 
both internal and external trading partners. The heightened potential for mistrust to 
develop increases the fragility and vulnerability of these relationships representing an 
additional burden on the parties involved.
Our analysis has supported the notion put forward in Proposition P3 that 
interaction between operating companies within an intragroup triad is conditioned 
by relationships with other companies inside the group; and also direct and indirect 
relationships with customers and suppliers outside of the group. We have 
demonstrated that relationships between operating actors will condition potential 
interaction with alternative buyers and sellers. We have also shown that 
relationships with alternative buyers and sellers conditions interaction between 
operating actors.
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11.3.5 Information flow between actors in intragroup relationships
Information transfer lies at the heart of exchange processes in business relationships. The 
distance between buyers and sellers represents the sum of factors that prevents the flow of 
information between actors. Distance is an indicator of closeness between actors. The 
closer actors are to each other, the greater the information exchange and the smaller the 
distance.
We have seen that the level of information exchange between actors in a group depends 
on the degree of social and cultural distance between them. Social distance is the extent 
to which both the individuals and organisations in relationships are familiar with each 
other through membership of the group and having a common parent. Cultural distance 
represents the degree to which the norms, values and working methods between group 
actors are influenced by the existence of a group culture.
Information flow is influenced by the value systems of each actor in the intragroup triad.
A corporate centre’s attitude to information exchange will be conditioned by its approach 
to intragroup trading. It may consciously seek to shape the values of individual operating 
actors to enhance the flow. However it may also adopt a neutral or negative stance which 
can decrease or retard the transfer of information between actors. Operating actors may 
face difficult dilemmas in managing information exchange in intragroup relationships.
On the one hand, they are influenced by the wishes of the centre which may favour the 
exchange of information in the wider interests of the group. But operating actors may 
value information in terms of advancing their own positions and may be reticent to impart 
information to other group companies, even when this contradicts with the express 
wishes of the centre.
Group environmental factors can reduce social distance between actors by increasing the 
breadth of interaction between them. A corporate centre may physically bring actors 
closer together in forums and groups that are outside the day to day settings of their 
relationships. It may encourage the exchange of personnel between companies as a 
means of transferring knowledge and building personal bonds. Informal information 
systems such as group grapevines and personal networks can also represent important 
information sources for group companies.
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We conclude that the process of information exchange is more difficult to manage and 
control within a group simply because of the presence of additional communication 
channels that can disseminate information quickly across the group. The presence of 
corporate centres (and other ‘centres’) represent additional communication nodes that 
significantly influence the exchange process, which operating actors may find difficult to 
control.
We must recognise that Proposition P4 may not apply in all circumstances. We 
conclude that the group environment is likely to increase the level of information 
each party has about the other, and the breadth of interaction between them, where 
the social and cultural distance between actors is low. However, where social and 
cultural distance between group actors is high, the group environment is likely to 
inhibit the level of information exchange between actors, diminishing their 
knowledge of each other and potentially retarding their level of interaction.
11.3.6 Trust between actors in intragroup relationships
Trust is a significant factor influencing the formation, development and maintenance of 
relationships between actors in business networks. Co-operation between actors requires 
a minimum level of trust for exchange processes to operate.
Opportunism is linked to trust in that when participants in business relationships trust, 
they are less likely to indulge in opportunistic activities at the expense of trading partners. 
Our research has indicated that when group actors are locked together by an internal 
mandate, this increases the likelihood of each party in the relationship acting 
opportunistically towards the other. In the case of group sellers, this is manifest in 
behaviour such as compromising the level of service or product quality given to internal 
customers or generally taking internal customers for granted and being complacent. Our 
study has demonstrated that internal customers may not be afforded the status and 
standing that is given to external customers.
We have also shown that opportunism can work in the other direction. Group buyers 
may take advantage of the position of group suppliers by demanding higher levels of
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service or advantageous prices. Our research suggests that internal buyers are less 
tolerant and generally more demanding of group suppliers.
The expectation of internal partners acting opportunistically towards each other has a 
number of consequences for the development of relationships. Firstly, trust is more 
difficult to achieve between the parties in circumstances where they are suspicious of 
each others’ motives. Internal buyers are likely to seek external partners to benchmark 
the performance of group suppliers. They are likely to be reticent to exclusively source 
from within side the group. Internal suppliers may have to demonstrate high levels of 
commitment towards internal partners to overcome the suspicion of opportunism. This is 
likely to involve them in incurring additional costs to prove their trustworthiness and 
credibility to over come potential prejudices associated with intragroup trading. The 
potential for opportunistic behaviour to occur, and the need to guard against it, potentially 
offsets transaction cost savings associated with common ownership.
Our analysis has supported the main points of Proposition P5 in that where a 
corporate centre mandates interaction between operating actors, this may affect the 
nature of intragroup relationships. One of the implications of this is that actors may 
regard the terms of a mandate as something that can be exploited, to gain an 
advantage over a group trading partner. The propensity for actors to act 
opportunistically is heightened in the group situation and will therefore influence 
the level of trust between them.
Trust is also difficult to achieve in intragroup relationships because actors may consider 
they are rivals. It is hard to trust a trading partner who is also perceived as a competitor. 
Corporate centres may deliberately promote rivalry between actors by making public and 
direct comparisons between their performances. This is done to motivate them to higher 
levels of achievement or to act as a warning to under performing actors.
When trading partners perceive they are rivals, this can have a significant influence on 
the way they behave towards each other. We have seen that rivalry may lead players to 
pursue one-upmanship strategies to further their positions at the expense of other group 
actors. This can increase the level of exposure of operating actors to the corporate centre. 
Internal actors may therefore attribute a higher level of risk in their interaction with other
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group companies. They may feel more exposed and vulnerable to the actions of internal 
trading partners. The potential for the group environment to enhance competitive 
pressures between group actors is another factor that makes trust more difficult to 
develop in intragroup relationships.
Our analysis generally supports the main argument put forward in Proposition P6 
that trust between operating actors in intragroup relationships is influenced by the 
presence and activities of the central actor. We have demonstrated how parties in 
an intragroup relationships may regard themselves as competitors for resources 
controlled by the centre. This is likely to make them suspicious of a trading partner 
who they see as a rival. We have also seen that actors may perceive their competence 
can be evaluated by the centre through their involvement in intragroup 
relationships. Finally, we have shown how these factors can influence the perception 
of risk actors attribute to their involvement in intragroup relationships.
11.3.7 Conflict and conflict resolution
Actors in business relationships have both shared and contradictory interests. Where 
contradictory interests are not resolved satisfactorily, the resultant outcome is conflict. 
Conflict therefore represents an inherent component of business relationships.
We have identified that conflicts can arise in intragroup relationships that are specifically 
related to the group situation. We have seen that group actors may find it difficult to 
reach agreement on what constitutes an equitable share of the benefits of their 
relationships because of the added dimensions of ownership and rivalry. Transfer pricing 
rules that are designed to overcome this issue may themselves become significant points 
of argument and dispute, particularly where they are open to multiple interpretation or 
perceived to be manipulated to the benefit of one of the parties. Opportunistic behaviour 
also represents an important source of conflict in intragroup relationships. Disagreement 
over what each party expects the other to invest in a relationship may cause long-standing 
disagreements between actors.
Conflicts arise in intragroup relationships when there is a divergence of goals between 
actors who may not be able to reach agreement on a particular activity or course of
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action. Actors may disagree on the fundamental basis on which they interact within 
intragroup relationships. Ambiguity, inherent in loosely worded rules and edicts can 
result in significant disagreements over their interpretation and meaning. The way actors 
interpret and react to the imposition of trading and transfer mandates thus give rise to 
additional sources of conflict that are absent in dyadic interaction between external 
actors.
Our analysis suggests that relationships within a group tend to be characterised by higher 
levels of conflict than that associated with interaction between unrelated actors. This is 
reinforced by the fact that in certain circumstances, actors cannot withdraw from their 
relationships and that the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms may not be 
available. The research has supported the view that termination of an intragroup 
relationship may be more difficult to achieve inside a group. We have seen that whilst a 
corporate centre may explicitly disallow its operating actors from withdrawing from their 
relationships, the perceived threat of sanctions may be enough to bind actors together, 
even in circumstance of high manifest conflict.
Our analysis has generally supported the main statements put forward in 
Proposition P7. We can conclude that the group situation is likely to heighten the 
level of conflict between actors but at the same time, make conflict more difficult to 
resolve. We have highlighted the difficulties and risks involved in terminating 
intragroup relationships. However we challenge the role of the centre as an arbiter 
in disputes between group actors and note the reticence of corporate centres to be 
involved in internal conflicts between operating companies.
11.4 Core conclusions
Having presented a summary of the detailed results and findings of this research, these 
are now brought together in the following core conclusions. These necessarily involve 
certain simplifications of the findings but demonstrate the main outcome of the research.
We began this thesis by suggesting that the motivation of actors to form and develop 
business relationships is based on a multiple of factors or contingencies. We saw that 
these could broadly be classified under the headings of: necessity, reciprocity,
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asymmetry, stability, efficiency and legitimacy. By understanding the influence of each 
factor and its interaction with others, we have a method of characterising and explaining 
the behaviour of companies. We also suggested that a key to understanding intragroup 
relationships is to recognise whether they are characterised by a common profile of 
contingencies that make them unique and different from other forms of business 
relationship. This potentially provides a useful reference by which to compare and 
contrast intragroup interaction with other forms of relationships, particularly 
intercompany relationships between autonomous actors.
We conclude that there is no one set of factors that defines an intragroup 
relationship.
We have seen that whilst the contingency of necessity, expressed in the form of mandated 
rules may feature strongly in some group relationships, in other cases, interaction may be 
driven by voluntary considerations in terms of partner selection and development. In 
certain circumstances actors may bound together by external forces that direct them to 
co-operate with other internal companies. In other circumstances, actors may be given 
the relative freedom to manage their own affairs and develop their own relationships with 
internal and external partners.
Similar considerations apply to the contingency of efficiency. We have seen that group 
actors may develop relationships because of some overall corporate benefit that derives 
from the synergy of their interaction, (e.g. the avoidance of transaction costs). However 
we have also demonstrated that in other circumstances, corporate groups are happy to 
forego the benefits of synergy and efficiency in favour of the autonomy and 
accountability of their individual businesses.
We have also shown that certain group relationships may emphasise the contingency of 
reciprocity where actors come together to co-operate for the good of the group because it 
is believed to be the right and desirable thing to do. However we have also demonstrated 
that in other circumstances group actors may be driven by self interest and will only 
co-operate with other group companies where they perceive it to be to their advantage. 
They may therefore seek to actively avoid dealing with other group companies, 
particularly where alternative trading partners are perceived to be more attractive.
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Finally, we recognise that whilst stability may characterise certain relationships in terms 
of the sequential development of trust created between the parties, in other circumstances 
stability may be created by an external force binding actors together even where the level 
of trust between them is low. Stability can be created in intragroup relationships in 
different ways utilising diverse mechanisms.
Intragroup relationships can therefore take many forms. In some instances they may 
reflect the types of relationship developed between external actors outside of a group. In 
other circumstances they may reflect relationships developed between sub units within a 
hierarchy. Our research has shown that this diversity can occur in different relationships 
within the same corporate organisation.
We can therefore say that whilst intragroup relationships may tend towards being 
mandated, or tend towards being voluntary there can be significant variation in between 
in terms of how and why group actors interact with each other.
Our second main conclusion relates to the way in which corporate groups are organised 
and co-ordinated.
We conclude that corporate groups are co-ordinated by a combination of authority 
and network-type mechanisms that define the fundamental characteristics of 
relationships between internal actors.
The co-ordination of large corporate groups is a complex task. As the range of actors 
expand, co-ordination becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve. We have 
highlighted in a number of sections in this thesis the nature of the role a corporate centres 
plays in co-ordinating relationships between internal business units. The research has 
indicated that co-ordination can be achieved in a number of ways. Mandated trading and 
transfer policies express hierarchical forms of co-ordination that are operationalised in the 
form of rules and edicts enforced over operating actors. Voluntary policies reflect 
network forms of co-ordination where actors are given the responsibility of defining the 
terms of their relationships between themselves. Encouraged policies reflect both 
network and hierarchical influences where corporate centres signal the desirability of 
relationships between actors but refrain from mandating their existence. We have seen
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that whilst corporate centres may mandate trading between internal business units, they 
may be reluctant to be involved in the subsequent development of the relationship created 
by the mandate, leaving this to the parties to work out for themselves. Relationships 
between business units are therefore a function of their position within a hierarchy and 
their position in a network.
Traditional writers have long pointed to the use of authority and price as alternative 
mechanisms for allocating resources within groups. Eccles & White (1988) highlight that 
transactions, whether inter- or intra-firm, can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which 
they combine both of these mechanisms. McGuinness (1996) in reviewing the works of 
Oliver Williamson notes that ‘real world firms’, are controlled by a blend of authority and 
market-like mechanisms. Bradach & Eccles (1989) contend that the sharp delineation of 
markets and hierarchies has given away to the widely accepted recognition that a myriad 
of organisational forms exist along with markets and hierarchies.
The traditional view of the multidivisional form of organisation is to regard it as a 
hierarchical, centre-periphery structure that is controlled and co-ordinated by a central 
headquarters. The use of authority-type mechanisms was strongly in evidence from the 
organisations reviewed in this study. We have shown however that authority may be 
distributed in a variety of ‘centres’ located across the organisation that influence the 
relationships of actors.
The description of corporate groups as market-like structures is more difficult to accept. 
The concept of the market, conjures up the notion of minimal bargaining or negotiation 
between group actors, little mutual adjustment and few long term recurrent relationships. 
Price provides all the necessary information about market conditions where each 
transaction is essentially considered as a single, one off, event. This study reveals that a 
more appropriate paradigm to describe the nature of multidivisional corporations is to 
regard them as sets of interconnected exchange relationships that are characteristic of 
industrial networks. This is difficult to reconcile with a system of straightforward market 
contracting between business units primarily based on price competition.
Corporate groups exhibit many of the traits of industrial networks. We recognise the 
existence of direct economic exchanges between group actors and the development of
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economic bonds between them. We can also see that non economic exchanges may be 
important which are primarily of a social or informational nature.
Networks exist within organisations as well as between organisations. A corporate group 
may be considered as a local ‘net’ within a wider industrial network where the boundaries 
of the net are defined by the ownership system of the company. Within a group, there 
always exists some path of interaction that connects any two firms because ultimately all 
actors are connected through the corporate centre. Intragroup actors may have close or 
distant relationships depending on their positions within the network. Network processes 
rather than market mechanisms more aptly describe the nature of multidivisional 
organisations.
Our third conclusion centres on the relationship between a group’s ownership system and 
the requirements of individual business units.
We conclude that tensions arise in intragroup relationships where the needs of the 
group’s ownership system contradict with those of the network requirements of 
individual business units.
We have shown that any unit in a multidivisional corporation is subject to the influences 
of two systems: firstly to an ownership system and secondly to a business network 
system in which it operates. We have seen that within the group environment there may 
be more than one ‘owner’ as corporate groups may be considered as multi-centred 
structures that exert direct and indirect influences over individual business units.
We have demonstrated how the needs of an ownership system may not be consistent with 
those of an individual unit’s network system. An example of this is occurs when internal 
actors develop strong business relationships with network partners outside of the group in 
preference to relationships with internal actors. Where corporate centres seek to break 
these external relationships and enforce internal trading against the wishes of individual 
actors the resultant intragroup relationships will be problematic for all parties. This is 
likely to be accentuated if there is a strong culture of autonomy and individuality between 
business units.
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Our research has demonstrated that tensions in intragroup relationships can manifest 
themselves in a number of ways. We predict that unless these tensions are routinely 
managed, conflict will increasingly dominate the atmosphere of relationships which may 
be difficult to resolve when the parties are locked together, and a corporate centre is 
reluctant to be involved in its resolution. We also predict that actors are more likely to 
take advantage of trading partners and act opportunistically in their relationships thereby 
heightening the level of mistrust between them. Under these circumstances, actors will be 
more reluctant to develop ‘open’ relationships with internal partners and seek to increase 
‘distance’ between them by concealing information, particularly interaction with other 
trading partners.
Tensions may therefore be created between actors that are difficult to resolve in practice. 
In these circumstances actors must learn to live in an ‘uneasy coexistence' with their 
trading partners and develop measures to compensate for the patterns of behaviour 
identified above.
Our fourth conclusions relates to the effectiveness of mandates in creating stable 
relationships between actors in a group. Our research has demonstrated that the 
imposition of mandates on reluctant parties to a trading relationship will profoundly 
influence the behaviour of actors in the way they react to each other and towards the 
corporate centre.
We therefore conclude that the imposition of a trading mandate over operating 
actors is not enough in itself to develop productive intragroup relationships between 
them.
Previous writers have demonstrated that one of the preconditions for the existence of 
stable inter firm relationships is the development of a ‘mutual orientation’ between the 
parties. Firms are motivated to interact with each other and expect others to do so. One 
of the elements of the process of mutual orientation is the development of certain bonds. 
A bond suggests a measure of tying where firms are not entirely free to dissolve these 
bonds at will. Strong bonds imply the existence of more stable relationships, whilst 
weakly bonded relationships are likely to be more volatile.
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Business relationships comprise different types of bonds. Economic bonds form the 
underlying rationale for many relationships where firms invest in each other to gain 
access to each others’ resources. However the existence of non economic bonds are not 
insignificant. Social bonds develop through social exchange processes which may start 
with minor transactions and build up over time as the parties gradually prove their 
trustworthiness. Social relationships may extend beyond the individual firm through the 
numerous individual social contacts of its people and become significant binding forces.
Formal bonds may be expressed in contractual arrangements between parties or in more 
general forms of agreement including ownership. Easton notes that formal bonds may be 
highly visible but may be less binding then they appear. (Easton 1992). This suggests 
that formal mandates on their own may be insufficient and, other elements of the bonding 
process need to be present, for close intrafirm relationships to develop.
We conclude from the research that whilst a corporate centre can impose formal bonds 
between operating actors, this is not enough on its own to develop close trading 
relationships between them. The motivation of the operating actors is a vital factor in 
developing more informal ties that build relationships over a period of time. Where the 
motivation to develop close relationships is inhibited in one or both of the parties, the 
resultant relationships are less likely to be productive simply because the development of 
more informal bonding processes (particularly social and informational) will be 
significantly impeded. The situation is akin to an arranged marriage between reluctant 
parties. Formal bonds cannot enforce informal ties between actors. Centralised authority 
cannot substitute for actor desire in developing close relationships. Whilst a mandate may 
seek to catalyse a bond between actors it can never provide the bond itself. Stable 
intrafirm relationships do not immediately come into existence because a corporate centre 
deems them to be so.
Our fifth conclusion relates to the level of trust that is associated with intragroup 
interaction.
We conclude that trust is difficult to develop and sustain in intragroup 
relationships.
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The issue of trust has been well highlighted throughout the research findings and in the 
summary presented earlier in this chapter and will not be considered in detail again. We 
emphasise the point however that trust may be difficult to establish both within, and 
outside of, the group.
The research has shown that an association between internal trading partners conditions 
their relationships with actors outside of the group. These are less likely to trust a 
supplier or customer who is a member of the same group as one of their competitors. 
They may perceive that the risk of dealing with a group actor is unacceptably high, 
fearing that confidential information will be passed to the internal competitor. In these 
circumstances they are more likely be reluctant to develop close working relationships.
We have also demonstrated that trust is difficult to develop with internal trading partners 
because of the potential for actors to be opportunistic in their relationships with one 
another. The lock in effect of a mandate may motivate actors to behave differently 
towards each other and attempt to take advantage over internal partners. We have seen 
that trust is difficult to develop where group trading partners perceive they are rivals. 
They may attribute higher personal risks in dealing with other group companies because 
of the exposure this gives them to the central actor.
The implications of these factors is that actors may have to work harder in proving their 
reliance as a credible and trustworthy suppliers/customers, again involving increased 
effort and commitment. Problems associated with developing and maintaining trust 
represent one of the reasons why managers may have a preference for relationships with 
external unrelated partners.
Our next main conclusion relates to the complexity and ambiguity that seems to be 
inherent in managing intragroup relationships. The research leads us to the conclusion 
that:
Managers find it difficult to manage in a situation that has some of the 
characteristics of a network and hierarchy, at the same time.
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Corporate groups may attempt to co-ordinate activities between various business units 
using a combination of hierarchical and network influences. We have seen that this can 
occur when trading between units is encouraged rather than mandated. Under these 
circumstances, operating actors may have to simultaneously reconcile the requirements of 
each system of governance, involving trade offs and compromises between each. This is 
likely to lead to ambiguity and uncertainty in their relationships.
We have seen that co-ordination in a hierarchy is achieved through conscious 
organisation where top down control is overtly exercised in the form of fixed rules and 
penalties for non conformance. Clear lines of authority are designed to reduce 
arbitrariness in decision making and improve consistency. Bureaucratic control reduces 
the discretion given to decision takers. There is clear reference upwards for clarification 
of decisions. Survival in such a system means adopting to organisational norms and 
ethics. In essence, effort is directed towards advancing the organisation as a totality. The 
whole is seen as more important than the individual parts.
We can see that managers operating in such an environment are driven by clearly defined 
and well articulated rules in the from of organisational policies that are formulated from 
the corporate centre. Penalties are clearly understood for non conformance and actors can 
reference decisions upwards for further explanation and clarification. Hierarchy therefore 
shapes the expectations of individual operating actors by clearly defining priorities and 
acceptable patterns of behaviour
Managerial emphasis in a network stresses different consideration. Networks tend to 
emphasise flatter organisational forms where informal relationships develop between 
essentially equal parties. Networks exist within the intricacies of social relations where 
the formation and sustaining of trust is prime activity for all actors. Policies are defined 
informally between the parties themselves rather than being centrally imposed. Actors 
have a wider discretion and freedom in defining their future destinies with few centrally 
defined constraints. They have greater accountability for their actions and decisions. The 
prosperity of the individual unit is the prime consideration of its management.
We can see that in intragroup relationships elements of each governance system can 
coexist within the same organisation. These can combine to significantly influence the
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atmosphere of intragroup relationships in terms of levels of co-operation, competition and 
conflict exhibited within them. For example, actors co-operate in intragroup 
relationships because they have to, should do or because they perceive it in their interest 
to do so. The difficulty that managers may face is that whilst they may be directed or 
encouraged to co-operate with certain internal trading partners (the hierarchical 
dimension), they may also be left to individually negotiate their proportion of the 
economic value that may accrue from the outcome of that co-operation (the network 
dimension). Actors may be significantly dissatisfied with the outcome where they 
perceive there are more attractive trading partners outside of the group, to whom they are 
denied access.
Similarly in terms of competition, whilst actors may be seen to compete for resources 
within their relationships they may also perceive themselves to be rivals for resources 
within the same hierarchy. Managers may be encouraged to co-operate with partners that 
they perceive as significant competitors in forums outside of their trading relationships. 
We have seen that this can cause managers dilemmas of how much to trust a trading 
partner that is considered a rival. Competition in intragroup relationship derives not only 
from a position within a business network but also from the ownership system of the 
group.
Finally, whilst conflict can arise because actors have opposing objectives within their 
trading relationships, they may also argue over factors that relate to their position and 
roles within a hierarchy. We have seen that actors may argue over the interpretation of 
rules and mandates detailing how they interact with other group companies. This can 
cause long-standing arguments between actors, particularly where a corporate centre is 
reluctant to intervene to manage or resolve the resultant conflict. We have shown that 
whilst actors may be directed to co-operate with other group companies they may not 
have access to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that are commonly employed 
within networks. This can make the management of conflict significantly more difficult 
in intragroup relationships. We can therefore see that the level of conflict in internal 
relationships is similarly an outcome of the influence of a unit’s network system and also 
its ownership system.
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The intragroup environment can therefore be seen to possess a network dimension and a 
hierarchical dimension. These dimensions may give rise to multiple interpretation of 
situations, events or circumstances that make the management of the resultant 
relationships ambiguous, complex and involved. Managers may have to continuously 
and subconsciously switch mind sets between these dimensions. They find it difficult to 
reconcile the needs of the group with their individual interests, giving rise to divided 
loyalties. Many respondents recognised and highlighted complexity associated with this. 
They spoke of the environment as being ‘more political’ with ‘more things to consider’ 
and ‘no clear dividing line’. ‘Conflicts of interest’ were highlighted that were not 
perceived to exist in external relationships. Actors have to continuously balance their 
individual needs against those of the overall group as a whole.
Many respondents highlighted that their internal relationships were inordinately time 
consuming because of this. Debates over internal relationships seem to assume far 
greater significance than in other relationships. Respondents identified a certain irony in 
this because whilst many believed that internal relationships with other group companies 
should, in theory, be easier to manage because of the bond of common parentage, in 
practice they recognised that the opposite seems to occur. For some respondents this has 
created disappointment and a frustration with the group trading situation. It is one of the 
reasons why some managers seem to prefer the relative simplicity and lack of ambiguity 
associated with intercompany relationships with external partners.
"The only thing I would say to you is that everybody I speak to in industry, all o f them have exactly the 
same problems. It is harder to deal with a sister company than it is with an external resource. Every 
senior manager I ’ve spoken to in major businesses, when you ask them about sister trading, intercompany 
trading, they always say i t’s difficult”. (Respondent 16).
The overall view from the research, gained from talking to managers involved in 
intragroup relationships, is that they either prefer clear top down direction from a 
corporate centre of how they should manage trading relationships with internal partners, 
or to be left alone to develop their relationships as they see fit, using their own evaluation 
and judgement. Anything falling between these options was seen as potentially causing 
confusion, ambiguity and grounds for misunderstanding and disagreement that were 
likely to undermine the long term success of intragroup trading.
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This finding has important implications for the way corporate centres should seek to 
co-ordinate activities between operating actors in a group.
A significant decision for corporate managers is to determine what mechanisms to 
employ to co-ordinate activities of individual operating companies. We have shown that 
the outcome of this decision can fundamentally affect the behaviour of operating actors in 
they way they form and develop intragroup relationships. Such influence can be direct or 
indirect, planned or unplanned, both positive and negative.
We conclude that intragroup relationships formed out of network processes where 
actors select their trading partners and assume responsibility for the development of 
their relationships according to their requirements, are more likely to result in 
productive relationships for all parties within the triad.
We use the term ‘productivity’ in this context in terms of satisfying the objectives of the 
parties. We recognise that individual actors may have different expectations of their 
relationships with other actors (both internal and external) and may expect diverse range 
of benefits to accrue from their interaction. A buying actor may see its relationship with 
a selling actor as a means of accessing important new technology. Conversely, a selling 
actor may see its association with a buying actor as a means of enhancing its credibility 
where the latter is a leader in its market sector. A central actor is likely to be concerned 
with the synergy to the group that might result from the interaction of the buyer and 
seller. We contend that these objectives are more likely to be realised where actors are 
given the responsibility for developing their own relationships rather having them 
enforced upon them. We therefore argue for minimum intervention by a corporate centre 
in the relationships between internal actors and advocate that a centre should leave the 
management and development of intragroup relationships to the individual operating 
actors. In these circumstances, a corporate centre should:
• Refrain from exerting direct or indirect influence over operating actors’ choice of
trading partners.
• Refrain from influencing interaction patterns between actors.
• Refrain from becoming involved in disputes and conflicts.
• Allow actors to manage the flow of information between them.
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• Measure and reward actors on the merits of their individual activities.
We have to recognise in practice however that it may be difficult for a corporate centre to 
‘sit back’ and leave these decisions to the individual parties. Involvement of the centre 
with both operating actors potentially places it in a position to identify synergies that 
could arise through the process of their interaction. We have identified that synergies can 
be realised through the exchange of information and know-how between operating actors. 
This may have an important advantage of keeping proprietary technology within the 
corporation. Synergies may simply accrue to the group where in house transfers of goods 
and services maximise profitability for the supplying actor. This is likely to occur where 
there is little difference between internal and external suppliers in terms of the technical 
performance of products and their associated service and quality parameters. Finally, 
synergies arise where closer co-ordination between buyer and seller results in lower 
transaction costs for the group.
A corporate centre is more likely to intervene in intragroup relationships where it 
perceives that these synergies are not being realised. This may happen for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, operating actors may not have recognised the gains to the group that 
could be realised through the process of their interaction. They may evaluate the 
potential benefits of their association only in individual terms. Secondly, the benefits of 
group synergies may not accrue equally to individual parties. What may be beneficial to 
the group as a whole may be perceived as having adverse consequences for an individual 
operating actor. This can happen, for example, when internal actors are directed to break 
long standing relationships with external trading partners in favour of internal companies. 
A corporate centre may be ‘forced’ to intervene where there has been a history of 
hostility and animosity between group actors or where there has been intense rivalry 
between them.
Whilst relationships can be enforced to ensure synergies are exploited for the benefit of 
the group, it would be misleading to give the impression that synergies can only be 
realised between operating actors through the centre involving itself in their business 
relationships. Where these synergies are visible and significant to the actors, then 
network processes may be equally applicable in ensuring they are exploited for the group 
as a whole. Where internal actors perceive that these synergies can be realised to further
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their individual interests they are likely to be motivated to develop the necessary internal 
relationships without the influence of central intervention.
We must also emphasis the point that the involvement of a corporate centre in the 
relationships of individual operating actors is not always adverse. We have seen in 
Chapter 8, that a centre can consciously enhance the flow of information between parties 
in an intragroup relationship by helping to reduce social and cultural distance between 
them. A corporate centre can therefore enhance or lubricate the process of interaction 
where internal actors are motivated to form closer relationships. However, whilst the 
centre can shape the environment to facilitate the formation and development of 
relationships, this is significantly different from assuming direct responsibility for 
defining the terms of interaction between group actors.
A major difficulty confronts the centre where internal actors are reluctant to form internal 
relationships that results in lost opportunities for the group. We recognise that in these 
circumstances, a centre may have little option but to directly define the terms of 
relationships between operating actors through the enforcement of trading and transfer 
mandates. Our analysis indicates that where a corporate centre is committed to adopting 
hierarchical forms of co-ordination, it must ensure that the following factors are 
considered and fulfilled in order to develop effective relationships.
• Operating actors accept that the centre has a legitimate authority to impose rules over 
their activities.
• Operating actors accede that the demands of the group are subservient to their 
individual needs and requirements.
• Rules and directives are clear and unambiguous and are continuously clarified and 
refined by corporate management as situations dictate.
• Trading mandates should be accompanied by transfer rules that minimise negotiation 
between operating actors.
• Actors should perceive the threat of penalties and punishments for rule violation.
• Measurement and reward systems should enhance co-operation between actors rather 
than promote rivalry between them.
• Corporate management should seek to adopt measures that reduce social and cultural 
distance between actors.
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• Corporate management should be prepared to assist operating actors in resolving and 
managing conflict between them
We therefore argue for ‘clarity and consistency of approach’ from a corporate centre 
when co-ordinating relationships between actors within a group. Whilst we argue that 
network forces are likely to result in more effective co-ordination strategies, we recognise 
that there are circumstances where a corporate centre needs to be directly involved in 
relationships between group actors. We contend that in these instances, intervention 
should be in such a form that minimises ambiguity and interpretation by operating actors 
in terms of what is expected of them by the central actor. We have shown that 
‘middle-of-the-road’ strategies that attempt to mix elements of hierarchical and network 
processes are likely to be problematic for the parties involved. Where corporate centres 
attempt to combine elements of each co-ordination systems as a basis of forming and 
developing relationships between group companies the outcome is likely to be 
sub-optimal for all of the actors.
11.5 Implications for managers
The results and core conclusions of this thesis have important implications for managers 
involved in intragroup relationships. We have referred to these throughout the chapter, 
but it is worthwhile to bring them together under a single heading.
We saw in the first of our core conclusions that there is no one set of factors that define a 
typical intragroup relationship. Each may involve variety and variation which means that 
the beliefs and perceptions of managers around intragroup trading experienced in one 
relationship, may not be appropriate in others. Intragroup relationships reflect the 
preferences of a corporate centre in the way it chooses to co-ordinate the activities of its 
business units. These choices are expressed in trading and transfer policies that can take 
various forms. They are responsible for shaping the corporate environment in terms of 
the social and cultural distance between actors.
Much of the language colloquially used to describe the nature of corporate groups uses 
the metaphor of the family. A corporate centre is sometimes referred to as the parent 
company. Operating units are commonly referred to as sister companies. Family
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relationships can take a myriad of forms. Families can be cohesive close-knit units, 
united through bonds of loyalty and kinship. Disagreements and disputes between family 
members may be suppressed for the overall good of the family unit. On the other hand, 
families may be distant and remote where individuals pursue their own agendas for their 
own means. Families may be characterised by rivalry, such as the competition that can 
develop between siblings to gain the attention of their parents.
These settings give rise to relationships with varying characterising features. The 
approach taken in one intragroup relationship may therefore be inappropriate in a 
different corporate setting. It may even be inappropriate for the management of 
relationships with other actors in the same corporate group.
A second implication of the findings is that managers are likely to find these relationships 
more complex and difficult to manage. Managers have to think and operate in at least 
two dimensions: horizontally within networks and vertically within hierarchies. The 
requirements imposed by each dimension may sometimes conflict, necessitating 
compromise and sacrifice. Managers may need to be more flexible and adaptive in their 
relationships with other group companies. When they are not prepared to make these 
sacrifices conflict is the likely outcome.
As well as being more flexible and adaptive in their internal relationships, managers must 
also be more guarded and diligent because of the potential for mistrust to develop with 
both internal and external trading partners. Within the group, actors are more vulnerable 
to the opportunistic behaviour of internal partners. Outside of the group, actors are 
vulnerable to the tactics and manoeuvrings of competitors who may seek to destabilise 
relationships with external trading partners. These factors may necessitate managers 
having to work harder in their internal relationships than they would have in equivalent 
external relationships.
We have also seen that one of the outcomes of operating in a hierarchy and network 
simultaneously is that actors may feel more vulnerable and exposed because of the 
visibility this gives them to corporate management. Disputes and arguments between 
group trading partners are more likely to assume high profile. Some managers may not 
welcome this exposure. We have seen that one of the consequences of this is that
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managers may feel that they have to be more cautious and prudent in their internal 
relationships.
Finally, the high exit barriers associated with mandated interaction means that managers 
may feel more constrained and entrapped in internal relationships, especially where 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are not available to the parties involved.
In summary, there are a number of reasons why managers may view internal relationships 
as less rewarding than equivalent external relationships. We have seen that they are 
likely to require more effort and attention in an environment where parties may be more 
demanding of each other. Actors may feel more vulnerable and exposed to political and 
opportunistic behaviour of internal partners, yet at the same time feel they unable to 
withdraw from these relationships. We have seen that anecdotal evidence suggests that 
managers generally prefer the relative clarity and lack of ambiguity associated with 
interaction with external trading partners. The findings of this thesis would indicate that 
there may be certain justification for these sentiments.
11.6 Recommendations for further research
We identified in chapter 1 a number of reasons why the study of intragroup relationships 
was important. We saw that previous studies have highlighted the importance of the 
multi-divisional form of organisation and its predominance in modem industrial society. 
This suggests that relationships between group actors are frequent and widespread. Our 
research has also shown that the study of intragroup relationships is potentially valuable 
because they provide an environment where hierarchical and network processes operate 
alongside each other in close proximity. Intragroup relationships tell us something about 
the interaction of hierarchical and network forces in industrial systems. We therefore 
recommend continuing research in this area.
The prime focus of this study has been to concentrate on the perceptions of individual 
managers involved in intragroup relationships. The majority of respondents were drawn 
from a single organisation to give the benefit of a focused case study. Follow up work is 
suggested in a number of areas.
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Firstly, research could be carried out at different levels within networks. Research could 
be targeted at specific relationships to compare and contrast the perceptions of actors 
involved on different sides of the same intragroup relationship. (Although in reality, the 
intragroup triad probably represents the smallest viable unit of analysis because of the 
influence of a corporate centre on the behaviour of operating actors). At the opposite end 
of the scale, research could be targeted at a higher network level where intragroup 
relationships may operate alongside external relationships between unrelated actors. This 
could usefully provide a comparison of the two forms in terms of their propensity to 
develop stable enduring relationships.
Secondly research could be targeted within specific group environments where various 
forms and combinations of trading and transfer mandates predominate. (In Chapter 5 we 
identified six potential combinations that shape interaction between group companies). 
We have highlighted that many of the respondents in the field research described group 
environments in which interaction between their operating companies was encouraged 
rather than being mandated or voluntary. This may be significant, or a chance event due 
to respondent selection. We therefore advocate that further research is carried out in 
contrasting environments, where hierarchical mechanisms dominate co-ordination 
patterns between group actors, or where interaction between actors is characterised by 
network processes. This would be important in validating some of the key conclusions 
presented in this thesis.
Thirdly, research could focus on specific events or circumstances involving intragroup 
relationships. Two change situations are of particular interest. Firstly, when a company is 
newly acquired into a group which already includes existing or potential trading partners; 
and secondly, when a group company is divested outside of the group, thereby 
transforming intragroup relationships into external intercompany relationships. The way 
actors respond to their new environments in terms of their behaviour patterns and their 
perceptions of the changing status of their trading partners would provide important clues 
about the nature of group relationships. A further interesting comparison would be 
between mature intragroup relationships and those that are newly formed.
Finally, research could replicate this study in different industrial sectors covering both 
manufacturing and service industries. More quantitative methods could be employed to
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identify the predominance of various forms of co-ordination mechanism across a large 
and diverse sample of corporations. This would contrast with the focus case study 
approach that has been adopted in this thesis.
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Addendum
Alas, Agrifood exists no more!
During the period when this thesis was being written, a fundamental change was taking 
place at the top of the organisation. The departure of the CEO, together with the 
appointment of a new ‘top team’ at the centre paved way for a fundamental review of the 
strategy of the group. Synergies between the individual business units, identified in 
previous corporate plans, were fundamentally questioned. The essential rationale for the 
existence of the group was put under the spotlight
The conclusion of the review was that the break up value of the individual parts of the 
group was worth more than the sum of their whole. The outcome was that the various 
business units that comprised Agrifood were divested to new owners, or became subject 
to management buy outs. In the space of six months, a £4.5b corporation effectively 
ceased to exist.
Much of the blame for the downfall of the group was attributed to ‘difficult’ acquisitions 
and adverse market conditions. However a theme that comes through the research is that 
Agrifood did not manage its internal relationships well. The extent to which this 
contributed to its demise is difficult to say.
The Agrifood example emphasises the point that a strategy built around synergies 
between individual business units must pay particular attention to the relationships that 
develop between those units. It is the vehicle of the relationship, and interaction between 
individual actors, that creates synergy for a group. The management of intragroup 
relationships is therefore an essential task. Whether corporate managers at Agrifood 
really appreciated this, is somewhat questionable.
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Focal Organisation: Agrifood PLC
Number of respondents interviewed by location in Agrifood PLC.
| Number | Respondent functions
Central Management
Corporate management 6 Group Commercial Director, Group Strategic Planner, Group 
Technical Director, Group Divisional Directors (X3).
Divisional Management 4 Divisional Purchasing Controller, Group Manufacturing 
Support Manager, Group Business Development Manager, 
Divisional Financial Director.
Business unit management (by operating company)
Tastetec 5 CEO, Commercial Director, Sales Director, Technical Director, 
Business Unit Manager.
Coverco 2 CEO, Marketing Director.
Millpro 3 CEO, Sales Director, Technical Manager.
Bakery Supplies 1 Marketing Director.
Agrivite 4 Purchasing Director, Purchasing Manager, Business Unit 
Director, Business Unit General Manager.
Potato Products 2 CEO, Regional Business Manager.
Petco 2 Purchasing Managers (X2).
Export Unit 1 Export Manager
Other Organisations
Number of respondents interviewed in other organisations
Corporate Group Number Respondent functions
Autosystems Inc. 1 Engineering Manager
Brit Chemicals Corp.. 2 Business unit sales manager. Business Unit Marketing 
Manager.
Biotec PLC 1 UK Business Unit Manager.
Tilston Industries 1 Group CEO
Branded Foods Corp. 2 Business Unit Purchasing Director, Business Unit Manager.
Euro Industries PLC 1 Business Unit Manager.
Western Provisions PLC 1 Group Purchasing Co-ordinator
Dairy Industries PLC 1 Business Unit Purchasing Manager.





1 In your conversations with a sister company, you feel that they are unusually 
reticent to tell you what is going on with other suppliers or customers outside o f  
the Group. You wonder what they might have to hide.
2 Suppose your group has a history o f favouring independence o f its operating 
companies and has refrained from setting rules and policies on intercompany 
trading. However there is now a change in direction and strategy and the Group 
is placing more emphasis on co-operation between sister companies. You 
wonder how people will react to the new situation.
3 Suppose you have a successful relationship with an external company for many 
years and have developed strong personal links with its people. And suppose 
your relationships with a similar sister company is not so good. Suddenly, the 
centre is encouraging you to give more o f your business to your sister company.
4 You have had a difficult relationship with a sister company for many years. 
Suddenly it is announced that your sister company is to be divested by the 
Group. You are concerned about the future.
5 You hear that people at the Centre have recently set rules and guidelines on 
intercompany trading to ensure matters are conducted in an orderly way and 
ensure individual companies are not disadvantaged.
6 You hear on the grapevine that a sister company has been trying to influence 
people at the centre to change the rules on transfer pricing in favour o f their 
business.
7 You seem to be continually in disagreement with a sister company over the 
meaning o f group policy on intercompany trading.
8 Your group has stated that the preferred policy is to favour internal companies 
where possible, but an internal supplier seems to believe that this means that it 
should be receiving the majority o f your business.
9 Someone at the centre argues that they have the right to impose any policy they 
wish on intercompany trading even if  that might be to the detriment to an 
individual business unit.
10 You are worried that your company is not following group policy on 
intercompany trading and are concerned about the consequences.
11 Over a period o f time your company has developed a good relationship with an 
intergroup partner. One o f your managers suggests that this has a positive affect 
on your image within the group.
12 Suppose that the policy o f your group has changed to encourage more 
interaction between sister companies. Someone at the centre has stated that the 
only way that this can be achieved is to develop formal reporting and control 
systems
13 Your Group continuously encourages greater co-operation between internal 
companies yet at the same time values individual accountability and focused 
responsibility to achieve individual budgets and targets.
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14 Your performance as an operating company is continuously being compared to 
other group companies by people at the centre.
15 As part of a policy to encourage internal co-operation, the centre has formed a 
number of working parties to identify areas of'best practice' within the group, 
share ideas and compare buying prices.
16 You discover that one of your group trading partners seems to be continually 
seeking information about you from sources within the group and particularly 
from people at the centre.
17 A senior manager in your company is promoted to a position in a sister 
company with which you have a trading relationship. You are considering 
whether this is a good or bad thing.
18 Suppose you are attending a group training programme at the London Business 
School with people from other group companies. You have been asked to 
present an analysis of your company's strategy including strengths and 
weaknesses. You are not sure what to say.
19 One of your managers believes that if intercompany relationships go wrong, 
then it is usually the CEOs of the operating companies who are held responsible
20 You have the suspicion that a number of sister companies who you supply are 
colluding in order to force you to reduce your prices.
21 Imagine that a group buyer is unhappy with your service and starts to tell other 
companies within the group.
22 You have developed good relationships with the major customers in your 
market over a number of years. Suddenly you hear that your group has 
acquired one of these companies. You are concerned about your relationships 
with the other customers.
23 You have developed strong supply relationships over recent years, with 
manufacturers of a certain raw material. Suddenly, one of these suppliers is 
acquired by your group. You are concerned about your relationships with the 
other suppliers.
24 An intercompany customer seems very sensitive about your relationship with 
other customers in the market and claims that you are assisting one of its 
competitors.
25 An intercompany supplier seems very sensitive about your relationship with 
other suppliers and claims that you are assisting its competitors.
26 You hear that a company within the group is taking a associate company of one 
of your competitors around FTC.
27 One of your colleagues argues that it is only people at the centre who 
understand the true value of intercompany relationships.
28 Suppose you are forced to direct your technical resources towards a sister 
company when you know there are more lucrative opportunities outside of the 
group.
29 Suppose the centre directs that you have to purchase a proportion of your raw 
materials from a group supplier, despite the fact that there are better suppliers 
within the market.
30 Your purchasing manager complains that since one of your suppliers was 
acquired by your group, the level of service has gone down. You wonder 
what's behind it.
31 You seem to have more than average quality problems with an internal supplier 
and wonder if they are taking advantage.
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32 You suspect that because of group transfer pricing rules, a sister company is 
making little profit from internal business.
33 You feel that a group customer takes advantage of being in the same group by 
continuously demanding faster service and better prices.
34 You perceive that an in-house supplier has become arrogant and has an attitude 
of taking your business for granted.
35 People at times feel they have something to prove and seem to be in 
competition with each other in intercompany relationships.
36 You know that an internal supplier is earning high profits and is performing 
significantly ahead of budget.
37 A manager in your business tells you that he thinks his actions are more closely 
scrutinised when dealing with a sister company and he feels more at risk.
38 You know that a group company is reluctant to deal with you. You hear on the 
grapevine that it has been attempting to discredit you with people at the centre 
by revealing recent service problems.
39 You have become so fed up with arguing with a sister company that you are 
tempted to cease supplying them.
40 Your company is seriously considering delisting a sister company as one of 
your suppliers. What might your thoughts be?
41 You are in dispute with a sister company and have asked the centre to 
intervene, however you find that people at the centre are reluctant to become 
involved.
42 One of your colleagues observes that you always seem to be arguing with a 
sister company and nothing ever seems to change.
43 One of your managers observes that intercompany relationships seem to be 
disproportionately time consuming in comparison to other external 
relationships especially in terms of senior management involvement.
44 Interaction between sister companies in your group is influenced by rules 
defined by people at the centre telling you who they should be trading with.
45 Being in the same group, you are always picking up information on the 
grapevine about sister companies.
46 One of your managers suggests that you must take into account the potential 
benefits to the group when dealing with sister companies.
47 Your CEO suddenly announces he has had a meeting with his opposite number 
in a sister company to 'sort things out'.
48 Even though the centre refrains from defining rules on intercompany trading, 




Frame | Frame title Frame description
1 Trading rules - actual Corporate centres specify to operating actors who 
they must buy from or sell to.
2 Trading rules - desired Corporate centres should specify to operating actors 
who they must buy from or sell to.
3 Trading rules effectiveness Trading rules enhance co-operation between internal 
actors.
4 Trading encouragement Corporate centres encourage internal business units to 
co-operate.
5 Transfer rules - actual Corporate centres specify transfer rules to operating 
actors.
6 Transfer rules - desired Corporate centres should specify transfer rules to 
operating actors.
7 Transfer rules effectiveness Transfer rules are effective.
8 Transfer encouragement Corporate centres encourage the use o f transfer rules 
by operating actors.
9 Culture change New policies and mandates are difficult to implement 
due to existing cultures and attitudes amongst 
operating actors.
10 Mandate change Nature o f relationships change when mandates are 
lifted.
11 Rules interpretation 
differences
Operating actors place different interpretation and 
meaning on group policies on intragroup trading.
12 Rules interpretation 
selectivity
Operating actors interpret mandates in terms most 
favourable to themselves.
13 Lobbying Operating actors seek to influence corporate centres 
to change the terms o f mandates in their favour.
14 Centre legitimacy Corporate centres have the right to impose trading 
mandates over operating actors.
15 Formal monitoring - actual Corporate centres formally monitor the relationships 
o f operating actors.
16 Formal monitoring - desired Corporate centres should formally monitor the 
relationships o f operating actors.
17 Punishment - actual Corporate centres punish actors to enforce policies on 
intragroup trading.
18 Reward - actual Corporate centres reward actors for intragroup 
trading.
19 Reward - desired Corporate centres should reward actors for intragroup 
trading.
20 Individual performance 
targets.




Individual measurement and reward systems are 
compatible with mandates on intragroup trading.
22 Comparisons - actual Corporate centres compare the performance o f  
individual operating actors.
23 Comparisons - desired Corporate centres should compare the performance of  
individual operating actors.
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24 Comparisons rivalry Comparisons of operating actors causes rivalry 
between them.
25 Centre information source Group companies seek information about each other 
through a central actor.
26 Information sharing 
encouragement
Corporate centres encourage operating actors to share 
information.
27 Openness - actual Group operating companies are open with each other.
28 Informal information 
networks
Group companies obtain information about each 
other through internal grapevines and informal 
information sources.
29 People transfer - actual Relationships between group companies are 
influenced by the movement of people between them.
30 People transfer - desired People should move between operating companies to 
enhance relationships.
31 Knowledge of trading 
performance
Group companies are knowledgeable of the trading 
performances of internal partners.
32 Knowledge strategic Group companies are knowledgeable of the strategies 
of their trading partners.
33 Knowledge cost & margins Group companies are knowledgeable of the costs and 
margins of internal partners.
34 Knowledge general Group companies are generally knowledgeable of the 
activities of their internal trading partners.
35 Business unit manager 
accountability
Corporate centres hold business unit managers 
responsible for relationships between their business 
units.
36 Business unit manager 
influence
Business unit managers are particularly important in 
setting the atmosphere of intragroup relationships.
37 Internal price collaboration Internal buyers collude to control prices from group 
suppliers.
38 Internal performance 
collaboration
Internal buyers share information on the performance 
of in house suppliers.
39 Trust between internal 
trading partners
Operating actors trust internal trading partners.
40 External customer mistrust External customers are mistrustful of a supplier in the 
same corporate group as one of their competitors.
41 External supplier mistrust External suppliers are mistrustful of a customer in the 
same corporate group as one of their competitors.
42 Internal customer sensitivity Group customers are sensitive over an internal 
supplier’s relationship with one of their competitors.
43 Internal supplier sensitivity Group suppliers are sensitive over an internal 
customer’s relationship with one of their competitors.
44 Group welfare over 
individual - actual
Group needs are put above individual needs.
46 Group welfare over 
individual - desired
Group needs should be put above individual needs.
47 External partners favoured 
over internal
Group companies favour external partners over 
internal.
48 Mandate opposition Operating actors seek to resist or circumvent a 
mandate they object to or dispute.
49 Seller mandate exploitation 
service
Group sellers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
compromising service.
50 Seller mandate exploitation 
quality
Group sellers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
compromising quality.
51 Buyer mandate exploitation 
price
Group buyers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
demanding lower prices.
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52 Buyer mandate exploitation 
service
Group buyers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
demanding higher levels of service.
53 Seller mandate exploitation 
general
Group sellers take internal trading partners for 
granted.
54 Seller favoured status Group sellers expect to have a favoured status when 
dealing with group customers.
55 External benchmarks Internal buyers are reluctant to source exclusively 
from in house companies because of the need for 
external benchmarks.
56 Internal seller commitment Group sellers need to work harder to satisfy internal 
customers.
57 Rivalry between actors Internal relationships are characterised by rivalry 
between actors.
58 Actor exposure & 
vulnerability
Individuals feel exposed and vulnerable in intragroup 
relationships.
59 Centre perception influence Group companies seek to influence the centre’s 
perception of each other.
60 Termination reticence Group companies are reluctant to terminate 
relationships with internal partners.
61 Centre termination 
disapproval
Termination of internal relationships would be 
disapproved of by a corporate centre.
62 Dispute intensity Internal relationships are characterised by high levels 
of dispute and argument.
63 Centre intervention 
reluctance
Corporate centres are reluctant to become involved in 
disputes between operating companies.
64 Centre intervention - desired Corporate centres should be involved in disputes 
between operating companies.
65 Internal relationships effort Internal relationships are disproportionately time 
consuming.
66 Co-operation - desired Internal actors should co-operate with each other.
67 Inferior trading partner 
mandate undesired
A corporate centre should not mandate a relationships 
with an inferior trading partner.
68 Openness - desired Group operating companies should be open with each 
other.
69 External customer priority Group sellers give priority to external customers over 
internal.
70 Buyer mandate exploitation 
general
Group buyers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
generally demanding increased commitment from 
internal suppliers.
71 Punishment - desired Corporate centres should punish operating companies 
to enforce intragroup trading.
73 Centre overview The centre takes an overview of the potential benefits 
of intragroup trading.
74 Seller mandate exploitation 
price
Group sellers exploit the existence of a mandate by 
charging higher prices.
77 Knowledge actual Group companies are generally knowledgeable of the 
activities and performance of internal trading 
partners.
78 Opportunism group sellers 
over buyers
Group sellers exploit the existence of a mandate in 
their internal relationships.
79 Opportunism group buyers 
over sellers




Sample Scoring for Respondent 1
No F ram e title S co res Total M entions M ean
F1 Trading ru les -  ac tual 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 -2  -2  -2  1 1 5 12 0.42
F2 Trading ru les • desired -1 1 0 2 0.00
F3 Trading ru les effec tiveness
F4 Trading en c o u ra g em e n t 1 1 1 1.00
F5 T ran sfe r ru les - ac tual -1 -2 -2 -5 3 -1 .67
F6 T ran sfe r ru les - des ired
F7 T ran sfe r ru les effec tiveness
F8 T ran sfe r e n co u ra g em e n t
F9 Culture ch a n g e 1 1 1 1.00
F10 M andate ch a n g e -1 2 2 2 2 2 9 6 1.50
F11 R ules interpretation d ifferences 2 1 2 .00
F12 R ules interpretation selectivity. 2 4 2 2 .00
F13 Lobbying 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 19 11 1.73
F14 C en tre  legitimacy 1 1 1 1.00
F15 Form al monitoring - ac tual -2 -2 -4 2 -2 .00
F16 Form al monitoring - des ired 1 1 2 2 1.00
F17 P u n ishm en t - ac tual -1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 0.67
F18 R ew ard  -  ac tual 1 1 1 1.00
F19 R ew ard  -  des ired
F20 Individual perfo rm ance ta rg e ts 2 4 2 2.00
F21 M easu rem en t/m an d a te  compatibility -1 -1 1 -1 .00
F22 C om parisons  - ac tual 2 1 2 .00
F23 C om parisons  - des ired -1 1 0 2 0 .00
F24 C om parisons  rivalry
F25 C en tre  inform ation so u rce 1 1 1 1.00
F26 Information sharing  en c o u ra g em e n t 2 2 1 2 .00
F27 O p e n n e s s  - ac tual -2 -2 1 -1 2 2
CMCMCM -6 13 -0 .46
F28 Informal inform ation netw orks
F30 P eo p le  tra n sfe r - des ired
F31 K now ledge of trading perfo rm ance 2 2 2 2 8 4 2 .00
F32 K now ledge stra teg ic
F33 K now ledge of c o s ts  & m argins 2 2 2 1 7 4 1.75
F34 K now ledge genera l 1 1 2 2 2 2 10 6 1.67
F35 B u sin ess  unit m a n ag e r accountability -2 -2 1 -2 .00
F36 B u sin ess  unit m a n ag e r influence 1 2 2 2 7 4 1.75
F37 Internal price collaboration 1 1 2 2 1.00
F38 Internal perfo rm ance collaboration 2 2 4 2 2 .00
F39 T rust be tw een  internal trading partners
F40 External cu s to m er m istrust. 2 2 2 2 8 4 2 .00
F41 External supplier m istrust
F42 Internal cu s to m er sensitivity 2 2 2 6 3 2.00
F43 Internal supplier sensitivity 1 1 2 4 3 1.33
F44 G roup w elfare over individual-actual -1 -1 -1 -3 3 -1 .00
F46 G roup w elfare over individual-desired 2 2 1 2 .00
F47 External pa rtn e rs  favoured  o ver internal 1 1 1 1.00
F48 M andate opposition 2 2 2 1 -2 -2 1 2 2 8 9 0.89
F49 S eller m a n d a te  exploitation serv ice -2 -2 1 -2 .00
F50 S eller m an d a te  exploitation quality 1 1 1 1.00
F51 B uyer m a n d a te  exploitation price 2 2 4 2 2.00
F52 B uyer m a n d a te  exploitation serv ice
F53 S eller m a n d a te  exploitation genera l 2 1 -1 2 3 0.67
F54 S eller favoured  s ta tu s 2 2 1 2 .00
F55 External benchm arks 2 2 1 2 .00
F56 Internal se ller com m itm ent
F57 Rivalry betw een  ac to rs 2 2 2 6 3 2.00
F58 E xposure  & vulnerability 1 1 1 2 5 4 1.25
F59 C en tre  perception  influence 2 2 4 2 2.00
F60 Term ination re ticence 2 2 2 -1 2 2 9 6 1.50
F61 C en tre  term ination d isapproval 2 2 4 2 2 .00
F62 D ispute intensity 1 1 1 1.00
F63 C en tre  intervention re luctance 2 2 4 2 2 .00
F64 C en tre  intervention - des ired 2 2 1 2 .00
F65 Internal relationships effort 1 2 2 5 3 1.67
F66 C o-operation  - desired . 2 2 2 2 2 10 5 2 .00
F67 Inferior trading p artn er - undesired .
F68 O p e n n e s s  -  des ired -2 -1 -3 2 -1 .50
F69 External cu s to m er priority 2 2 1 2 .00
F70 B uyer m an d a te  exploitation genera l 1 1 1 1.00
F71 P u n ishm en t - des ired
F73 C en tre  overview 1 -2 1 1 1 4 0 .25
F74 S eller m an d a te  exploitation price 2 2 1 2 .00
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Appendix 6
Statistical analysis - One sample t-test
S core range +2 to -2
N Total num ber of responden ts who recorded resp o n ses  in a  particular fram e.
M M ean of the  scores.
SD Standard  deviation of the scores.
O ne sam ple t-test Null hypothesis = The sam ple m ean for ea ch  fram e is equal to  0. 
Significance level = equal to  or le ss than 0.05 
A = No significant difference therefore accep t null hypothesis 
R = Significant difference therefore reject null hypothesis 
For further information s e e  page  54
No F ram e title Fram e description N M SD t-value 2-tail P
1 Trading rules - actual C orporate cen tres specify to  operating actors 
who they m ust by from or sell to.
40 -0.4 1.4 -1.79 0.082 A
2 Trading rules - desired C orporate cen tres should specify to 
operating actors w ho they  m ust buy from or 
sell to.
17 -0.2 1.5 -0.60 0.555 A
3 Trading rules effectiveness Trading rules en hance  co-operation betw een 
internal actors.
31 -1.6 0.4 -21.23 0.000 R
4 Trading encouragem ent Corporate cen tres encourage  internal business 
units to  co-operate.
37 1.8 0.4 31.75 0.000 R
5 Transfer rules - actual C orporate cen tres specify transfer rules to 
operating actors.
31 1.0 1.5 3.68 0.001 R
6 Transfer rules - desired Corporate cen tres should specify transfer 
rules to operating actors.
25 1.1 1.1 5.30 0.000 R
7 Transfer rules effectiveness Transfer rules a re  effective. 27 -1.0 0.8 -6.38 0.000 R
8 Transfer encouragem ent C orporate cen tres encourage th e  u se  of 
transfer rules by operating actors.
0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
9 Culture change New policies and m andates  a re  difficult to 
implement due to existing cultures and 
attitudes am ongst operating actors.
30 1.7 0.4 21.77 0.000 R
10 M andate change N ature of relationships chan g e  when 
m andates  a re  lifted.
35 1.2 1.1 6.89 0.000 R
11 Rules interpretation differences O perating ac tors p lace different interpretation 
and meaning on group policies on intragroup 
trading
28 1.2 1.2 5.49 0.000 R
12 Rules interpretation selectivity. Operating ac tors interpret m an d a tes  in te rm s 
m ost favourable to them selves.
17 1.5 1.0 6.11 0.000 R
13 Lobbying Operating actors seek  to  influence corporate 
cen tres to  change the term s of m andates in 
Iheir favour.
40 1.4 1.0 9.23 0.000 R
14 C entre legitimacy Corporate cen tres have th e  right to  im pose 
trading m andates over operating actors.
30 0.6 1.1 3.04 0.005 R
15 Formal monitoring - actual Corporate cen tres formally monitor the 
relationships of operating actors.
11 -0.3 1.7 -0.54 0.602 A
16
<
Formal monitoring - desired Corporate cen tres should formally monitor the 
relationships of operating actors.
35 -0.4 1.4 -1.82 0.078 A
17 P unishm ent - actual Corporate cen tres punish ac to rs to  enforce 
policies on intragroup trading.
28 -0.7 1.1 -3.31 0.003 R
18 Rew ard - actual Corporate cen tres reward ac to rs for 
intragroup trading.
14 0.7 0.9 2.99 0.010 R
19 Rew ard - desired Corporate cen tres should rew ard ac tors for 
intragroup trading.
11 1.1 1.0 3.48 0.006 R
20 Individual perform ance ta rgets O perating com panies a re  m easu red  against 
individual perform ance ta rgets .
32 2.0 0.3 41.67 0.000 R
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21 M easurem ent/m andate
compatibility.
Individual m easurem ent and rew ard system s 
a re  com patible with m andates  on intragroup 
trading.
35 -0.6 1.2 -2.69 0.011 R
22 C om parisons - actual Corporate cen tres com pare th e  perform ance 
of individual operating actors.
33 1.8 0.4 26.01 0.000 R
23 C om parisons - desired Corporate cen tres should com pare the 
perform ance of individual operating actors.
24 0.4 1.2 1.67 0.108 A
24 C om parisons rivalry Com parisons of operating ac to rs ca u ses  
rivalry betw een them .
12 0.5 1.3 1.19 0.261 A
25 C entre information source Group com panies seek  information about 
each  o ther through a  central actor.
35 0.4 1.3 1.70 0.098 A
26 Information sharing 
encouragem ent
Corporate cen tres encourage  operating 
actors to  sh are  information.
37 1.7 0.7 14.74 0.000 R
27 O p en n ess  - actual Group operating com panies a re  open with 
each  other.
39 -0.2 1.1 -1.32 0.194 A
28 Informal information networks Group com panies obtain information about 
each  o ther through internal grapevines and 
informal information sources.
37 1.5 1.1 7.77 0.000 R
30 P eople  transfer - desired P eople should move betw een operating 
com panies to  en hance  relationships.
26 1.8 0.3 27.71 0.000 R
31 Knowledge of trading 
perform ance
Group com panies a re  know ledgeable of the 
trading perform ance of internal partners.
25 1.8 0.4 24.04 0.000 R
32 Knowledge strategic Group com panies a re  know ledgeable of the 
strateg ies of their internal trading partners.
7 1.4 0.5 7.07 0.000 R
33 Knowledge costs  & m argins Group com panies a re  know ledgeable of the 
costs  and  margins of their internal partners.
12 1.3 0.9 4.75 0.001 R
34 Knowledge general Group com panies a re  generally know ledgeable 
of the activities of their internal trading partners.
9 1.7 0.6 9.10 0.000 R
35 B usiness unit m anager 
accountability
Corporate cen tres hold business  unit m anagers 
responsible for relationships betw een their 
business units.
37 0.4 1.6 1.47 0.150 A
36 B usiness unit m anager 
influence
Business unit m anagers a re  particularly 
important in setting th e  atm osphere of 
intragroup relationships.
34 1.5 0.6 16.03 0.000 R
37 Internal price collaboration Internal buyers collude to control prices from 
group suppliers.
37 0.2 1.3 0.88 0.382 A
38 Internal perform ance collaboration Internal buyers sh are  information on the 
perform ance of in house  suppliers.
38 1.3 1.0 8.33 0.000 R
39 Trust betw een internal trading 
partners
Operating ac tors trust internal trading partners. 13 -0.8 1.1 -2.60 0.023 R
40 External custom er mistrust. External custom ers a re  mistrustful of a  supplier 
in the  sam e  corporate group a s  one of their 
competitors.
39 1.2 0.9 7.97 0.000 R
41 External supplier mistrust External suppliers a re  mistrustful of a  custom er 
in the sam e  corporate group a s  one  of their 
com petitors.
34 0.8 1.1 4.26 0.000 R
42 Internal custom er sensitivity Group custom ers a re  sensitive over an  internal 
supplier's relationship with o n e  of their 
competitors.
33 0.9 1.0 5.42 0.000 R
43 Internal supplier sensitivity Group suppliers are  sensitive over an  internal 
custom er's relationship with o n e  of their 
com petitors.
32 1.4 0.7 11.53 0.000 R
44 G roup w elfare over individual - 
actual.
Group n ee d s  a re  put above individual needs. 35 -0.6 1.0 -3.56 0.001 R
46 G roup w elfare over individual - 
desired .
Group n ee d s  should be put above individual 
needs.
36 1.7 0.6 15.46 0.000 R
47 External partners favoured over 
internal
Group com panies favour external partners 
over internal.
18 1.7 0.5 15.69 0.000 R
48 M andate opposition Operating ac tors seek  to  resist or circumvent 
a  m andate they object to  or dispute.
34 1.4 0.6 14.14 0.000 R
49 S eller m andate  exploitation 
serv ice
Group sellers exploit the ex istence of a  
m andate by compromising service.
28 0.7 1.2 3.16 0.004 R
50 Seller m andate  exploitation 
quality
Group sellers exploit the  ex istence of a 
m andate by compromising quality.
32 0.9 1.2 4.19 0.000 R
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51 Buyer m andate  exploitation 
price
Group buyers exploit the ex istence of a  
m andate by dem anding lower prices.
16 0.7 1.5 1.74 0.103 A
52 Buyer m andate  exploitation 
service
Group buyers exploit th e  ex istence of a  
m andate by dem anding higher levels of 
service.
14 0.4 1.4 1.03 0.323 A
53 Seller m andate  exploitation 
genera l
Group sellers take internal partners for granted. 37 1.4 0.8 9.79 0.000 R
54 Seller favoured sta tus Group suppliers expect to  have  favoured 
status w hen dealing with group custom ers.
22 1.3 0.8 7.24 0.000 R
55 External benchm arks Internal buyers a re  reluctant to  source 
exclusively from in house  com panies b ecau se  
of the need  for external benchm arks.
24 1.4 0.8 8.01 0.000 R
56 Internal seller com mitment Group sellers need  to  work harder to 
satisfy internal custom ers.
13 2.0 0.0 N/A N/A
57 Rivalry betw een ac tors Internal relationships a re  characterised  by 
rivalry betw een individuals.
40 1.3 0.9 9.36 0.000 R
58 E xposure & vulnerability Individuals feel exposed  and vulnerable in 
intragroup relationships.
40 0.9 1.3 4.43 0.000 R
59 C entre perception influence Internal com panies seek  to  influence the 
cen tre 's  perception of each  other.
39 1.1 1.2 5.55 0.000 R
60 Termination reticence Group com panies a re  reluctant to term inate 
relationships with internal partners.
40 0.3 1.3 1.58 0.123 A
61 C entre termination disapproval Termination of internal relationships would be 
d isapproved of by a  corporate centre.
22 1.6 0.5 16.63 0.000 R
62 D ispute intensity Internal relationships a re  characterised  by 
high levels of dispute and  argum ent.
37 1.2 1.1 6.46 0.000 R
63 C entre intervention reluctance C orporate cen tres a re  reluctant to  becom e 
involved in d isputes betw een operating 
com panies.
34 1.1 1.2 5.23 0.000 R
64 C entre intervention - desired C orporate cen tres should be  involved in 
disputes betw een operating com panies.
28 0.4 1.3 1.83 0.078 A
65 Internal relationships effort Internal relationships a re  disproportionately 
time consuming.
37 1.3 1.1 7.45 0.000 R
66 Co-operation - desired. Internal ac tors should co-opera te  with each  
other.
32 1.9 0.3 34.54 0.000 R
67 Inferior trading partner undesired. A corporate centre  should not m andate a  
relationship with an  inferior trading partner.
25 1.5 0.7 11.55 0.000 R
68 O p en n ess  - desired Group operating com panies should be open 
with each  other.
26 1.5 0.7 9.98 0.000 R
69 External custom er priority Group sellers give higher priority to  external 
custom ers over internal.
17 1.4 0.6 9.35 0.000 R
70 Buyer m andate  exploitation 
genera l
Group buyers exploit the ex istence of a  
m andate by generally dem anding increased  
commitment from internal suppliers.
28 0.9 1.0 4.78 0.000 R
71 P unishm ent - desired C orporate cen tres should punish operating 
ac tors to  enforce intragroup trading.
6 1.3 0.4 8.00 0.000 R
73 C entre overview The centre  takes  an  over view of the potential 
benefits of intragroup trading.
20 0.4 1.4 1.39 0.180 A
74 Seller m andate  exploitation 
price
Group sellers exploit th e  ex istence of a  
m andate by charging higher prices.
17 1.0 0.9 4.55 0.000 R
77 Knowledge actual Group com panies a re  know ledgeable of the 
activities and perform ance of internal 
trading partners.
34 1.6 0.6 14.96 0.000 R
78 O pportunism  group sellers 
o ver buyers
Group suppliers exploit th e  ex istence of a  
m andate in their internal relationships.
40 1.1 0.7 9.68 0.000 R
79 O pportunism  group buyers 
o ver sellers
Group buyers exploit the ex istence of a  
m andate in their internal relationships.
38 0.8 1.0 5.18 0.000 R
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Appendix 7 
Statistical analysis - Mann-Whitney test
Score range +2 to -2
Type Type 1 = Agrifood respondents. Type 2 = Other respondents.
N Number of respondents who recorded responses in a  particular frame.
M Mean of the scores.
SD Standard deviation of the scores.
Mann-Whitney Null hypothesis = There is no difference between the distributions (i.e. respondent types 1 & 2 have similar views). 
Significance level = equal to or less than 0.05.
A= No significant difference therefore accept null hypothesis 
R = Significant difference therefore reject null hypothesis.
For further information se e  page 54.
No Fram e title Frame description Type N M SD Z-value 2-tail P
1 Trading rules - actual Corporate centres specify to operating actors 
who they must by from or sell to.
1 30 -0.2 1.4 -1.686 0.092 A
2 10 -1.1 1.0
2 Trading rules - desired Corporate centres should specify to 
operating actors who they must buy from or 
sell to.
1 15 -0.4 1.5 -1.066 0.286 A
2 2 1.0 0.0
3 Trading rules effectiveness Trading rules enhance co-operation between 
internal actors.
1 24 -1.6 0.4 -1.273 0.203 A
2 7 -1.8 0.4
4 Trading encouragem ent Corporate centres encourage internal business 
units to co-operate.
1 29 1.9 0.3 -1.252 0.211 A
2 8 1.6 0.5
5 Transfer rules - actual Corporate centres specify transfer rules to 
operating actors.
1 21 0.9 1.4 -0.394 0.694 A
2 10 1.1 1.6
6 Transfer rules - desired Corporate centres should specify transfer 
rules to operating actors.
1 19 1.0 1.2 -0.931 0.352 A
2 6 1.7 0.4
7 Transfer rules effectiveness Transfer rules are effective. 1 20 -1.2 0.6 -0.156 0.120 A
2 7 -0.6 1.2
8 Transfer encouragem ent Corporate centres encourage the use  of 
transfer rules by operating actors.
1 0 N/A N/A
2 0
9 Culture change New policies and m andates are  difficult to 
implement due to existing cultures and 
attitudes am onqst operatinq actors.
1 23 1.7 0.4 -0.444 0.657 A
2 7 1.6 0.6
10 M andate change Nature of relationships change when 
m andates are  lifted.
1 27 1.5 0.8 -2.332 0.020 R
2 8 0.3 1.4
11 Rules interpretation differences Operating actors place different interpretation 
and meaning on group policies on intragroup 
tradinq
1 21 1.2 1.1 -0.318 0.750 A
2 7 1.2 1.5
12 Rules interpretation selectivity. Operating actors interpret m andates in terms 
most favourable to themselves.
1 12 1.7 0.5 -1.071 0.284 A
2 5 0.9 1.7
13 Lobbying Operating actors seek  to influence corporate 
centres to change the terms of m andates in 
their favour.
1 30 1.3 1.0 -0.970 0.332 A
2 10 1.6 0.8
14 Centre legitimacy Corporate centres have the right to im pose 
trading m andates over operating actors.
1 22 0.7 1.1 -0.694 0.487 A
2 8 0.3 1.3
15 Formal monitoring - actual Corporate centres formally monitor the 
relationships of operating actors.
1 8  -0.3 1.7 -0.107 0.915 A
2 3 -0.3 2.1
16 Formal monitoring - desired Corporate centres should formally monitor the 
relationships of operating actors.
1 27 -0.5 1.5 -0.663 0.507 A
2 8 -0.3 1.4
17 Punishm ent - actual Corporate centres punish actors to enforce 
policies on intragroup trading.
1 23 -0.7 1.1 -0.549 0.583 A
2 5 -0.9 1.2
18 Reward - actual Corporate centres reward actors for 
intragroup trading.
1 14 0.7 0.9 N/A N/A
2 0
19 Reward - desired Corporate centres should reward actors for 
intragroup trading.
1 10 1.3 0.9 -1.289 0.198 A
2 1 -0.7
20 Individual performance targets Operating com panies are  m easured against 
individual performance targets.
1 23 2.0 0.0 -1.599 0.110 A
2 9 1.8 0.5
253
21 M easurem ent/m andate
compatibility.
Individual m easurem ent and reward system s 
are compatible with m andates on intragroup 
trading.
1 27 -0.4 1.3 -1.486 0.137 A
2 8 -1.1 1.0
22 Com parisons - actual Corporate centres com pare the performance 
of individual operating actors.
1 25 1.8 0.4 -0.312 0.755 A
2 8 1.8 0.5
23 Com parisons - desired Corporate centres should com pare the 
performance of individual operating actors.
1 19 0.1 1.2 -2.415 0.016 R
2 5 1.6 0.5
24 Comparisons rivalry Comparisons of operating actors causes  
rivalry between them.
1 8 0.1 1.5 -1.329 0.184 A
2 4 1.3 0.5
25 Centre information source Group com panies seek  information about 
each other through a central actor.
1 27 0.6 1.3 -0.219 0.029 R
2 8 -0.4 1.1
26 Information sharing 
encouragem ent
Corporate centres encourage operating 
actors to share information.
1 28 1.7 0.8 -0.714 0.476 A
2 9 1.8 0.4
27 O penness - actual Group operating com panies are open with 
each other.
1 29 -0.6 0.9 -3.517 0.000 R
2 10 0.9 0.9
28 Informal information networks Group com panies obtain information about 
each other through internal grapevines and 
informal information sources.
1 27 1.7 0.5 -1.101 0.271 A
2 10 0.8 1.9
30 People transfer - desired People should move between operating 
com panies to enhance relationships.
1 19 1.8 0.3 -0.295 0.768 A
2 7 1.9 0.4
31 Knowledge of trading 
performance
Group com panies are knowledgeable of the 
trading performance of internal partners.
1 18 1.8 0.4 -1.522 0.128 A
2 7 2.0 0.0
32 Knowledge strategic Group com panies are knowledgeable of the 
strategies of their internal trading partners.
1 6 1.3 0.5 -1.155 0.248 A
2 1 2.0
33 Knowledge costs & margins Group com panies are knowledgeable of the 
costs and margins of their internal partners.
1 10 1.3 1.0 -0.112 0.911 A
2 2 1.3 1.1
34 Knowledge general Group com panies are generally knowledgeable 
of the activities of their internal trading partners.
1 6 1.5 0.6 -1.381 0.167 A
2 3 2.0 0.0
35 B usiness unit m anager 
accountability
Corporate centres hold business unit m anagers 
responsible for relationships between their 
business units.
1 27 0.4 1.7 -0.106 0.915 A
2 10 0.5 1.4
36 B usiness unit m anager 
influence
Business unit m anagers are particularly 
important in setting the atm osphere of 
intragroup relationships.
1 25 1.6 0.5 -0.772 0.440 A
2 9 1.4 0.7
37 Internal price collaboration Internal buyers collude to control prices from 
group suppliers.
1 29 0.2 1.3 -0.094 0.925 A
2 8 0.0 1.7
38 Internal performance collaboration Internal buyers share information on the 
performance of in house suppliers.
1 28 1.3 0.9 -0.304 0.762 A
2 10 1.3 1.3
39 Trust between internal trading 
partners
Operating actors trust internal trading partners. 1 11 -1.1 0.8 -1.220 0.223 A
2 2 0.5 2.1
40 External custom er mistrust. External custom ers are mistrustful of a  supplier 
in the sam e corporate group a s  one of their 
competitors.
1 29 1.3 0.7 -0.567 0.571 A
2 10 0.9 1.4
41 External supplier mistrust External suppliers are mistrustful of a  custom er 
in the sam e corporate group a s  one of their 
competitors.
1 27 0.8 1.0 -0.108 0.914 A
2 7 0.7 1.3
42 internal custom er sensitivity Group custom ers are sensitive over an internal 
supplier's relationship with one of their 
competitors.
1 24 1.0 1.0 -0.817 0.414 A
2 9 0.7 1.1
43 Internal supplier sensitivity Group suppliers are sensitive over an internal 
custom er's relationship with one of their 
competitors.
1 25 1.4 0.7 -0.560 0.576 A
2 7 1.4 0.4
44 Group welfare over individual - 
actual.
Group needs are put above individual needs. 1 25 -0.9 0.7 -1.807 0.071 A
2 10 0.0 1.4
46 Group welfare over individual - 
desired.
Group needs should be put above individual 
needs.
1 26 1.7 0.7 -0.123 0.902 A
2 10 1.7 0.6
47 External partners favoured over 
ntemal
Group com panies favour external partners 
over internal.
1 17 1.7 0.5 -0.699 0.485 A
2 1 2.0
48 Mandate opposition Operating actors seek  to resist or circumvent 
a  m andate they object to or dispute.
1 26 1.5 0.6 -1.903 0.057 A
2 8 1.2 0.3
49 Seller m andate exploitation 
service
Group sellers exploit the existence of a  
m andate by compromising service.
1 20 0.8 1.2 -1.249 0.212 A
2 8 0.5 1.2
50 Seller m andate exploitation 
quality
Group sellers exploit the existence of a 
m andate by compromising quality.
1 23 1.0 1.2 -0.704 0.481 A
2 9 0.7 1.3
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51 Buyer m andate exploitation 
price
Group buyers exploit the existence of a  
mandate by demanding lower prices.
1 13 1.0 1.5 -0.111 0.077 A
2 3 -0.7 1.2
52 Buyer m andate exploitation 
service
Group buyers exploit the existence of a  
m andate by dem anding higher levels of 
service.
1 10 ‘ 0.3 1.5 -0.502 0.616 A
2 4 0.6 1.4
53 Seller m andate exploitation 
general
Group sellers take internal partners for granted. 1 28 1.5 0.6 -1.414 0.157 A
2 9 0.8 1.3
54 Seller favoured status Group suppliers expect to have favoured 
status when dealing with group custom ers.
1 18 1.4 0.8 -0.538 0.590 A
2 4 1.0 1.2
55 External benchmarks Internal buyers are reluctant to source 
exclusively from in house com panies because 
of the need for external benchmarks.
1 19 1.2 0.9 -2.606 0.009 R
2 5 2.0 0.0
56 Internal seller commitment Group sellers need to work harder to 
satisfy internal customers.
1 10 2.0 0.0 0.000 1.000 A
2 3 2.0 0.0
57 Rivalry between actors Internal relationships are characterised by 
rivalry between individuals.
1 30 1.5 0.8 0.036 0.026 R
2 10 0.8 1.0
58 Exposure & vulnerability Individuals feel exposed and vulnerable in 
intragroup relationships.
1 30 1.0 1.3 -1.050 0.294 A
2 10 0.5 1.4
59 Centre perception influence Internal com panies seek  to influence the 
centre's perception of each  other.
1 30 1.3 1.0 -2.126 0.034 R
2 9 0.3 1.4
60 Termination reticence Group com panies are reluctant to terminate 
relationships with internal partners.
1 30 0.4 1.2 -0.252 0.801 A
2 10 0.2 1.6
61 Centre termination disapproval Termination of internal relationships would be 
disapproved of by a  corporate centre.
1 16 1.6 0.5 -0.120 0.904 A
2 6 1.6 0.5
62 Dispute intensity Internal relationships are characterised by 
high levels of dispute and argument.
1 27 1.3 0.7 -0.248 0.804 A
2 10 0.8 1.7
63 Centre intervention reluctance Corporate centres are  reluctant to becom e 
involved in disputes between operating 
com panies.
1 25 1.2 1.0 -0.596 0.551 A
2 9 0.7 1.6
64 Centre intervention - desired Corporate centres should be involved in 
disputes between operating com panies.
1 23 0.4 1.4 -0.061 0.916 A
2 5 0.6 1.0
65 Internal relationships effort Internal relationships are disproportionately 
time consuming.
1 28 1.3 1.0 -1.056 0.291 A
2 9 1.4 1.3
66 Co-operation - desired. Internal actors should co-operate with each 
other.
1 24 1.9 0.3 -1.323 0.186 A
2 8 1.8 0.3
67 Inferior trading partner undesired. A corporate centre should not m andate a  
relationship with an inferior trading partner.
T  20 1.5 0.7 -0.286 0.775 A 
2 5 1.6 0.5
68 O penness - desired Group operating com panies should be open 
with each other.
1 20 1.4 0.8 -1.548 0.122 A
2 6 1.8 0.4
69 External custom er priority Group sellers give higherpriority to external 
custom ers over internal.
1 14 1.5 0.6 -1.957 0.051 A
2 3 0.8 0.3
70 Buyer m andate exploitation 
general
Group buyers exploit the existence of a 
m andate by generally demanding increased 
commitment from internal suppliers.
1 20 1.0 1.0 -1.545 0.122 A
2 8 0.6 0.9
71 Punishm ent - desired Corporate centres should punish operating 
actors to enforce intragroup trading.
1 4 1.5 0.4 -1.500 0.134 A
2 2 1.0 0.0
73 Centre overview The centre takes an over view of the potential 
benefits of intragroup trading.
1 16 0.3 1.3 -0.809 0.419 A
2 4 0.8 1.9
74 Seller m andate exploitation 
price
Group sellers exploit the existence of a  
m andate by charging higher prices.
1 13 0.9 0.9 -0.709 0.478 A
2 4 1.3 0.8
77 Knowledge actual Group com panies are knowledgeable of the 
activities and performance of internal 
trading partners.
1 25 1.4 0.7 -2.492 0.013 R
2 9 1.9 0.3
78 Opportunism group sellers 
over buyers
Group suppliers exploit the existence of a 
m andate in their internal relationships.
1 30 1.2 0.5 -1.206 0.228 A
2 10 0.7 1.1
79 Opportunism group buyers 
over sellers
Group buyers exploit the existence of a 
m andate in their internal relationships.
1 29 0.9 1.1 -1.242 0.214 A
2 9 0.7 0.7
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